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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2012

Lessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards

Résumé

Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with greater asymmetric information are likely to adopt a unitary board. Firms with a high potential for private benefit extraction are likely to adopt dual boards. Firms well monitored by financial market and institutional forces are less likely to have dual boards. Our results imply that freedom of contract about board structure is valuable for shareholders.
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Dates et versions

hal-01637565 , version 1 (17-11-2017)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01637565 , version 1

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François Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron Slovin, Marie Sushka. Lessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards. 2012 FMA European Conference, Jun 2012, Istanbul, Turkey. ⟨hal-01637565⟩
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