One logical requirement for language is intention recognition. Considering or not considering phenomena as intentional, influences the meaning we attribute to them. Furthermore, all interpretations of texts make hypotheses on their production-a sentence cannot be thought as not having an author. U. Eco formulates the distinction between intentio operis and intentio auctoris; we will suggest that this redoubling is necessary only within a poststructural paradigm, that separates semiotic meaning from psychological intentions. In the perspective suggested by L. Wittgenstein, the role of intentions lays in language, and not behind it; people do not mean by thinking but by speaking, and much of what we usually consider as private to the individual, actually depends on the use of language. If intention is semiotic, built in communications, then all texts carry an author as real effect of their interpretation: interpreters wonder about what in the text is and is not deliberately intended. We will propose to read in Eco's partition of intentiones a guide to a pragmatic method, rather than an implicit ontological threshold between thoughts and words. We will also suggest to consider choices as a valuable concept for semiotic research.