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Chapter 29

Gender, the Wars of Decolonization and the Decline of Empires after 1945

Raphaëlle Branche

After the end of the Second World War, the five European countries still in control of colonial possessions in Africa and Asia were involved in Wars of Decolonization, the shorter or longer armed struggles against anticolonial movements. These countries were Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal.¹ A much larger number of African and Asian countries were involved in these conflicts. They include Algeria, Angola, Belgian Congo, Burma, Cameroon,² Guinea-Bissau, Indochina, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mozambique and the Philippines. The first Wars of Decolonization began in Asia immediately after World War II, which officially ended in Europe on 8 May 1945, and in Asia on 2 September 1945, with the respective surrenders of Germany and Japan. The last Wars of Decolonization ended in Africa in the early 1970s.³ An important international context of all of these conflicts that influenced their course and outcome was the Cold War (1946–91), the rivalry between the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies in NATO, on the other, which did not end until the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies. During this period, many of the Wars of Decolonization were at the same time “proxy wars” between the communist East and the capitalist West, in which however neither China and the Soviet Union nor the United States directly engaged each other.⁴

In some colonized countries, nonviolent means were successfully used in the anticolonial struggle. The peaceful protests of the Indian independence movement, led by Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), against British rule certainly provides the most powerful example of these alternative paths to independence.⁵ Yet this chapter focuses on violence and, more specifically, on conflicts that resulted in wars in which the armed forces of the colonial powers fought nationalist insurgents. In particular, this chapter analyzes the multiple ways in which these wars were gendered. These anticolonial struggles were always nationalistic, even when communist guerrillas were the dominant force. Armed combat was one of the main means to achieve the ultimate goal of freeing the country from colonial rule, but it was always part of various broader actions aimed at winning popular support for the political project of national liberation. Contrary to other types of wars, the Wars of Decolonization broke out in countries dominated by colonial powers for decades. Generations had been brought up as colonizers and colonized. To shift the balance of powers was a dramatic challenge against the backdrop of a long-term reality. For this reason, more than other wars, the Wars of Decolonization required very broad and active support by the population.

When challenged by anticolonial movements, the British, Belgian, Dutch, French and Portuguese governments tried to negotiate a new relationship with their colonial territories. These attempts failed in several cases, such as in the British colony and protectorate of Kenya or the Portuguese possessions in Africa which include today Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea. Still, the colonial powers usually refused to concede that the armed conflicts they faced were “real wars.” Instead, they described

them as “rebellions” and “upheavals.” This denial sometimes lasted for decades after the anticolonial struggle had ended. France, for example, only began officially using the term “Algerian War” in October 1999, 37 years after the ceasefire that ended the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) was signed.⁶ Yet all colonial powers had sent their armies into rebellious areas, sometimes calling up not just troops serving in the colonies, but also troops sent from the mainland armed forces. Some of these troops were mobilized on a massive scale, including conscription—notably in France and Portugal. However, these conflicts were still officially considered “internal unrest,” and insurgents were “rebels” or “outlaws.” In most cases a state of emergency was declared, giving the state the authority to resort to extraordinary measures of repression without admitting that it was at war. But from the historian’s perspective, these were indeed wars, engaging armed troops and aimed at possessing a territory and acquiring or maintaining sovereignty.

With the possible exception of the second part of the First Indochina War (1950–54), when Communist China contributed troops to support the newly founded Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in its fight against the French, these were all guerrilla wars led by armies that were much less well equipped and much smaller than the forces mobilized by the colonizing powers. This type of warfare relied on surprise attacks in the forms of ambushes, random assaults and kidnappings, which depended on the ability to quickly fade away from engagements. Broad support from the civilian population was thus crucial to the guerrilla movements’ successes and, earlier on, to their very existence. Estimating the number of people involved in the Wars of Decolonization is therefore difficult, because scholars must count not only combatants, but also all the people who aided, fed, treated, guided, informed and otherwise supported them. This basic interconnectedness between armed troops and civilians is what sets apart the armies of the colonizers and colonized. This is also why the civilian population was so crucial to these conflicts, either in the short term to win the war, or in the longer term to achieve the political aims of national independence or remaining in an empire.

We have to conceptualize the Wars of Decolonization after 1945 as “total wars” like the First and Second World Wars, because of their “peculiar intensity and extension” and “the tendency to abolish the boundaries that distinguish the front from the homeland.” They, too, affected all areas of the economy, society and culture.⁷ Similar to many of the territories occupied by Japan and Germany during Second World War—indeed, in some cases these same territories had been battlegrounds during the Second World War—colonial spaces were spaces of war and spaces of violence.⁸ In the colonies as well, entire civilian populations were involved in the conflicts.⁹ Because of civilians’ roles in supporting guerrilla warfare, they became targeted victims of war violence and also players and stakeholders in the military confrontation and political outcome. What was different from other twentieth century wars was often the composition and organization of the anticolonial armies involved in the struggle. Like the partisan troops of the resistance movements in the territories occupied by the Axis Powers during World War II, they involved fewer professional soldiers and more inexperienced fighters, including women.¹⁰ The struggle for liberation challenged the colonial powers’ ideas of white manhood, but it also led to conflicts in the construction of male identity within the armies of the insurgents. One challenge was the fact that women actively participated in the struggle for national liberation in addition to men, which called into question dominant ideas of the gender order and led to a reconsideration of gender relations during and after the conflicts.

This female participation in military operations and the effects of the wars on women’s agency raise the issue of differences and similarities between Wars of Decolonization and other

total wars. In the revolutionary dynamic involved in many Wars of Decolonization lies one of their main characteristics: these wars aimed at expelling the colonizers from spaces where a new social, political and economic order was supposed to emerge. Gender issues was central to these hopes and perspectives.

Most important for the understanding of the specific interrelatedness of gender and war in colonial conflicts is the difference between the colonized and the colonizers, even though they constantly interact with each other. To explore this interrelatedness, it is necessary to study on the one hand the gender policies of and gender relations in the armed struggle of the liberation movements. On the other hand, one must examine gendered policies as the colonial powers' response to the military and political challenges posed by liberation movements along with the resulting short-term effects. In the following, the chapter investigates these themes in three steps: first, it briefly discusses the development of the research on the intersection of gender, colonial rule and Wars of Decolonization; then it looks at the armed anticolonial conflicts after 1945 and their gender policies and gender relations; and, finally, it focuses on the gender policies that the colonial powers developed in reaction to the challenges of the anticolonial liberation movements.

Gender, Colonial Rule and the Wars of Decolonization

To understand the specific character of colonial rule, historians need to look beyond its repressive and violent dimensions. Because colonial rule was envisioned as a long-term project, colonial powers also implemented policies aimed at convincing the native populations to stay within the colonial realm. Or, at least, the colonizers intended to sap some of the populations' main claims against them. The outbreak of armed protest against colonial rule upset this order of things and forced the colonial powers to react and adapt very quickly, sometimes aiming for radical changes in social organization, including gender relations.¹¹

Frantz Fanon (1925–61), the Martinique-born, Afro-Caribbean psychiatrist, was one of the first to write on this topic. His work long influenced the fields of postcolonial studies and critical theory.¹² During the Algerian War of Independence he laid the foundations for an analysis that regarded the bodies of the colonized peoples—notably but not only women—as an essential location of power and thus a site for “revolutionary violence.” Fanon called for the liberation of bodies and minds. By insisting on how Algerian women could actively use their headscarves and their bodies as an instrument in the fight for independence, Fanon established an enduring and emancipating myth of their participation in the conflict.¹³ Fanon died during the war and was not there to notice that the reality of the Algerian War was, ultimately, very different. His texts are brilliant and thought provoking, but they were informed by the fact that he was as an ardent supporter of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) and actively participated in its struggle. Like other intellectuals involved in the anticolonial project, he sought to use words to bring about a certain reality. Writing for the nationalist newspaper *El Moudjahid*, founded by the FLN in 1956, in war-torn Algeria, Fanon picked aspects of the revolutionary struggle that fit the agenda of presenting the FLN to the international public in such a way that Westerners could identify with it. One of his ideas was especially fertile: the notion that human beings are transformed by action and that violence can be revolutionary.

Even though Fanon was one of the first thinkers to reflect on the possible roles women could take in the anticolonial struggle, his analysis was flawed because his argumentation conceptualized gender relations as essentially connected to the “colonial situation” as described

by the French ethnologist Georges Balandier (1920–2016) in 1951.¹⁴ Fanon did not explore the fact that the gender order in colonized countries was established during a long-term process influenced by the interplay of a multiplicity of domestic and international factors. Both the interrelatedness and temporality of this process require greater consideration, and their significance cannot be reduced to the colonial situation alone.¹⁵ The postindependence evolution of certain forms of domination over women in fact demonstrates the survival of structures in continuity with the colonial period. Furthermore, it is important to study not only the short-term effects of the Wars of Decolonization on the gender order, but also the long-range repercussions as well. In Algeria, for example, although many women had actively supported the liberation struggle, women's rights suffered a considerable regression beginning in the 1980s.

One of the first scholars to closely study the participation of women in the Algerian War of Independence was the historian Djamilia Amrane, a former FLN activist who was convicted and imprisoned by the French. Between 1978 and 1986 she interviewed 88 female supporters of the FLN, and this research led to the 1994 book *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*.¹⁶ Since the 1990s, historians have studied the case of Algeria more intensively. Three recent, important works bear special mention. Ryme Seferdjeli explored the struggle over women during the Algerian War,¹⁷ Neil MacMaster analyzed French policy targeting women in its Algerian colony, as well as the role of Algerian women in France during the war,¹⁸ and, using oral history interviews, Natalya Vince published the first in-depth exploration of the postindependence experiences of women who had fought against French rule.¹⁹

Other Wars of Decolonization that have been studied from the perspective of women's and gender history include the Malayan struggle for independence from British rule (1945–57), which succeeded in August 1957 when the Federation of Malaya finally became independent. Women's and gender historians have also studied the First (1946–54) and Second Indochina Wars (1955–75), the conflicts in which liberation movements in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos fought first against the French and later against the US. Furthermore, scholarship on women and gender now includes several of the anticolonial movements in Africa against Belgian, British, French and Portuguese rule that continued after 1945.

Historians Lenore Manderson, Virginia H. Dancz and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied explored the place of women in the Malayan struggle for independence from British rule. They focused on the role of women in the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), other nationalist parties like the Malayan National Party (MNP) and the guerrilla.²⁰ Sandra Taylor and François Guillemot studied the role of women in the League for the Independence of Vietnam, known as the *Việt Minh*, which was formed in 1941 as a national movement for independence from French rule. Both historians showed that many Vietnamese women joined the ranks of the *Việt Minh* and fought alongside their male counterparts in both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military in the wars against the South Vietnamese government and its French and US allies from 1946 to 1975.²¹

Meredith Terreta researched the history of colonial British and French Cameroon until it achieved independence in 1960. Her work chronicled the spread of the nationalist movement of the Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC) from the late 1940s into the first postcolonial decade and explored the history of the Democratic Union of Cameroonian Women in this time period.²² Cora Ann Presley carried out substantial research on the Kikuyu in Kenya. Based on rare oral testimony from women participants in the Mau Mau Rebellion (1952–60) in British Kenya, her study analyzed changes in women's domestic reproduction, legal status and gender roles that took place under colonial rule.²³

Many other decolonization conflicts have not as yet been sufficiently studied from the perspective of women's and gender history. Moreover, the gender dimension has not been treated evenly in the research. The main focus of the scholarship so far has been the role of women in the anticolonial liberation movements. Sometimes emphasizing women's importance or seeking to leave behind a view of women as being mere victims, this research has not always investigated the effects of women's engagement on gender relations more generally, nor have scholars compared the situation during the liberation struggles with the development before and after the war in order to be able to identify short- and long-term effects.

Furthermore, most of this research largely ignored men and masculinity, even though historian Mrinalini Sinha had already demonstrated in her seminal 1995 book, *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century*, the value of thinking about the interconnected constructs of masculinity of the colonizer and the colonized.²⁴ She emphasized the subtle interplay of reversed reflections and its effects on the societies of both the colonizers and the colonized. But even 25 years later many colonial societies and Wars of Decolonization have not yet been examined from this perspective. The investigation of men and masculinities in colonial territories to a large degree still needs to be completed. Notably in regard to the multiple forms of masculinity in nationalist ranks and men's interactions with colonizers, there is very little scholarship. Exceptions include fascinating research on Zimbabwe and South Africa.²⁵ Another field to explore is the reaction of colonizers. Current research points, for example, to the counterinsurgency techniques used by colonial powers almost everywhere during these conflicts, but has not utilized a gender perspective.²⁶

Armed Anticolonial Movements and Gender Relations

The study of how the rise armed decolonization movements influenced gender relations needs to be based on an analysis of the periods leading up to the conflicts. Here, scholarly attention has focused on women's participation in politics. Such studies indicate the importance of distinguishing between liberation movements that actively fought for gender equality and demanded equal rights for women and men, including equal female education, and those movements that merely organized sections for women with the aim of mobilizing them for the liberation struggle.

In their specific, but determined, position—in the female section of a liberation movement—women militants could play a political role in spreading nationalistic awareness among women, often in areas closed to men. This was notably the case in Algeria, where militant women members of the first nationalist party, the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), went into Muslim homes to lead debates among women. After armed combat began in 1954, the Association of Muslim Women of Algeria continued to work to “convince girls and women of the need for their active participation in demonstrations or even armed actions,” according to a police report of the time.²⁷ As the war took hold, young women demonstrated their desire to “actively join the armed struggle being led by their fathers, husbands and brothers.”²⁸ Some of them joined the *maquis*—the armed guerrilla—or terrorist groups, as nurses, launderers and cooks. But the majority supported the liberation by joining the *maquis*' support networks in urban and rural areas. The women's association of the National Liberation Front led by Mamia Chentouf (1922–2012) propagated the idea that women must “encourage, in every possible way, men to take part in all the events organized by nationalist groups [and] strive

to show their husbands or sons who might collaborate with the French government, how their family will be scorned.”²⁹

The conventional gender roles of the colonial period persisted in many respects in the anticolonial movements—for the most part, public actions and fighting were still the reserve of men constructed as the “protectors” of women and children. But women were encouraged to support the men fighting against the colonizers. They were supposed to safeguard and assert the moral and cultural values of their community, which included the expectation that they “shame” men into the armed struggle, as the Algerian example demonstrates. The leaders of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) likewise encouraged women in the “liberated zones” to “humiliate” their husbands into combat and hoped that women’s mere presence among the guerrilla fighters would induce more courageous behavior.³⁰

There was clearly no direct link between female participation in nationalist parties and their openness to feminist demands. But a political program that supported gender equality made it easier to mobilize women, even for armed struggle. For example, this was the case in Malaysia, where the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), founded in 1930, at least rhetorically supported the socialist women’s emancipation theory and an equal integration of women in the movement. Accordingly, it trained both women and men for guerrilla warfare, first for the fight against the Japanese occupation (1941–45), and starting in 1948 for the anticolonial struggle against the British. Ethnic categories are very important in Malaysia, and being Malay (or not) is an essential criterion of political life. From this perspective, the CPM was unique in that there were no ethnic barriers to joining. In the Philippines, too, an increasing number of young women took up arms in the communist guerrilla movement, the *Hukbalahap*, or *Huk*, which first had fought against Japanese occupation and later against the new Philippine government during the Huk Insurrection (1946–54). This movement also supported gender equality in its program.³¹

The Malayan National Party (MPN) pursued a different policy: it insisted on the difference between men and women and thus organized them separately. Furthermore, it was initially open to only Malay men and women; in 1948 the party opened membership in its organizations to non-Malay. The male youth organization of the MNP was *Angkatan Pemuda Insaf* (Generation of Awakened Youth or API), and its members were the first to be trained for the struggle. The API motto “Freedom through Blood” clearly indicates the obligation to sacrifice their lives for independence. Outlawed by the British in summer 1947, the API went underground. So did its sister organization for young women, *Angkatan Wanita Sedar* (Generation of Conscious Women or AWAS), the name of which was a warning since its acronym is pronounced like the word for “beware!” It was modeled after the Indonesian movement *Isteri Sedar* (Conscious Women), which had fought against Dutch colonial rule in the 1930s. Initially, AWAS emphasized the cultural role of women in the national movement and propagated a “female” Malay nationalism, which included the demands of equal education for girls, greater autonomy for wives and more political rights for women. But after the British colonial authority had declared the “state of emergency” in June 1948—marking the start of the Malayan guerrilla war fought between Commonwealth forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) from 1948 to 1960—more and more young members of AWAS joined the guerrillas too. They trained separately from men, but fought together.³²

The same happened during the First and Second Indochina Wars. More and more young women joined the *Việt Minh* and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam (PLAF) in South Vietnam and Cambodia, founded in 1941, which fought first against Imperial Japan during World War II, and later in the Wars of Decolonization against France and

subsequently the United States and the South Vietnamese state established in 1955. The *Việt Minh*, founded under the leadership of Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1968), also supported a program of “socialist women’s emancipation.” Accordingly, women were encouraged to take such roles as village patrol guards, intelligence agents, propagandists and military recruiters. They enlisted in both the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong guerrilla insurgent force in South Vietnam and fought in all combat zones. Furthermore, they provided manual labor to maintain the supply lines known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They also worked—often armed—in the rice fields in North Vietnam and Viet Cong-held farming areas in South Vietnam’s Mekong Delta to provide food for their families and the communist war effort. The revolutionary socialist government in North Vietnam, founded in 1945, and the PLAF included the improvement of women’s rights in their call to enhance social equity. The 1960 Marriage and Family Law of North Vietnam, for example, banned forced marriage, child marriage, wife beating and concubinage.³³

In all three countries, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, however, in the daily grind of these anticolonial movements, women were not really equal to men. Furthermore, their entry into the guerillas led to careful scrutiny of romantic and sexual relations in the armed forces. The attempt to police gender relations in the liberation armies and a preoccupation with “good” sexual morals can be found elsewhere when women joined the guerillas, such as in Algeria and Kenya. In Algeria, combatants were described as relatives—“brothers and sisters”—and initially romantic relations between members were prohibited there too. However, this ban was soon lifted, and later some members of the *maquis* even married, though policy on this subject varied by region. Guerilla leaders needed female support, but remained uncomfortable with the presence of women, especially young women, in their ranks. Some encouraged them to marry, while others expelled them from the guerilla movement.³⁴ In Kenya, where women were quite active in the Mau Mau movement—between 1952 and 1958, more than 34,000 women were imprisoned for participating in the struggle—sexual intercourse with guerilla fighters was also forbidden.³⁵

In Cameroon, women were organized in the spaces controlled by the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC). They did not always volunteer to join the UPC, however, and some were even forced to marry combatants fighting in the other territories controlled by the military wing of the UPC.³⁶ Others served as spies, and yet others as combatants for the armed wing of the UPC in the Bamileke region in Cameroon’s West and Northwest in 1957.³⁷ The UPC, too, officially supported “women’s emancipation” and propagated their active role in the fight for independence. One of the vocal advocates of this policy was UPC Secretary General Ruben Um Nuyobé (1913–58). He believed that such a policy would set the movement apart from the colonizer. Accordingly, a school for UPC cadres set up in 1955 also included several women from the *Union Démocratique des Femmes Camerounaises* (UDEFEFEC). One of them was Marie Ndjat, who became the secretary general of the UPC central committee of Songmbengue. She led men in several armed actions before her arrest in 1956. In the trial against her, members of the association Social Evolution of Cameroon (ESOCAM)—founded by the French administration to support the Westernization of Cameroon women—testified against Ndjat. They denounced her for her “savagery” and her putatively unfeminine and immoral behavior. One of their major criticisms was that she supposedly had sexual relations with UPC men.³⁸

During the Mozambican War of Independence (1964–74) against Portugal, the Mozambique Liberation Front also appealed to young women to join its ranks for the armed struggle. It targeted unmarried 10-to-15-year-old girls who lived in the “rebel” milieu. These

girls were armed and, beginning in 1967, organized in a Female Detachment (*Destacamento Feminino*) of the FRELIMO. This detachment was trained in neighboring Tanzania, which had become independent from British rule in 1961. As the embodiment of the “new socialist women,” these young female fighters became the subject of many speeches by FRELIMO leaders. In the daily reality of war, they were indeed “liberated” from the authoritarian control of their parents, who remained in their villages. They experienced a new form of equality with men, especially men of their age. But the FRELIMO limited their freedom by claiming fraternal authority over them, labelling them “little sisters.” It, too, prohibited sexual or romantic relations among guerilla fighters and punished any violation. Only in the last years of the war did the FRELIMO adopt a more flexible policy in this matter.³⁹

Also beyond the armed struggle, women played a crucial role in the anticolonial liberation movements by providing essential support for the fighters. Women supplied them with food and clothing, did the laundry, hid soldiers, spied for them and otherwise provided them with information. Even in spheres of society and culture traditionally reserved for women or in places that only women could visit (private homes, markets and public baths), women involved in anticolonial struggles for liberation expanded their “repertoire” of possible political actions.⁴⁰ Women also played an important role in peaceful, civil actions. They initiated and organized for example public protest by taking part in demonstrations in front of jails or public buildings and writing petitions to the colonial State or the United Nations. In Algeria in late June 1958, around fifty veiled women gathered before the Algiers Prefecture in the early morning. They asked to meet with the prefect, held up signs in French and stated that they were there for “news about our husbands and children currently under arrest.” The protesting women wore headscarves and brought along their young children. They occupied the street, with some of them lying down and blocking traffic, and used the tradition of female wailing as a form of audible protest during these events.⁴¹ In Cameroon, the women of the Bamileke region likewise used their specific social status to achieve their goals and contribute to the struggle. As the primary farmers in the region, these women were responsible for planting the fields. Taking advantage of this social and economic role, they planted crops on the roads so that their harvest would block the circulation of military and administrative vehicles.⁴²

Even while acting explicitly as “mothers” or “wives” in the “female sphere” assigned to them, women who supported the decolonization struggle pursued their own agendas. They used traditional gender roles not only to organize gender specific forms of protest, but also to cover up their activities in the liberation movement. The young girls and women who supported the Algerian War of Liberation through covert acts of urban terrorism, known as the *fidaiia*, are one such example. Because women could walk unnoticed in the streets of Algerian cities, the *fidaiia* could execute bombings without disguise.⁴³ In turn these young female terrorists were made into heroes of the liberation movement. In 1960, *El Moudjahid*, its newspaper, published a play that portrayed a *fidaiia*. In this play, another young woman praised her with the following words: “I am full of regret that I am married and cannot make my own decisions. I am ashamed I cannot be like you. And I am proud of you and those like you [...]”⁴⁴ These *fidaiiate* could become an icon of the new form of warfare, not despite but because they were a relatively small group and an exception. They were presented as young and die-hard nationalists committed to the ideals of the FLN to the point of transgressing the gender roles assigned to women. They were willing and able to kill—a right and duty usually reserved for men—and they even killed unarmed people. In the rhetoric of the FLN this was acceptable female behavior only in a situation of national emergency like the war of liberation from France.⁴⁵ Similarly, the much larger number of young

Mozambican women who joined the armed struggle of the FRELIMO were made icons of the liberation movement and the heroines of a new world.⁴⁶ But unlike in Algeria, these women in Mozambique were actively encouraged by the political leaders of the FRELIMO to join its ranks and to take part in military training.

In any case, one characteristic of the anticolonial movements, particularly their armed forces, was the youth of their supporters. Movement leaders used gender identities to their advantage without necessarily subverting the gender order of their societies. In the long term, however, they often tried to restore prewar gender regimes after they came into power. Youths, nevertheless, were an entirely different matter. Village communities had succeeded in maintaining the principle of authority based on age even when colonization had disrupted other traditional power structures. But bearing arms gave a completely unusual power to young people in countries at war. Although they sometimes made arrangements with guerrilla movements, the usually older village leaders ultimately had to obey younger men whose origins were sometimes unknown to them. Indeed, when combatants were fighting in regions far from their homes, they were not subject to control by family or regional networks. Combatants also used *noms de guerre*, making it even harder to identify them.⁴⁷ Thus, in Southeastern Angola, as historian Inge Brinkman has shown, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), founded in 1956, successfully took full control of regions where its leaders, who were from other parts of the country, set up a new order. The MPLA notably began to fight witchcraft, condemning to death witch doctors whom civilians had denounced. The movement thus overturned villages' traditional jurisdictions organized by elders. The MPLA showed its power to oppose the colonial rulers (who had outlawed execution of witch doctors), thereby building its own power at the expense of elders.⁴⁸ This overturning of authority based on age was one of the essential aspects of these guerrilla movements, particularly when they had the means to consolidate their control over territories. The policies of colonial powers and their responses to the anticolonial movements were, however, not necessarily more favorable for male elders wishing to maintain their power, notably over the women and the young men of their communities.

The Gendered Response of the Colonial Powers

One of the recurring techniques for fighting guerrilla movements was the creation of “forbidden zones,” along with massive forced resettlement of populations in order to enclose and monitor the civilian population. The major aim was to cut off the guerilla fighters' access to their logistical bases. Whatever their name or euphemism, these operations worked in the same way: Civilian populations suspected of supporting the guerrilla were ordered to leave their homes, which were often destroyed. They were grouped together in detention camps controlled by a curfew and surrounded by barbed wire with exits monitored by soldiers. Here, armed men held power, having stripped it from the traditional authorities (the elders of communities).⁴⁹

In Malaysia, the British used this system of resettlement areas and “new villages” extensively. They mostly targeted the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), affiliated with the Malaysian Communist Party, and its Chinese supporters, who lived on the edge of the jungle. Following the plans of British General Sir Harold R. Briggs (1894–1952), chief of the imperial general staff and director of the operations in Malaya, these people were forcibly moved to “new villages.” In total, colonial authorities created 450 detention camps, holding over 470,000 people (of whom a substantial majority were Chinese). During the Mau Mau Uprising in

Kenya (1952–59), the British held an estimated 150,000 Kikuyu in detention camps. Britain and France used similar resettlement policies in Cameroon and other African colonies. Once a camp was set up in an area, any shelters remaining outside the resettlement areas were razed to the ground. Algerians were also subject to extensive resettlement under French rule, with 25 percent of the Algerian population ultimately moved to camps over the span of a few years.⁵⁰

This deprivation of the freedom to move or settle down also meant restricted access to economic resources (mainly fields, pastureland and water), resulting in unemployment, economic hardship and malnutrition, as in Malaysia and Algeria. But the effects were also psychological and social, as sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad have shown. Cut off from their land and traditional activities, peasants found themselves “defined by what they were no longer and by what they were not yet.”⁵¹ The basic social unit was not the village as in the past, but the camp. Traditional structures and forms of group control did not work any longer, and the elders lost some of their power. Instead, here too, younger, often-armed men became the protectors of the elders. The old world was turned upside down.

Colonial authorities attempted to compensate the community elders by proposing an alliance meant to restore the power that they had lost due to rebellion or colonization and repression. For British-controlled Kenya, this colonial policy is especially well researched. The British successfully recruited a very large number of “loyalists” within the Kikuyu community itself during the Mau Mau Uprising between 1952 and 1959, and they attempted to considerably strengthen the power of loyal local authorities, the “chiefs.” For example, the “relocation scheme” set up by the British gave loyalists land confiscated from the Mau Mau. The hope was that economic and political power would mutually strengthen each other.⁵²

Alongside resettlement, French policy during the Algerian War was also based on recruiting militias made up of Algerians. Many of them were *Harkis*, Muslim Algerian who served as auxiliaries in the French Army. These Algerian militiamen were encouraged to live with their families near or inside military outposts. Described by the French as people who had “chosen France,” they were seen as “traitors” by the FLN. The French administration, however, never conceded the same standing and power to them that the British conceded to the Kikuyu loyalists. It refused to give them weapons on a permanent basis and granted them no political power. While there are examples of substantial empowerment related to this French policy, these are limited to former guerillas of the Army for National Liberation (ALN) who joined the French army as commandos. These men had given up any possibility of going back, and the colonial power exploited their desire for revenge, offering these armed men substantial power over civilian populations and over ALN fighters.⁵³

Yet something else made these oppressive policies new: repression and violence went hand-in-hand with social engineering policies aimed at transforming colonial societies. One example is the Sanaga-Maritime Department in Cameroon, controlled by French Lieutenant Colonel Jean Lambertson, who was responsible for the repression of the Sanaga people accused of supporting the outlawed UPC Independence Party between 1959 and 1964. According to him, repression was not enough. Along with it, the French had to “replace the ideology spread by the UPC with a reasonable and sane conception of the role that the Bassa people [could] play in helping build a modern Cameroonian nation.”⁵⁴ The major aim of such social engineering policies was to gather support from parts of the colonized population.

Acknowledging the limits of the contribution of colonization to colonized societies and the need to find powerful levers to avoid the population supporting rebel forces, the colonial powers focused particular attention on colonized women. Propaganda insisted on their social

status and their civil and political rights. Caring for women was described as an indicator of civilization. In its rhetoric, Western society and culture brought to the colonized by the imperial powers offered women more civil, social and political rights. This narrative has a long tradition in the rule of colonial powers. As historian Partha Chatterjee has shown for nineteenth-century India under British rule, constructing an image of colonized women as victims of social traditions was part of the process of setting up colonial rule.⁵⁵ Under the pressures exerted by the Wars of Decolonization, the colonial powers were forced to follow their words with action.

Two examples are well documented: Kenya and Algeria. Two years after the Mau Mau rebellion broke out, the British government pursued a women's policy in Kenya. The officers of the Community Development Department, set up in 1954, created women's clubs named in Kikuyu "Progress Among Women." During their meetings, women watched propaganda films and were taught the basics of a hygienic childcare. They also received food, which helped to increase attendance and became crucial once famine struck some regions.⁵⁶ Interestingly, all women were treated alike in the food distribution, whether they were the wives of homeguards that guarded the camps or were married to Mau Mau rebels. The goal was to win over women not just to overcome the uprising, but also to build a new Kenya. Other policies were tested locally, such as the prohibition of female genital mutilation in the Meru district in 1956. Here, as historian Lynn Thomas has shown, young women refused the colonizer's prohibition and broke free of the old women who traditionally carried out genital mutilation. Young women performed the act on themselves with other instruments, thus proving agency against both the colonial authorities and traditional authorities. They did so by using one policy in the British fight against the rebellion as a means to have their voices heard. They hoped to show their courage in the face of pain and the risk of repression for having braved the prohibition.⁵⁷

In Algeria, the French appealed to supposedly universal moral values, but these were clearly assigned by gender. One example is the Psychological Action Program in Eastern Algeria known as "Muslim Women against Rebellion," the principles of which were distributed to the prefects in early 1958. Here these "universal moral values" were described as "major fundamental instincts":⁵⁸

Any man who gives his aid to the rebels and takes it away from his own family is contemptible and a criminal, not worthy to be the head of a family. Such a man believes himself to be courageous because he runs around the mountain carrying a rifle and bullets. But during this time, his abandoned children cry in hunger. So where is the courage of this man who cowardly flees the cries and criticism of his sons and daughters? True courage lies in the women who stay in the home deserted by their husbands, consoling their children and trying to feed them nevertheless.⁵⁹

According to this program, husbands who supported the FLN, took up arms and left their women and children unprotected were to be "despised by any man worthy of being called a man."⁶⁰ There is no clearer way to portray the degradation of men targeted by French propaganda.

Yet the innovation in this colonial rhetoric lay in a policy presented more explicitly as positive for women and aimed at giving them power within Algerian society, beginning in their own families. Three areas were given priority: inheritance, marriage and children. Careful not to shock Algerian men, the French legal experts studying these questions in 1957 clearly stated that they wanted their proposed reform to be "an initial stage on the path, both traditionalist and reformist, that is supported by the entire Muslim community of Algeria, including men and

women alike.” Furthermore, they indicated, “The legislator’s aim is, admittedly, to increase the rights of Muslim women, but only insofar as the rights of Muslim men are already recognized. The aim is not, through the reform process or as a result of unintended consequences, to upset a balance that has deliberately been established.”⁶¹ They mentioned precedents in India, Morocco, Tunisia and elsewhere.

What, then, were the actual changes of the reform? For the most part, the reform prevented women from being wholly disinherited, prohibited them from being married too young or against their will and allowed them to file for divorce. In 1958, the regime change in France brought—for the first time—equal political rights for French and Algerians in Algeria, as well as the first political rights for Algerian women. The promises of equality between the colonized and colonizers, on the one hand, and between men and women, on the other hand, finally seemed to become a reality. This development raised hope in some circles of women in Algeria. Demonstrations or petitions sent to the French authorities by women’s groups, often headed by French women, indicate as much. One petition, submitted in September 1958, demanded, “to free [women] from abusive customs that, 12 centuries after the Prophet’s death, all too often make them slaves, to pass laws that will allow them to be born free and to move forward, to give them a status guaranteeing equality of their rights with those of men.”⁶² Certainly aware of the symbolic value of his choice, the new French president, Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), appointed Nafissa Sid Cara (1910–2002) to his first government in 1958; she was the first Muslim to enter a French government, and a woman to boot.

Sid-Cara was behind the February 1959 ordinance that reformed marriage law in Algeria, which was inspired by the 1956 reform of Tunisian civil law. The legal age was raised to 15 for women and to 18 for men. The consent of both spouses was required, and both spouses had to be present at the wedding. During the wedding ceremony, birth certificates were checked and a family booklet was given out. Repudiation by the husband was abolished, and divorce became the only possibility for dissolving a marriage. Divorce proceedings were to be held before a judge, and both spouses had to be present (to avoid the wife being represented by a male relative without her knowing it). The judge would decide on the future for the children and mother.⁶³

This reform of civil law reflected some of the basic demands of the international women’s movement of the time. But different than in other countries, such as Kenya and India where the colonial power had attempted to intervene during the interwar period, Algeria had not seen such requests earlier.⁶⁴ Instead, the reform of Algerian marriage law in 1959 was part of the French administration’s policy to win the war by gaining the support of Algeria’s female population. French propaganda intensively advertised the reform, and administrators used women’s evenings and other social activities organized by female army personnel to reach the Algerian women.⁶⁵ This propaganda did not go unnoticed by the FLN. It forbade the Algerian population from marrying according to French law and, more generally, appeals to French courts. According to FLN decree, Algerians had to marry according to Islamic law by reciting the first sura. FLN judicial committees took charge of civil law matters, denying any French court the authority to deal with private matters. The private was political, as both sides knew.

Conclusion

From a global perspective, the Wars of Decolonization achieved their primary goal: all over the world, colonies won their independence in the first three decades after World War II,

and the liberated peoples entered the United Nations as newly founded nation states. This decline of colonial powers gave birth to new agents. In many former colonial countries, men and women who had fought in the anticolonial liberation movements took the lead from former authorities, but men did so more than women. Thus, from a gender perspective, this successful change needs to be carefully scrutinized and assessed in a more qualified way. The persistence of gender relations dominated by traditional roles and the superiority of men over women had its roots in the preexisting colonial order and the anticolonial war itself. Even communist- and socialist-dominated liberation movements that had delineated specific places for women and girls in their organizations and at least rhetorically acknowledged them as equal to men, nevertheless fostered a division between male tasks and female activities through their gendered practices.

Women were obligated to do their share in the anticolonial struggle. The anticolonial conflicts were by nature very demanding of women, if they were not involved in the fighting themselves: the guerillas needed not only food and shelter but also nursing and intelligence that women were most able to provide. In addition, the nationalist parties and armed liberation movements needed broad popular support and targeted women as the “pillar of the society,” the “bedrock” of the national community. Such a role was neither new nor specific to guerilla warfare, but it gained an offensive dimension when used to reinforce the colonized people’s cohesion against the colonizers. The context of the anticolonial struggle shaped the lives of the people: even everyday tasks were related to war issues, and in some areas being neutral was simply impossible.

Yet this involvement of native people in the support of the armed movements did foster changes in the gender roles and relations for women. In the context of war, they gained new agency, and they experienced new relationships to public spaces (either by protesting or by simply traveling from one place to the other). They also experienced new responsibilities vis-à-vis their families since men were often absent and out of reach. In some cases, women were also engaged in the armed movements and, even if they rarely carried arms, they experienced in guerilla life gender relations that were often quite different from the traditional gender-based social relationships of the prewar period—though not totally distinct from them. Indeed, many nationalist movements had to develop policies to address the challenge that overthrowing the colonial power might lead to far reaching changes in the social order. Some of these movements were explicitly revolutionary, others were not, but all had to deal with the fact that their call for a revolt might affect the whole social body once the colonizers were out of the country. Yet the fight against colonial rule was always the priority during the liberation struggle, and these social and gender issues were rarely addressed until the aftermath of war and liberation. Nevertheless, the war did have far-reaching impacts on people’s lives and the social and gender order of postwar societies.

Gender issues were especially important after the liberation, because they had already become a focus of the colonial powers’ wartime policies. Herein lies the main particularity of the Wars of Decolonization: political sovereignty was at stake, but so was the power over society and culture. As a result, the way women and men should live, and according to what kind of standard, was crucial to the definition of the various war aims. In many respects, the Wars of Decolonization were wars over civilization for the colonizers and over identity for the colonized peoples, and gender was a fundamental issue in this regard. Nationalist movements reversed the colonizers’ discourse and imposed their views on gender issues as well. After the war, however, as after so many other conflicts, the new male elites leading the liberated nations insisted that the wartime gender relations, which they described as exceptional due to the necessities and

impediments of war, needed to be “reordered,” which often meant an attempt to return to the old gender hierarchies.

¹ The war in Rhodesia (1964–79) also known as the Zimbabwe War of Liberation and the South African struggle for liberation could have been included, because its aim was to free a population from colonialism, but both were excluded because their white authorities were only indirectly linked to Britain, as both were self-governing colonies.

² Achille Mbembe, *La naissance du maquis dans le Sud-Cameroun, 1920–1960: histoire des usages de la raison en colonie* (Paris: Khartala, 1996).

³ On the end of empires, see Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, eds., *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁴ See Martin Thomas et al., eds., [*The Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial Nation States, 1918–1975*](#) (London: Hodder Education, 2008).

⁵ See Bal Ram Nanda, *In Search of Gandhi: Essays and Reflections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁶ On the memory of the Algerian War in France, see Raphaëlle Branche, *La guerre d'Algérie: une histoire apaisée?* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2005).

⁷ Roger Chickering, “Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept,” in *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914*, ed. Manfred F. Boemeke et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13–28.

⁸ On the *Gewaltraum* concept, see Wolfgang Sofsky, *Zeiten des Schreckens: Amok, Terror, Krieg* (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2002). See also Jörg Baberowski and Gabriel Metzler, eds., *Gewalträume: Soziale Ordnungen im Ausnahmezustand* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2010).

⁹ See the introductory chapter to part III by Karen Hagemann and Sonya Rose on “Gendering War: The Age of the World Wars—Overview” in this handbook.

¹⁰ See the chapter by Karen Hagemann on “History and Memory of Female Military Service in the Age of World Wars” in this handbook.

¹¹ See in particular Neil MacMaster, *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the “Emancipation” of Muslim Women, 1954–62* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).

¹² See esp. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (French 1952) (London: Pluto, 1967), and *Dying Colonialism* (French 1959) (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1965).

¹³ See, for example, Aaronette M. White’s critique of Fanon in “Men Are Fighting for Freedom, All the Women Are Mourning Their Men, but Some of Us Carried Guns: A Raced-Gendered Analysis of Fanon’s Psychological Perspectives on War,” *Signs* 32, no. 4 (2007): 857–884.

¹⁴ Georges Balandier, “La situation coloniale: approche théorique,” *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* 11 (1951): 44–79.

¹⁵ Thus, Robert J. C. Young’s article, while very interesting, falls in the trap of focusing on the relationship between colonized and colonizer. See Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 360–382.

¹⁶ Djamila Amrane, *Des femmes dans la guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: Karthala, 1994).

¹⁷ Ryme Seferdjeli, “‘Fight with Us, Women, and We Will Emancipate You’: France, the FLN, and the Struggle over Women during the Algerian War” (D.Phil. thesis, London School of Economics, University of London, 2005).

¹⁸ MacMaster, *Burning the Veil*.

¹⁹ Natalya Vince, *Our Fighting Sisters: Nation, Memory and Gender in Algeria, 1954–2012* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015).

²⁰ See, Lenore Manderson, *Women, Politics and Change: The Kaum Ibu UMNO, Malaysia, 1945–1972* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980); Virginia H. Dancz, *Women and Party Politics in Peninsular Malaysia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987); and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, “Against Multiple Hegemonies: Radical Malay Women in Colonial Malaya,” *Journal of Social History* 47, no. 1 (2013): 153–175.

²¹ Sandra C. Taylor, *Vietnamese Women at War: Fighting for Ho Chi Minh and the Revolution* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); and François Guillemot, *Des Vietnamiennes dans la guerre civile: L’autre moitié de la guerre 1945–1975* (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2014).

²² Meredith Terretta, *Petitioning for Our Rights, Fighting for Our Nation: The History of the Democratic Union of Cameroonian Women, 1949–1960* (Oxford: Langaa Research & Publishing, 2013), and *Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence: Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition and State Building in Cameroon* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013).

²³ Cora Ann Presley, *Kikuyu Women, the Mau Mau Rebellion, and Social Change in Kenya* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

²⁴ Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The “Manly Englishman” and the “Effeminate Bengali” in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).

²⁵ For example, Norma J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London: James Currey, 1995); and Raymond Suttner, "Masculinities in the African National Congress-led Liberation Movement: The Underground Period," *Kleio* 37, no. 1 (2005): 71–106.

²⁶ David French, *British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Huw Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Matthew Hughes, ed., *British Ways of Counter-Insurgency: A Historical Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2013).

²⁷ Intelligence gathered on 11 August 1955 by the General Intelligence Police of Algiers, 3F/141, Archives Nationales d'Outre Mer (ANOM).

²⁸ Intelligence gathered on 10 November 1955, 3F/141 (ANOM).

²⁹ Intelligence gathered on 20 October 1955, 3F/141 (ANOM).

³⁰ Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, "The Role of Women in the Liberation of Mozambique," *Ufahamu* 13, no. 2–3 (1984): 128–185, 153; and Harry G. West, "Girls with Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of FRELIMO's Female Detachment," *Anthropological Quarterly* 73, no. 4 (2000): 180–194.

³¹ Vina A. Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

³² Aljunied, "Against Multiple Hegemonies."

³³ See Karen G. Turner, "'Vietnam' as a Women's War," in *A Companion to the Vietnam War*, ed. Marilyn B. Young and Robert Buzzanco (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 93–112.

³⁴ Data from Seferdjeli, “Fight with Us.”

³⁵ According to Presley, *Kikuyu Women*, 213. See also Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005) esp. 221–231, 244–265.

³⁶ See several eyewitness testimonies of demonstrations in 1958 (but not confirmed by French services) in FM/DPCT//19 (ANOM).

³⁷ Meredith Terretta, “A Miscarriage of Revolution: Cameroonian Women and Nationalism,” *Stichproben: Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 7, no. 12 (2007): 61–90, 67.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 72.

³⁹ West, “Girls with Guns.”

⁴⁰ Charles Tilly, *Contentious French* (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1986).

⁴¹ Intelligence notes dated 24 June 1958, 3F141 (ANOM).

⁴² Terretta, “Miscarriage of Revolution.”

⁴³ See Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d’une combattante de l’ALN: Zone autonome d’Alger* (Algiers: Chihab Editions, 2013), 610.

⁴⁴ *El Moudjahid*, 65, 31 May 1960.

⁴⁵ Assia Djebar, *Les Enfants du Nouveau Monde* (Paris: René Juillard, 1962).

⁴⁶ West, “Girls with Guns.”

⁴⁷ Mike Kesby, “Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerrilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe, 1972–1980,” *The Journal of Southern African Studies* 22, no. 4 (1996): 561–584.

⁴⁸ Inge Brinkman, “War, Witches and Traitors: Cases from the MPLA’s Eastern Front in Angola (1966–1975),” *Journal of African History* 44, no. 2 (2003): 303–325.

⁴⁹ For information on these practices, see Christian Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 177–234.

⁵⁰ Michel Cornaton, *Les camps de regroupement de la guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: Editions ouvrières, 1967).

⁵¹ Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le déracinement: la crise de l’agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964), 161.

⁵² Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 136.

⁵³ Raphaëlle Branche, *La Torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie, 1954–1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), and “The best *fellagha* hunter is the French of North African descent” (General Challe). Harkis in French Algeria”, in *Unconventional Warfare: Guerrillas and Counterinsurgency in History*, ed. Brian Hughes and Fergus Robson (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, to be published in 2017); and François-Xavier Hautreux, *La Guerre d’Algérie des harkis, 1954–1962* (Paris: Perrin, 2013).

⁵⁴ Mbembe, *La naissance*.

⁵⁵ Partha Chatterjee, “Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women: The Contest in India,” *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 4 (1989): 622–633.

⁵⁶ See Cora Ann Presley, “The Mau Mau Rebellion, Kikuyu Women, and Social Change,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 22, no. 3 (1988): 502–527.

⁵⁷ Lynn M. Thomas, “‘Ngaitana (I Will Circumcise Myself)’: The Gender and Generational Politics of the 1956 Ban on Clitoridectomy in Meru, Kenya,” *Gender & History* 8, no. 3 (1996): 338–363.

⁵⁸ Psychological action program entitled “Muslim Women against Rebellion” for Eastern Algeria in early 1958, presented in a letter to prefects from the IGAME de l’Est, 10 January 1958, 932//89 (ANOM).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Interior Ministry, Department of Algerian Affairs, “Draft reform for the personal status of Muslim and Kabyle women in Algeria,” June 1957, 142 pp., FM/81F/74 (ANOM).

⁶² Motion from the Committee for Social Action and Women’s Solidarity of Miramar, Bains Romaines and Bainem, dated 29 September 1958, FM81F75 (ANOM).

⁶³ On Nafissa Sid Cara and the reform, see Neil MacMaster, “The Colonial ‘Emancipation’ of Algerian Women: the Marriage Law of 1959 and the Failure of Legislation on Women’s Rights in the Post-Independence Era,” *Stichproben: Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 7, no. 12 (2007): 91–116.

⁶⁴ See Cora Ann Presley's research on Kenya in Preseley, "Mau Mau Rebellion"; and Mrinalini Sinha's analysis of the 1929 Child Marriage Restraint Act in India in Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

⁶⁵ Macmaster, "The Colonial 'Emancipation.'"