Rethinking Representation, Citizenship and Identity : Toward a Radical Pluralism

Samuel Hayat

▶ **To cite this version:**

Samuel Hayat. Rethinking Representation, Citizenship and Identity : Toward a Radical Pluralism. Jan Harald Alnes; Manuel Toscano. Varieties of Liberalism : Contemporary Callenges, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp.130-149, 2014, 978-1-4438-5812-0. hal-01508294

HAL Id: hal-01508294
https://hal.parisnanterre.fr/hal-01508294v1

Submitted on 10 Jun 2022

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

POSTPRINT. Publié dans Manuel Toscano and Jan Harald Alnes (ed.), *Varieties of Liberalism: Contemporary Challenges*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, p. 130-149

Rethinking representation, citizenship and identity: towards a radical pluralism

Liberalism –as an ideology centred on the achievement of collective and individual freedom– is in crisis. While it has been a movement that allowed the progress of liberties and drew a path towards emancipation, it seems unable to face the political and economic challenges of the 21st century. In many countries and for many people, liberalism no longer symbolises the struggle for emancipation, but the rule of bankers, billionaires and corrupted leaders. The aim of this paper is to conceptualise an alternative ideology that would share the emancipating goals of liberalism, but not its more dubious features. In order to do so, I will first use a genealogical approach: liberalism has not always been linked with capitalism, oligarchy and State oppression. Thus it is possible to use contemporary critiques of liberalism to identify the most questionable aspects of this ideology, and then look through its history to determine when these aspects have become key features of liberalism. By studying the controversies that took place inside the liberal movement when liberalism integrated these features, we will be able to see what alternatives were proposed. It will then be possible to use an ideal-type approach to construct an ideology by drawing on these alternatives.

As a preamble, we therefore have to determine the main features of liberalism that are currently criticised (Mouffe 1992). Contemporary liberalism is based on the principle that society is formed by autonomous individuals; radical critics point out that the focus on individuals masks the relations of power and domination between social forces and the inequalities that result, which make the idea of individual autonomy a lie (Connolly 1991; McClure 1992). Contemporary liberalism has developed in democracies with sovereign national assemblies as the unique sources of legislative rule; radical critics show that nation-states are no longer the primary political actors and that national laws have become subordinated to the decisions of transnational unelected bodies (Colliot-Thélène 2011). Contemporary liberalism uses nation-based processes of representation to link the leaders and their constituencies; radical critics argue that representation produces apathy and that people no longer trust their elected leaders (Barber 1984). Three core principles of liberalism –the autonomy of individuals, sovereign national assemblies, and representation– appear at the centre of contemporary critiques.

However, as we said, liberalism has a history (Leonhard 2001), and liberals have not always been univocally in favour of individualism, parliamentarism and representation. It is

especially true in a country where debates about liberalism and liberal principles have always been vivid: France. During the first decades of the French liberal movement, these principles were deeply contentious, and some self-identified liberals argued that citizenship should take into account the social identities of individuals, sovereignty should not be monopolised by national assemblies, and representation should not lead to the political exclusion of citizens between two elections. If we look at the controversies that took place in the French liberal movement from the 1820's to the 1840's, we can clearly distinguish between two positions. The first, which I shall call "conservative liberalism", was deeply unitary –a single kind of citizenship, a single sovereign body, a single procedure of representation– and has historically prevailed. But another ideology can be reconstructed through the studies of these controversies; since it is profoundly pluralistic –multiple aspects of citizenship being represented through different procedures in different institutions–, we can it call "radical pluralism" –a concept already used by some proponents of radical democracy, which I use here in a slightly different sense (Wenman 2003).

My hypothesis is that radical pluralism, as an ideal-type built through the study of controversies that took place in the French early liberal movement, could constitute a preferable alternative to liberalism –an ideology that would aim at freedom without resorting to the principles that led liberalism to its contemporary failure. In order to conceptualise radical pluralism, I will first turn to the history of liberalism in France in the first half of the 19th century. I will show that liberalism was then a broad political movement, in which controversies led to the emergence of what we can call radical pluralism. I will then consider the institutional devices that were set up during the Revolution of 1848 in France, as an embodiment of radical pluralist principles, and thus as a way for us to specify radical pluralism as an ideal-type. Finally, I will show how we can use this ideal-type as a guide to analyse several contemporary devices and experimentations that can be linked with radical pluralism, and thus constitute the basis for a political alternative to liberalism.

Pluralism in the history of liberalism in 19th century France

In France, during the first part of 19th century, liberalism was a political movement, organised around newspapers and associations, united by some common intellectual and historical references, but also divided in matters of political strategy (Jardin 1985; Girard

1985; Jaume 1997; Jennings 2011). It was a party, the *parti libéral*, in the loose sense this word had at that time (Huard 1996). As such, it developed liberalism as a political project more than as moral philosophy. Liberals were united by a common opposition to the "ultra-royalists" that came to power in the beginning of the 1820s and intended to bring France back to the *Ancien Régime*. Thus, early liberalism in France was defined by a single principle: the attachment to the realisations of the 1789 Revolution, i.e., the equalisation of civil conditions, the abolition of the *Ancien Régime*, and the promotion of a very simple and negative concept of liberty: citizens should be equally free in the limits of the law (Berlin 1969). As we can see, this conception of liberalism shares some important features with what moral and political philosophers now call liberalism. But some questions were not solved inside the early French liberal movement: what interpretations should be given to the principles of 1789? There were tensions and controversies about the way freedom and equality were to be realised (B. Williams 1962). Every liberal agreed that individuals should be equal, but what did it entail? Should a proper liberal regime take into account the differences, as a problem to correct or as diversity to cherish? Every liberal agreed that citizens should be represented (Manin 1996), but by which institutions, and should the representation be exclusive –i.e. exclude citizens from direct political participation between two elections– or inclusive –i.e. promote direct participation of the constituents (Hayat 2011; 2013)? Should the individuals be face to face with the State, or should intermediary bodies be recognised, and in that case, what relation should exist between them and the State (Rosanvallon 2002; Rosanvallon 2004)?

All these questions gave birth to several controversies during the first decades of the French liberal movement. For this reason, I will use the French example to construct radical pluralism as an ideal-type that can be opposed to conservative liberalism. While the French early liberal movement cannot be said to be similar to other kinds of liberalism –especially British liberalism–, the controversies that took place can give us a basis to build a conceptual distinction between conservative liberalism and radical pluralism. These controversies really started when liberals were faced with an important political challenge: the accession to political power after the Revolution of 1830 (Pinkney 1972; Pilbeam 1991). For the first time, the ideological ambiguities inside the liberal party were revealed. An important question that arose and profoundly divided liberals was the question of the place of the workers in a liberal regime. Indeed, they had played a crucial part in the success of the insurrection of July 1830, and they began to present claims. Among these claims, one in particular was difficult for liberals to correctly address: the possibility for workers to organise, create associations, and

negotiate common rates (*tarifs*) with merchants (Sewell 1980). On the one hand, it seemed entirely compatible with liberalism: on what ground should the State refuse the citizens the right to free association? But on the other hand, it went against the principle of free trade and the revolutionary Le Chapelier law that prohibited corporations and trade associations (Kaplan and Minard 2004). The liberals in power decided to forbid the workers the right to associate and thus to exist as a social group. Following the *doctrinaires*, especially Guizot, they considered that only society, as a free collection of individuals, and the State, as the only locus of power, should have a legal existence, and that they should be linked solely through the mechanism of representation –excluding citizens from direct political participation between elections (Rosanvallon 1985). As a result, this issue became central for more radical liberals who soon called themselves republicans or radicals. As part of their political agenda they established the right for workers to associate and improve their situation –along with the extension of the electoral franchise to all male citizens (Pilbeam 1995).

Thus, the ideology of radicals coincided with some features of the workers' corporative traditions, inherited from the *Ancien Régime* but deeply transformed by the revolutions of 1789 and 1830. Between 1831 and 1834, there were multiple hybridisations of political radicalism and working-class traditions, most notably in the republican associations that were aimed specifically at the workers, such as the *Société des Droits de l'Homme*. As a result, a new ideology emerged, distinct from conservative liberalism defended by Guizot and the liberals in power. Undoubtedly, it was linked with liberalism, since it relied on the interpretation of the principles that had been at the core of the liberal party, i.e., the principles of the 1789 Revolution. But this new ideology considered society, the State, and their relations in a new manner. First, society could not be conceived as a mere collection of individual citizens: citizens were members of social groups, and these social groups were illegitimately unequal in society. Even if the 1789 Revolution had abolished the privileges, a new aristocracy had appeared –the bourgeoisie– and a new *Tiers-Etat* –the proletariat– two classes bound to fight. As it was written in an article from the working-class journal *L'Echo de la Fabrique, journal industriel et littéraire de Lyon*, on June 9th 1833, "if prompt mediation were not to take place between the bourgeois aristocracy and the proletariat […], the same existing struggle would necessarily take place between them as it did fifty years ago between nobles and commoners". Even if individuals were supposed to be granted civil equality, a new lower class, the proletariat, remained submitted to the rule of a bourgeois aristocracy, which should be abolished (Rancière and Faure 2007). Therefore society should not be conceived as

a collection of individuals, but also as the place where classes with different interests oppose. As a result, specific mechanisms of representation should be set up to guarantee the lower classes a political voice inside the institutions of the State –as it was argued, for example, by the saint-simonian Jean Reynaud in a 1832 pamphlet, "The necessity of a special representation for proletarians"– or through a specific organization that could represent all the different trades –as advocated, for example, by the shoemaker Efrahem in 1833 in the pamphlet "The association of the workers of all trades".

This had important consequences on the liberal and radical conception of citizenship, identity, and representation. For conservative liberals, citizenship was defined only through a common national identity, and society should be represented as a whole. For this reason, census suffrage was not seen as incompatible with conservative liberalism: since the State has to represent a unified society, society could be said to delegate the electoral function to the more able, i.e. the rich (Rosanvallon 1992). Since there was a unique general interest in society, it was not a problem to make the rich responsible for enforcing it. For radicals defending the cause of the workers, the situation was very different. Citizenship relied on the combination of two distinct identities: a national identity and a socio-economic one. Belonging to the bourgeoisie or the working class did not solely determine an economic status; it also went with different political rights. Their political specificity was illustrated by both their exclusion from the suffrage by conservative liberals and by their claim for a specific representation, supported by radicals. As a result, since citizenship had some socio-economic aspect, the rich could not be said to fully represent the poor, because part of the political identity of the poor came from belonging to a specific community with special interests. It that sense, for radicals, the plurality of identities should go with an institutionalised plurality of representation. Maybe this plurality should come to an end when the proletariat disappears, but until then it was a necessity.

So after 1830, liberalism –as a political movement opposed to ultra-royalism and defending the principles of the 1789 Revolution– became separated into two trends: conservative liberalism and what we can call radical pluralism. Both trends were based on two different interpretations of liberal principles, especially concerning the specific situation of the working class. This dichotomy echoed a secular issue: the role of intermediary bodies. The common opposition between French liberalism (supposed to come from Montesquieu) and republicanism (borrowing from Rousseau) is profoundly misleading here: according to this false dichotomy, liberals should be in favour of intermediary bodies, and left-wing

republicans oppose them (Dijn 2005). But in 1830, conservative liberals in power were the ones who opposed the legal existence of intermediary bodies –here, the association of workers–, whereas radicals and republicans claimed the recognition of the specific political identity of the working class, and the necessity for a specific representation.

The reason for the discrepancy between our vocabulary and that of the political ideologies of that time is to be found in the history of the liberal party during the 19th century, and particularly, in its relation with the working class. The Revolution of 1830 had divided the liberal party between conservative and radicals –the former being opposed to pluralism and the latter defending it. But it is only with the Revolution of 1848 that this radical pluralism really came into existence, since its promoters became the prominent political force, at least in Paris. Indeed, the Revolution of 1848 empowered radicals and a new political system was organised, the Republic, considered as an alternative to liberal representative government. Through the description of the institutions that then appeared, we can hope to grasp an example of how radical pluralism could be embodied.

The revolutionary institutions of 1848 as an ideal-type of radical pluralism

The French Revolution of 1848 was largely made against some prominent features of conservative liberalism, as they were institutionalised during the July monarchy: forms of representation that excluded the vast majority of the citizens from political activity, strict limitation of the press and association, incapacity to deal with rising unemployment and permanent poverty. As a result, contrary to what had happened in 1830, one of the first decisions of the newly appointed Provisional Government was to dissolve the representative institutions, the Assembly and the Chamber of Peers, and to call for the election of a constituent Assembly (Agulhon 2002). However, this invalidation of the institutions of representative government did not lead to the disappearance of the vocabulary of political representation. On the contrary, the idea rapidly spread that every authority should be democratically elected, and thus that the logic of political representation should extend far beyond legislative institutions. In the first few weeks of the new regime, the procedure of democratic election was imposed (by the government or by revolutionaries themselves) in the National Guard, in the hundreds of clubs that were rapidly spreading, in the national

workshops that were set by the government… Discussions took place about applying the electoral rule to just about every social function (the judges, the Arts Academy, etc.).

As a result, no institution could claim to be the unique real authority appointed by the people: there was a plurality of duly elected institutions, each of them authorised by the (male) citizens, so each of them could have a say in the public decisions. But while these different institutions could be said to be representative institutions, they were not exactly representing the same aspect of society. They were all representing the people, but seen through a different lens. The Provisional Government (and the constituent Assembly after its installation on May 4th) embodied the nation as a community governed by a common law; the officers of the National Guard represented the people in arms, the citizens-fighters who enforced order in their city by themselves (Hincker 2007); the elected leaders of clubs –and even more so the elected leaders of the federations of clubs– represented the deliberating citizens, engaged in the public sphere to discuss the common good and to watch the government (Amann 1975; Hayat 2012). Thus this plural representation went along with a plural conception of citizenship: being a citizen could not be summed up by being subject to national law or by having the right to vote. Being a citizen, in 1848, meant being composed of different political identities, each of them embodied in a different elected institution. Plural representation was the result of the revolutionary process, but it did not come from nowhere: it was deeply linked with radical liberalism. The former members of the opposition to conservative liberalism were now part of the political process, whether directly in the Provisional Government or as elected officers of the National Guard, the national workshops, the clubs, etc. Under the renewed idea of republicanism, radical pluralism was spreading, giving birth to an unprecedented pluralist system of representation.

Among the new representative institutions, one of them was particularly revealing: the *Commission de gouvernement pour les travailleurs*, or Luxembourg Commission (Bruand 2006). This commission was nominated to satisfy the claims of the Parisian workers, who had been at the core of the successful insurrection, and who asked for solutions to what was called the "social problem", i.e., unemployment, poverty, submission to capitalists and merchants, uncontrolled mechanisation, etc. At the head of the Luxembourg Commission were placed the two more radical members of the Provisional Government: Louis Blanc, a famous socialist, and Albert, a worker that had been very active in secret societies under the July monarchy. This Commission was composed of elected delegates from the different trades. As such, it was a real Parliament of the workers. Moreover, it was headquartered in the Luxembourg

Palace (the former Chamber of Peers), a symbolic choice that put the representatives of the workers at the highest position. The initial mandate of the Commission was to come up with a plan to reform the economy and to solve the social problem, but it also played an important role in implementing the reduction of hour rates and in solving conflicts between workers and employers. In his famous analysis of the 1848 Revolution, Karl Marx mocked this "socialist synagogue" as a powerless institution, but he missed a very important fact. Despite its lack of real coercive power, the mere existence of the Luxembourg Commission stated that in a Republic, work could and should have a special representation, that citizens were not only defined by their affiliation to a national community, but also by their class. While the Luxembourg Commission itself was short-lived, in April its members created a working-class electoral committee that played an important role in the politicisation of the Parisian workers. The repression of the insurrection of June 1848 prevented this institutional attempt to represent the working class from becoming perennial, but it remained a fascinating herald of trade unionism in France (Gossez 1968).

So there was a highly pluralist institutional system in France during the first months of the Second Republic. Several institutions coexisted, each of them representing a different aspect of citizenship and a different identity of constituents. Whereas conservative liberalism considered a unified society, composed of monadic individuals, radical pluralism took into account the inner diversity of the selves and the different social roles individuals had to adopt in their public life (Baker 2003). Instead of a drawing a unique frontier between politics and private business –characteristic of conservative liberalism (see for example Constant's famous discourse on the Liberty of the Moderns)– this plural system of representation was founded on a multiplicity of political activities, related to different aspects of social life. The problem of this pluralism was to determine, in case of conflict, which representative institution should have the upper hand, the last word. In a unitary system of representation, the answer was simple: the political legitimacy resided entirely in a single political authority, for example the Parliament. But when several institutions were elected, each of them could invoke the people's sovereignty to legitimise its choices. In 1848, this problem of coordination was never resolved, even if the appeal to the people, for example through demonstrations as the one that took place on March 17th, could have constituted a solution in accordance with popular sovereignty (Robert 1996). Indeed, the plural system of representation, attempted during the first months of the Republic, soon became invalidated by the progressive prominence of the newly elected constituent Assembly. Even though its original mandate was only to draft a new

Constitution, this Assembly soon acted as the sole legislative authority, and its deputies (who were mostly conservatives) worked towards the annihilation of the revolutionary conquests of February. On the occasion of the events of April 16th (an unsuccessful workers' demonstration), May 15th (a failed invasion of the Assembly) and June 23-26th (an unsuccessful workers' insurrection), deputies progressively restored an order founded on the principles of conservative liberalism. During the constituent process, which ended with the vote of the Constitution in November 1848, republicanism was redefined as a new version of conservative liberalism, based on popular sovereignty through universal male suffrage, and the possibility of radical pluralism was rejected as a danger for society, assimilated with socialism (Coutant 2009).

So the Revolution of 1848 inaugurated a pluralist regime, based on the principles developed by radicals and workers under the July monarchy, but it was short-lived. After a few months, conservative liberalism became hegemonic again, under a republican form, soon to be replaced by a so-called liberal Empire after Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte's *coup d'état* in December 1851. Undoubtedly, the plural representative system of early 1848 was unstable and lacked mechanisms to solve the conflict between representative institutions. However, it was the incarnation of a new ideology, based on an alternative interpretation of the liberal principles of 1789, and its main features could be used to define an radical pluralist regime, broadening the ideal-type of radical pluralism.

Contemporary experimentations in radical pluralism

After 1848, radical pluralism can be said to disappear in France. Through diverse regimes, French political culture established itself as mostly unitary. During the Third Republic, the revolutionary tradition was re-written to fit this unitary spirit, erasing the pluralist aspects of Jacobinism, radicalism, early republicanism and early socialism. It has only been recently, in the 1980s, with decentralisation (Defferre Laws), democratisation of the work place (Auroux Laws), and the progressive transformation of European Union into a political authority, that the unitary political culture started to be challenged. However, this pluralist tradition was never entirely erased in France. Moreover, in other countries, liberalism had taken other paths, and some pluralist aspects could be found, even if the radical pluralism I want to conceptualise here, based on the plurality of both identities and representative institutions,

remained scarce. It is thus possible to use the radical pluralism of the early French liberal movement and the plural institutions of the 1848 Republic as an ideal-type, from which it is possible to consider different situations, in order to identify current political devices that can be described as forms of radical pluralism. We would end up drawing from diverse elements in order to invent an alternative ideology to conservative liberalism that could face contemporary political challenges.

In order to outline this ideology, it is first necessary to clearly distinguish radical pluralism from other forms of pluralism. Its specificity is that it should be based on a triple plurality: the identities that are considered politically relevant, the procedures of representation, and the political institutions that represent those identities. As such, it is distinct from most incarnations of group representation, descriptive representation, or politics of presence (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Young 2000; M. S. Williams 2000). Indeed, while these forms of political inclusion of dominated social groups, especially women, clearly are related to the recognition of the plurality of identities in society, they mostly consider this inclusion through the means of representation inside a unitary political system –in parliamentary regimes and inside legislative assemblies. Radical pluralism is also distinct from polyarchy (Dahl 1971) or constitutional mechanisms of separation of power (Elster and Slagstad 1988), which rely on plural institutions, but are based on a unitary conception of citizenship and are primarily focused on the elites and designed to limit the power of the people. There are exceptions, though, which should not be minimised. For example, there are some links between radical pluralism and the dualist interpretation of the Constitution as an incarnation of popular sovereignty during constitutional periods, which can be represented by a specific body –for example the American Supreme Court– vested with the power to overthrow legislations passed by the Congress, which also represents the people, but the people of "normal" times (Ackerman 1993). Similarly, many feminist theorists and activists have thought of ways to radically transform representative institutions by the inclusion of a gender perspective (Benhabib 1996; Cornwall and Goetz 2005; Mackay 2008; Squires 2008). So the frontier between radical pluralism and constitutionalism or group representation is not hermetic. But for analytical purposes, we can say that radical pluralism, as an ideal-type, requires a deeper commitment to both identity and institutional pluralism. Radical pluralism should also be distinguished from the forms of pluralism that are opposed to liberal goals. For example, totalitarian or authoritative regimes that rely on the massive enrolment of citizens in a unique party often institutionalise a dualist system: the official political institutions, and the

authorities of the party (Arendt 1951). While there is a plurality of institutions (State and party) that rely on a plurality of identities (citizens are represented both as members of the national community and as party members), it would be misleading to include these institutional setups as incarnations of radical pluralism, since our aim is to conceptualise an alternative ideology that would share with liberalism its basic aims –individual and collective freedom. That being said, it is possible to single out three traditions that we can relate to radical pluralism, as they pursue liberal goals and rely on a pluralisation of identities and representative institutions.

The first tradition can be found in the labour movement, through trade unionism and forms of socialism that rely on the association of workers (Kelly 1988). While this tradition is clearly more developed in Britain, in Germany or in Northern countries (Hyman 2001), it is not absent from French socialism and trade unionism (Rosanvallon 1987). Indeed, after the Revolution of 1848, when the majority of republican deputies preferred to adapt conservative liberalism to popular sovereignty, a new tradition grew inside labour and socialist movements. Drawing on the idea of association developed under the July monarchy and on the achievements made during the early months of the Second Republic, this tradition attempted to define socialist institutions in a radically pluralist manner. The experience of the Luxembourg Commission had opened the way for reflexions about a possible institutionalisation of the representation of workers. In the decades that followed the Revolution of 1848, in the French labour movement the question of the representation of workers was intensely debated. Among the socialist thinkers who played a part in this debate, one of them, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, advocated an advanced form of radical pluralism (Bancal 1970). From *Confessions d'un révolutionnaire* in 1849 to *De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières* in 1865, Proudhon defended the possibility of a socialism that would not be State-based, but would rely on the mutual cooperation of the workers. In particular, he defended the idea that each social function (i.e., each trade, but also the judicial courts, the army, the Church, etc.) should be separated, reorganised through universal suffrage, and federalised. In this system, the State would have only a function of coordinating between different institutions, each of them representing a different aspect of the identities and social roles of citizens. Proudhon's ideas were very influential on the early French labour leaders – from the founders of the French section of the International Workingmen's Association in 1864, to those of the anarcho-syndicalist General Confederation of Labour (CGT) in 1895 (Ridley 1970; Rolland 1995). This view of a socialism that would not be based on the State,

but on plural representative institutions rooted in the different social spheres individuals were engaged in, can also be found in different trends of anarchism and self-management socialism (Linden and Thorpe 1990). Moreover, it has some echoes –in a much more institutional and reformist way– in the systems of partnership that give important powers to trade-unions and representatives of entrepreneurs in most economic matters, such as in Germany or in Scandinavian countries (Kaufman and Kleiner 1993).

A second tradition that can be considered to belong to our ideal-type of radical pluralism is the tradition of community institutions, in the large sense, from community organising (Rivera and Erlich 1998; Stall and Stoecker 1998) to the recognition of legal autonomy for a minority (Wright 1999). While this form of pluralism shares some of its principles with group representation, the main difference is that the representation of communities does not solely happen through the integration to a unitary political institution, but also through the establishment of specific representative devices. Those devices do not substitute the other representative institutions, but add to them, in order to make the community members represented both as part of the nation and as part of their community. Most examples of this form of plural representation rely on the use of associations, but it is only when these associations begin to regroup a large fraction of the community and/or to federalise several numbers of smaller-scale community associations that we can see them as representative institutions (M. E. Warren 2001). In order to properly understand this loose form of representation, one has to depart from the principal-agent model of representation and to adopt a more systemic approach to representation (Mansbridge 2003; Mansbridge 2011; Maia 2012). If we consider the example of Black Americans, it is not a single association that creates a specific representation for members of this community, but rather the fact that associations have been created in most professions and activities, along with some massive and perennial associations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and with a specific association inside legislative institutions: the Congressional Black Caucus. Here, institutional pluralism comes from the high level of autonomous organisation of the community, which creates an effective plural representation for Black Americans, even if it is only through associations. On the other end of the spectrum, this form of pluralism can be legally institutionalised, or even recognised by the Constitution. The examples of the representation of indigenous communities in Latin America are revealing (K. B. Warren and Jackson 2002). During the 1980s and 1990s, most Latin American countries with large indigenous communities experienced social movements claiming the right to a certain degree

of autonomy and a better representation for these communities. In most countries, these movements have led to the creation of large federations of associations (such as the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia), or to the emergence of indigenous political parties (such as the Pachakutik in Ecuador). But it some cases, recognition has gone much further. For example, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 gave the indigenous communities a specific representation in the Senate (art. 171), the right to have autonomous jurisdictions, laws and procedures (art. 246), and the right to self-govern locally according to their customs (art. 330). In the Chiapas, since 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation managed to conquer indigenous autonomy and self-government in dozens of municipalities, even if no real agreement was reached with the central Mexican government. In 2009, under the president Evo Morales (himself a trade unionist and a self-identified indigenous), a new Bolivian Constitution has been voted, which officially recognises a very large set of rights for indigenous peoples (art. 30), including the inscription of their indigenous identity in official identification documents, autonomy in all matters regarding culture, education, medicine, ownership, justice or local government, and representation in all the institutions of the State. Beyond their real diversity, all these cases can be linked with the idea of radical pluralism, as they rely on the pluralisation of both identities and representative institutions.

Finally, we can identify a third tradition of radical pluralism in a set of devices that are not linked with specific class, gender or ethnic identities, but rather with the experience of being governed. Indeed, in democracies, citizens are both members of constituencies and subject to laws and governments, and can then develop a specific political activity in which they do not act as voters but try to directly influence the laws or the way they are governed. In constitutional theory, it can be said that it is the fact that citizens belong to a constituency and elect their legislators that renders the laws legitimate (Rehfeld 2005). But in the day-to-day political experience, it is different: some citizens vote, and all of the people in a given territory have to abide by laws, even if they have not voted for or contributed to draft them. Citizens in democracies can therefore be said to have a dual political identity, and while, as voters, citizens are represented, they can also act as subjects to laws and regulations through institutions that Pierre Rosanvallon has called “counter-democratic” (Rosanvallon 2006; Resmini 2012). Counter-democratic devices –from transparency associations to procedures of recall referendum– allow citizens to watch, survey, judge and possibly punish their elected leaders. Similarly, to some extent, it is possible to consider institutions related with direct or participative democracy, and even certain social movements, as elements that effectively

pluralise political systems (Pateman 1970; Blondiaux 2008; Sintomer 2011). Indeed, the idea that citizens in democracies are doubly represented, first by their elected representatives and second by some specific participative or counter-democratic devices, is totally foreign to conservative liberalism, which knows only representation through elections and direct participation to "public opinion" through free expression of individuals (Reynié 1998). So when representative claims emerge from these kinds of devices and when they start to play a direct role in political processes, we clearly depart from conservative liberalism and representative government (Saward 2010). The important condition for these devices to be considered as relevant to radical pluralism is the necessity for them to have a real part in sovereignty, not just a consultative role or an informal lobbying power (Fung 2003). When institutionalised devices are thought to be real incarnations of a sovereign people who acts not as a constituency, but as subjects, and irrespectively of their elected representatives, we can say some sort of radical pluralism is involved. In France, the sans-culotte tradition of popular societies and the 1848 clubs (to the extent to which they were federalised and institutionalised) exemplify this aspect of radical pluralism (Soboul 1971; Boutry 1990). Nowadays, it is certainly the massive participative devices such as the national conferences in Brazil that go the furthest in the direction of radical pluralism. Indeed, in national conferences, lay citizens can participate directly in the important debates and nominate spokespersons that are accountable and have a real say in political processes (Avritzer 2009; Pogrebinschi and Santos 2010). If these institutions are taken seriously and their institutionalisation is reinforced, they could form the basis of a real system of plural representation, distinct from representative government.

Conclusion

On many accounts, contemporary liberalism is deeply unsatisfactory. Its core principles and institutions –individual autonomy, sovereign national assemblies and representative government– fall short of their emancipating promises when it comes to addressing the political and economic changes we are currently experiencing. But as we have seen in the history of the early French liberal movement, these principles and institutions were not originally hegemonic in liberalism. They have historically prevailed against minority voices –strongly linked to the emerging labour movement– that advocated for a substantially different

interpretation of liberal principles. Through the study of their ideas and the institutional achievements of the 1848 Revolution, I have tried to construct the ideal-type of an ideology that would share liberal goals, but without its more questionable aspects: radical pluralism. Contrary to the conservative and unitary form of liberalism that has prevailed, radical pluralism is founded on the plurality of citizens' identities and on the need for a corresponding plurality of representative institutions. I have tried to use this ideal-type of radical pluralism to discuss several contemporary ideas and devices, related to the representation of workers, of ethnic minorities and to forms of participative or counter-democracy. Beyond the diversity of all these experiments, they all share some common radical pluralist features. Together with the investigation in the history of pluralist ideas, they could give directions to those who want to criticise what liberalism have become without sacrificing its initial goals. They do not by themselves solve the problems liberal democracies are currently facing, but they can give a basis to rethink political institutions in a radically pluralist way, providing us with new means to meet contemporary economic and political challenges.

References

Ackerman, Bruce. 1993. *We the people, volume 1: Foundations*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Agulhon, Maurice. 2002. *1848 ou l'apprentissage de la République: 1848-1852*. Paris: Éd. du Seuil.
Amann, Peter H. 1975. "The Paris club movement in 1848." In *Revolution and reaction: 1848 and the Second French Republic*, ed. Roger Price, 115–132. London, New York: C. Helm, Barnes and Noble.
Arendt, Hannah. 1951. *The origins of totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
Avritzer, Leonardo. 2009. *Participatory institutions in democratic Brazil*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Baker, Gideon. 2003. *Unstable subjects and unknowable others: is political representation possible?* Salford: European Studies Research Institute.
Bancal, Jean. 1970. *Proudhon, pluralisme et autogestion*. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.
Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. *Strong democracy: participatory politics for a new age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Benhabib, Şeyla, ed. 1996. *Democracy and difference: contesting the boundaries of the political*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. "Two concepts of liberty." In *Four essays on liberty*, 118–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blondiaux, Loïc. 2008. *Le nouvel esprit de la démocratie: actualité de la démocratie participative*. Paris: Seuil.

Boutry, Philippe. 1990. “Des sociétés populaires de l’an II au ‘parti républicain’. Réflexions sur l’évolution des formes d’association politique dans la France du premier XIXe siècle.” In *Storiografia francese ed italitana a confronto sul fenomeno associativo durante XVIII e XIX secolo*, ed Maria Teresa Maiullari-Pontois, 107–135. Torino: Fondazione Luigi Einaudi.
Bruand, Françoise. 2006. “La Commission du Luxembourg en 1848.” In *Louis Blanc : un socialiste en République*, ed Francis Démier, 107–131. Paris: Créaphis.
Colliot-Thélène, Catherine. 2011. *La démocratie sans “demos”*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Connolly, William E. 1991. *Identity/difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Cornwall, Andrea, and Anne Marie Goetz. 2005. “Democratizing democracy: feminist perspectives.” *Democratization* 12 (5): 783–800.
Coutant, Arnaud. 2009. *1848, quand la République combattait la démocratie*. Paris: Mare & Martin.
Dahl, Robert Alan. 1971. *Polyarchy: participation & opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dijn, Annelien De. 2005. “Aristocratic liberalism in post-revolutionary France.” *The Historical Journal* 48 (03): 661–681.
Elster, Jon, and Rune Slagstad, eds. 1988. *Constitutionalism and democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fung, Archon. 2003. *Deepening democracy: institutional innovations in empowered participatory governance*. London: Verso.
Girard, Louis. 1985. *Les libéraux français, 1814-1875*. Paris: Aubier.
Gossez, Rémi. 1968. *Les ouvriers de Paris. 1: L’organisation, 1848-1851*. Paris: Société d’histoire de la Révolution de 1848.
Hayat, Samuel. 2011. “‘Au nom du peuple français’. La représentation politique en question autour de la révolution de 1848 en France”. PhD diss., University Paris 8 Saint-Denis.
———. 2012. “Participation, discussion et représentation: L’expérience clubiste de 1848”. *Participations* (2): 119–140.
———. 2013. “La représentation inclusive”. *Raisons politiques* (50): 115–135.
Hincker, Louis. 2007. *Citoyens-combattants à Paris, 1848-1851*. Villeneuve-d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Huard, Raymond. 1996. *La naissance du parti politique en France*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques.
Hyman, Richard. 2001. *Understanding European trade unionism: between market, class and society*. London: Sage.
Jardin, André. 1985. *Histoire du libéralisme politique, de la crise de l’absolutisme à la constitution de 1875*. Paris: Hachette.
Jaume, Lucien. 1997. *L’individu effacé, ou le paradoxe du libéralisme français*. Paris: Fayard.
Jennings, Jeremy. 2011. “Constitutional liberalism in France from Benjamin Constant to Alexis de Tocqueville.” In *The Cambridge history of nineteenth-century political thought*, ed. Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys, 349–373. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kaplan, Steven L., and Philippe Minard, eds. 2004. *La France, malade du corporatisme? XVIIIe-XXe siècles*. Paris: Belin.
Kaufman, Bruce E., and Morris M. Kleiner. 1993. *Employee representation: alternatives and future directions*. Madison: Cornell University Press.
Kelly, John E. 1988. *Trade unions and socialist politics*. London: Verso.

Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.
Leonhard, Jörn. 2001. *Liberalismus*. München: Oldenbourg.
Linden, Marcel van der, and Wayne Thorpe, eds. 1990. *Revolutionary syndicalism: an international perspective*. Aldershot: Scolar press.
Mackay, Fiona. 2008. "'Thick' conceptions of substantive representation: women, gender and political institutions." *Representation* 44 (2): 125–139.
Maia, Rousiley C. M. 2012. "Non-electoral political representation: expanding discursive domains." *Representation* 48 (4): 429–443.
Manin, Bernard. 1996. *Principes du gouvernement représentatif*. Paris: Flammarion.
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks represent Blacks and women represent women? A contingent 'Yes'". *The Journal of Politics* (61): 628–657.
———. 2003. "Rethinking representation." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515–528.
———. 2011. "Clarifying the concept of representation." *American Political Science Review* 105 (03): 621–630.
McClure, Kirstie. 1992. "On the subject of rights: pluralism, plurality and political identity". In *Dimensions of radical democracy: pluralism, citizenship, community*, ed. Chantal Mouffe, 108–27. London: Verso.
Mouffe, Chantal. 1992. *Dimensions of radical democracy: pluralism, citizenship, community*. London: Verso.
Pateman, Carole. 1970. *Participation and democratic theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The politics of presence*. Oxford: Clarendon press.
Pilbeam, Pamela M. 1991. *The 1830 Revolution in France*. Basingstoke: MacMillan.
———. 1995. *Republicanism in nineteenth-century France, 1814-1871*. Basingstoke London: MacMillan.
Pinkney, David H. 1972. *The French Revolution of 1830*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pogrebinschi, Thamy, and Fabiano Santos. 2010. "Participation as representation: the impact of national public policy conferences on the Brazilian Congress." Paper presented at the APSA 2010 Annual Meeting. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1643679.
Rancière, Jacques, and Alain Faure, eds. 2007. *La parole ouvrière : 1830-1851*. Paris: la Fabrique.
Rawls, John. 1993. *Political liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rehfeld, Andrew. 2005. *The concept of constituency: political representation, democratic legitimacy, and institutional design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Resmini, Marta. 2012. "Counter-democracy as participation: representation and its ambiguities". Paper presented at the APSA 2010 Annual Meeting. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2105553.
Reynié, Dominique. 1998. *Le triomphe de l'opinion publique: l'espace public français du XVIe au XXe siècle*. Paris: O. Jacob.
Ridley, Frederick. 1970. *Revolutionary syndicalism in France, the direct action of its time*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rivera, Felix G., and John Erlich. 1998. *Community organizing in a diverse society*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Robert, Vincent. 1996. *Les chemins de la manifestation, 1848-1914*. Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon.

Rolland, Patrice. 1995. "À propos de Proudhon: une querelle des influences." *Revue française d'histoire des idées politiques* 2: 275–300.
Rosanvallon, Pierre. 1985. *Le moment Guizot*. Paris: Gallimard.
———. 1987. *La question syndicale: histoire et avenir d'une forme sociale*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
———. 1992. *Le sacre du citoyen: histoire du suffrage universel en France*. Paris: Gallimard.
———. 2002. *Le peuple introuvable: histoire de la représentation démocratique en France*. Paris: Gallimard.
———. 2004. *Le modèle politique français: la société civile contre le jacobinisme de 1789 à nos jours*. Paris: Éd. du Seuil.
———. 2006. *La contre-démocratie: la politique à l'âge de la défiance*. Paris: Éd. du Seuil.
Saward, Michael. 2010. *The representative claim*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schlosberg, David. 1998. "Resurrecting the pluralist universe." *Political Research Quarterly* 51 (3): 583–615.
Sewell, William Hamilton. 1980. *Work and revolution in France: the language of labor from the Old Regime to 1848*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sintomer, Yves. 2011. *Petite histoire de l'expérimentation démocratique: tirage au sort et politique d'Athènes à nos jours*. Paris: la Découverte.
Soboul, Albert. 1971. "De l'an II à la Commune de 1871: la double tradition révolutionnaire française." *Annales historiques de la Révolution Française* XLIII: 535–553.
Squires, Judith. 2008. "The constitutive representation of gender: extra-parliamentary re-presentations of gender relations." *Representation* 44 (2): 187–204.
Stall, Susan, and Randy Stoecker. 1998. "Community organizing or organizing community? Gender and the crafts of empowerment." *Gender and Society* 12 (6): 729–756.
Tully, James. 1995. *Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Warren, Kay B., and Jean E. Jackson. 2002. *Indigenous movements, self-representation, and the state in Latin America*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Warren, Mark E. 2001. *Democracy and association*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wenman, Mark A. 2003. "What is politics? The approach of radical pluralism." *Politics* 23 (1): 57–65.
Williams, Bernard. 1962. "The idea of equality." In *Philosophy, politics and society*, ed. Peter Laslett and Walter G. Runciman, 110-131. Oxford: Blackwell.
Williams, Melissa S. 2000. *Voice, trust, and memory: marginalized groups and the failings of liberal representations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wright, Jane. 1999. "Minority groups, autonomy, and self-determination." *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 19 (4): 605–629.
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.