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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2019

Encouraging long-term shareholders: The effects of loyalty shares with double voting rights

Résumé

The 2014 passage of the Florange Act in France changed an opt-in provision for loyalty shares (allocating a second voting right for shares held at least two years) to an opt-out provision with shareholder approval. We find that before 2014, loyalty shares were popular among small family firms. Following the Act, firms with a one share – one vote structure that announced they would opt out of the law incurred a negative market reaction, suggesting that shareholders have a positive perception of loyalty shares. It appears that by encouraging costly monitoring by long-term shareholders, loyalty shares can benefit all shareholders.
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Dates et versions

hal-02291364 , version 1 (18-09-2019)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02291364 , version 1

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François Belot, Édith Ginglinger, Laura Starks. Encouraging long-term shareholders: The effects of loyalty shares with double voting rights. 9th Financial Engineering and Banking Society international Conference, May 2019, Prague, Czech Republic. ⟨hal-02291364⟩
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