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Decisions to stay and migrate in Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria

Hervé Nicolle, Juan-David Sempere, Lisa Pfister, Rosa Ojwang, Simona Vezzoli

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PACES

Making migration and migration policy decisions
amidst societal transformations

Decisions to stay and migrate in Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria

Scoping studies for the PACES project

Hervé Nicolle

Rosa Ojwang

Lisa Pfister

Juan-David Sempere

Simona Vezzoli

Samuel Hall

Samuel Hall

Samuel Hall
East Africa Limited

Univesidad de
Alicante

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PACES (Making migration and migration policy decisions amidst societal transformation) is a 40-month research project (2023-2026) that examines decisions to stay and migrate over time and space, researches the politics of knowledge in migration policy and seeks to use its insights to inform future migration policies and governance. PACES is carried out by a consortium of 14 partners in Europe and Africa.

Contact for PACES project

Simona Vezzoli
International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: www.iss.nl/paces

Authors

Hervé Nicolle, herve.nicolle@samuelhall.org, Rosa Ojwang, rosa.ojwang@samuelhall.org, Lisa Pfister, lisa.pfister@samuelhall.org, Juan-David Sampere, jd.sempere@ua.es, Simona Vezzoli, vezzoli@iss.nl.

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1. Introduction

We don't travel for the fun of it, as far as I know; we're foolish, but not that foolish.

Samuel Beckett, *Mercier and Camier*

Knowledge and understanding of people's decision to migrate is critical for policymakers' ability to develop migration policies. The EU-funded **PACES project - Making migration and migration policy decisions amidst societal transformations** focuses on two parallel research components: the factors shaping migration decision-making and the mechanisms supporting migration policies.

The project will combine theoretical and empirical knowledge from several academic disciplines and methodological paradigms to systematically investigate the interactions between migration decisions, policies, and broader social transformation. PACES will draw on data collected in Algeria, Ethiopia, Italy, Libya, Nigeria, Slovakia, and Spain to elaborate a heuristic model that identifies different constellations of conditions that influence decisions to stay and migrate at various stages of individual life trajectories and migrant journeys. **This report presents three scoping studies carried out to examine and select the six research locations (secondary cities) in Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria.**

The scoping studies considered nine locations from which the six research areas are selected at the end of this report. **These scoping studies were conducted for the research component, also referred to as work package (WP), that studies how people make decisions to stay and migrate to/in/from Algeria, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.** Within this component, we explore how people's decisions to stay and migrate are influenced by societal changes, individual life experiences and migration policies over time and as people move across different locations. We pay particular attention to the role of people's perceptions of their social and personal situation, as well as their values and expectations, as determining factors in decisions to stay or emigrate.¹

Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria are countries of origin, transit and destination, which makes it possible to study the factors that determine decisions to stay and migrate among different populations: 1) residents who decide to stay or who may aspire to migrate, 2) migrants on the move and 3) people settled in these countries. The combination of all these characteristics makes these three countries suitable for exploring the links between long-term social transformations and migration decision-making processes before the onset of migration and throughout the migratory journey.

Although the characteristics of these three countries at national level are important, this project moves from the national context to the regional and municipal context. To do this, it focuses on specific secondary cities, their historical development, including their migration history and their role in the national mobility dynamics. In sum, this WP seeks to highlight how long-term societal changes in the selected secondary cities shapes the perceptions, values, personal expectations and life and migration aspirations of residents and migrants.

2. Methodology

The term 'methodology' in this document refers to both the definitions and selection process used during the inception phase of the research (WP4). The methodology is based on a three-pronged approach: 1) the

¹ For the conceptual approach underpinning this research component see the paper *Researching decision to stay and migrate: A Temporal Multilevel Analysis framework* available on the PACES website at [Publications – IMI \(migrationinstitute.org\)](#) and www.iss.nl/PACES.

selection of countries, 2) within each country, the selection of secondary cities, 3) and finally the definition of 'urban communities' or 'city neighbourhoods'. As shown in the figure and table below, this section (2) clarifies the selection process at country, city and community level, while the following section (3) presents the results of this selection process at the country and city level. However, the communities (equivalent to the primary sampling units for the study) have not yet been selected and will only be selected after an initial series of interviews with local experts, institutions and targeted field observations. And of course, the specific methodology for sampling institutions or individuals has not been fully developed at this preliminary stage and is not included in this document.





Table 1: Synthesis of the outcomes of section 2 (Methodology) and 3 (Selected countries and secondary cities)

Objective of this document	Country	Secondary city	Community	Institutions and Organisations	People
Selection modalities	Explanation	Explanation	Explanation	No	Definition
Actual selection	Three countries	Six cities	No	No	No

The country scoping studies were based on publicly available statistics, a variety of written sources but also on direct knowledge of the country and cities by members of the project team. One of the aims of this research is indeed to build on and favour a heuristic approach that is as much rooted in the (apparent) objectivity of official statistics as in observation and empirical knowledge. The experience (both prior to and during the fieldwork) of the team members (WP4 and beyond) was therefore crucial in selecting the countries and - to a lesser extent - the communities. The scoping studies for secondary cities were based on available statistics and known information in secondary literature and among the partners. As highlighted in the initial objective of this WP, the in-depth research carried out in the following phase of this project will uncover further knowledge on the long-term societal changes in the preselected secondary cities or urban communities, reveal more detailed (statistical) evidence of local and regional migrations and generate new insights on how these aspects have shaped and continued to shape current aspirations to stay and migrate.

The selection of countries and secondary cities followed the same logic, which was both subjectively rooted in the past experience (e.g. by virtue of prior knowledge or previous research projects) and objectively supported by the data (Figure 2). On this basis, three secondary cities were systematically selected or identified by the research team in each country, before only two were finally chosen, following internal brainstorming and a typological harmonisation of the six sites, with an emphasis on diversity (politically, socially, economically, as well as in terms of mobility patterns).

Figure 2: Selection process for countries and communities (WP4)



2.1. Selection of countries: using the known to produce the new

First and foremost, it is important to note that while the national dimension is obviously relevant for thinking about the decision-making issues of this WP (since it informs the political, policy and regulatory aspects), the choice of urban communities is really the most relevant level for thinking about socio-economic interactions, the intersubjective reality of mobility and the experience of decision-making. With this important caveat in mind, the choice of countries mainly relied on available data and official resources (such as the World Bank, UNHABITAT, UNDESA as well as available governmental sources) to provide a general understanding of the selected countries, their long-term societal changes and migration history, and to understand whether the shortlisted countries could provide an angle corresponding to the conceptual framework of the project. Another factor was the quantity, depth, and diversity of sources on a given country: we needed to have sufficient resources and recent data, without however favouring over-researched areas, to produce research that was part of a certain genealogy while *at the same time* producing innovative data, analyses and critical perspectives.

We thus explored the historical and current developments that may have shaped people's livelihoods, their possible desires for change and their aspirations to stay or migrate. In total, almost 15 indicators have been selected, with the aim of promoting a choice that reflects the diversity of national situations and mobility issues: population size, fertility rates, ethnic group composition, GDP per capita, demographic pressure, urban development, transport infrastructure, public services, socio-economic conditions, governance, violence and insecurity, external development initiatives, refugees and IDPs, human flight and brain drain, international migrant stock, refugee hosting and refugee population (origin), international students abroad, internally displaced persons. Some of these indicators are not mutually exclusive, but the objective is not to produce a synthetic view on each country but rather to identify, for each indicator, differences, and commonalities between the three different countries.

In addition to these standard measures, we also took into account historical factors, such as colonisation, independence and the path to independence, political developments over the past 60 years, the current political situation with political crises, tensions and wars (e.g. Boko Haram and the insurgencies in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, unrest in Algeria and civil war in Ethiopia from 2020), economic developments including restructuring and development interventions by international institutions (e.g. IMF, World Bank, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa) (see Table A1 in Annex I for specific trends and figures).

2.2. Secondary towns, urban communities, and survey participants

2.2.1. What we talk about when we talk about 'secondary cities'

Urban growth in Africa has seen the expansion of big cities as well as small and medium-sized urban settlements, often referred to as secondary cities. In the hierarchy of cities, secondary cities are ranked lower than primary cities, but are bigger than small towns. Secondary cities are part of an urban system and they hold a functional role: they generally have a strategic economic position and host regional markets, they are services and communication hubs, may be in an optimal position for transport and trade and may hold an important administrative and political role, e.g., regional capitals.² Secondary cities may benefit from various forms of government investment as in public infrastructure and government-supported industrial activities. While a secondary city may be seen as less dynamic and glamorous than a big city,³ it generally hosts improved public facilities (schools and healthcare facilities), infrastructure (electricity, piped water, telephone/broadband, paved road network), economic (agricultural and non-agricultural employment, large businesses) and commercial activities (markets, eateries, entertainment such as cinemas), features that are largely unavailable in villages. The growth of secondary cities can be partially attributed to 'urban dispersal strategies' meant to slow down the growth of large cities and are thus places with the potential for further growth.⁴

Secondary cities have been characterized as in-between places, the middle ground between the big city and the rural areas, between the capitalist-driven anonymous life of the city and the agricultural subsistence life of the rural village. For rural villagers seeking to leave behind village life, secondary cities hold clear advantages: they are more proximate to the village and often host other villagers who disseminate information about life in the city, and job and housing opportunities, facilitating their own migration. As such, these cities may be the first destination of rural-urban migrants who seek elements of city life but may be unable or uncertain about their abilities to live in a big primary city, such as the nation's capital.⁵ Therefore, secondary cities may function as a steppingstone for migration to a big city or to international destinations. For this reason, these cities may be targeted locations for national or international policies that seek to deter further migration to the big cities or to international destinations.

Nevertheless, these cities are often the destination of many rural-urban migrants who are satisfied with their move to a secondary city and have no aspiration to move onward.⁶ In this respect, we agree with the EQUAL Partnership's analysis of African secondary or 'intermediary cities': "more and more migrants, refugees and IDPs settle, either temporarily or permanently, in African intermediary cities. These cities constitute central spaces for mixed movements driven by processes of urbanization, socio-economic transformation, environmental stressors, as well as conflict and persecution. Though not always intended as final destinations, persons on the move may consider intermediary cities more accessible - financially, geographically, and socially - than capital cities."⁷

Secondary cities are therefore good sites to study how the transformation of the urban space and its society shapes people's perceptions of its present and expectations about the future. In turn, secondary cities are sites to observe how these perceptions and expectations influence desires to stay or to migrate (further) among

² Andreasen, M. H., Agergaard, J., Kiunsi, R. B., & Namangaya, A. H. (2017). Urban transformations, migration and residential mobility patterns in African secondary cities. *Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography*, 117(2), 93-104.

³ Ingelaere, B., Christiaensen, L., De Weerd, J., & Kanbur, R. (2018). Why secondary towns can be important for poverty reduction-A migrant perspective. *World Development*, 105, 273-282.

⁴ Beauchemin, C., & Schoumaker, B. (2005). Migration to cities in Burkina Faso: Does the level of development in sending areas matter? *World Development*, 33(7), 1129-1152.

⁵ Ingelaere, B., Christiaensen, L., De Weerd, J., & Kanbur, R. (2018). Why secondary towns can be important for poverty reduction-A migrant perspective..

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Stürmer-Siovit, J. and Morthorst, L. J., "Creating Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships to Address Urban Migration and Displacement in African Intermediary Cities", Equal Partnerships Policy Paper, 2024. Available at https://equal-partnerships.com/wp-content/uploads/Equal-Partnerships_Policy-Paper_EN.pdf

residents of these cities as well as migrants who are considering making the city their permanent residence or may see it only as a stepping stone to further away destinations.

With these caveats in mind, we will consider 'secondary cities' or 'intermediary cities' not according to their respective administrative or geographical boundaries, but according to the fluidity and interactions that they often allow in terms of mobility. The research and sampling will therefore be carried out within specific communities and neighbourhoods of these 'secondary cities' – without any size limit. In this WP, secondary cities then include a great variety of urban settlements with a wide range of population sizes and features,⁸ although they generally have an important function within the system of cities. We identified twelve characteristics to guide our selection of secondary cities:

- Population size (small = up to 250,000; medium = 250,000-500,000; large = 500,000-1 million)
- Urban development (1 limited investment to 5 strong investment)
- Transport infrastructure, including roadways, railways and various forms of public and (affordable) private transport (1 low to 5 high)
- Access to public services such as education, healthcare and social protection measures (1 low to 5 high)
- Official socio-economic conditions of the population, specifically literacy, fertility and mortality, levels and sectors of employment, in the past 20-25 years up to present (1 low to 5 high)
- Local governance, representativeness, corruption (1 low to 5 high)
- External development initiatives, such as projects by GIZ, USAID, EU Trust Fund for Africa, etc. (1 low to 5 high)
- Violence and insecurity (1 low to 5 high)
- Climate-induced stresses such as droughts and floods (1 low to 5 high)
- New development initiatives promising important future changes (1 low to 5 high)
- Internal and international (im)migration to the city, all forms (1 low to 5 high)
- Internal and international (e)migration from the city, all forms (1 low to 5 high)

This list, which is used to a general comparison and the selection of the cities in section 7, is purely intended as a strategy to limit our selection of 2 secondary cities among multiple options within each country and, ultimately, to enable meaningful comparative analyses. It does not capture a wide range of historical, political, and cultural aspects that complete the picture of the historical evolution of the city, its strategic importance and how it shapes the 'identity' of its population. These elements may engender specific conditions that strongly influence decisions to stay and migrate more so than any of the characteristics identified about. However, such in-depth knowledge will only emerge from the upcoming research and conversations with local experts, community representatives, long-standing residents, and migrants.

2.2.2. Defining 'communities' (city neighbourhoods): moral regions, situations, and hubs

Within each secondary city, we will select one city neighbourhood (or community) to examine the links between local social transformations and migration dynamics observed at the city level. We envision the selection of neighbourhoods where both long-term residents and migrants live, where processes of integration and inclusion, discrimination, and segregation shape livelihoods of their residents. Within these communities, we will analyse local livelihoods, social norms, values, the meanings they give to local amenities and changes over time, and preferences towards staying and migrating, noting for instance a visible culture of migration. The


⁸ Andreasen, M. H., Agergaard, J., Kiunsi, R. B., & Namangaya, A. H. (2017). Urban transformations, migration and residential mobility patterns in African secondary cities.

working definition of community presented below is meant to help the research team identify "sampling units" for the fieldwork in the next phase of research. To date (February 2024), no community has yet been selected.

A fruitful discussion among the partners this WP in autumn 2023 raised questions about the very notion of communities (or city neighbourhoods) for our study. How can we define and circumscribe the relevant framework for this study? Should we consider the community as a geographical, administrative, socio-economic or even emotional area - as we might say of a 'community of belonging'? Urban anthropologist Michel Agier (1996) provided some valuable insights in this direction when he referred to the 'twofold transcendence'. First, drawing on the lessons of the anthropology of the Chicago School of Anthropology (Robert Park, Robert Redfield, Louis Wirth, mainly), he defined the 'moral milieu' and 'moral regions', applied to any urban space without any a priori limit or scale (Figure 3). The moral milieux symbolized how a place is defined by urban actors, whoever they may be (from planners to back-alley dwellers). "This sense of place (...) corresponds to an imaginary cartography of city dwellers who live in certain parts of the city while having at least some experiences, ideas or images of other spaces."⁹

Second, Agier appeals to the notion of *situation*, which is not defined by spatial boundaries, even subjective or experimental ones, but by interaction (Figure 3). For the Africanist anthropology of the Manchester School at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, and particularly for J. Clyde Mitchell, the structural/institutional character is secondary, and the only priority is the observation of phenomena on an interactional scale, i.e. through attention to the day-to-day exchanges between agents. As Agier points out, for migrants (or any other city dweller), this phenomenological context of urban interaction can vary from one situation to another several times a day (work, family, leisure, etc.). For this reason, we need to "place the full weight of the analysis on the interactional context rather than on the background of the individuals involved in the situation or on the 'cultures' in the name of which they interact."¹⁰

Figure 3: Regional and situational perspectives on urban (PACES' visuals based on Agier's typology)




Lastly, the third analytical perspective introduced by Agier is that of the *web or network*, which should enable researchers to construct more interactional and intersubjective frameworks for investigation. For Melvin

⁹ Michel Agier, "Les savoirs urbains de l'anthropologie", *Enquête*, 4 | 1996, 35-58.

¹⁰ Mitchell, J.C, "The Situational Perspective", in *Cities, Society, and Social Perception. A Central African Perspective*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987.

Webber, for example, this interactional characteristic of the city is the reason why we should look beyond the simple administrative, formal or physical limits of the urban: "The spatial forms [of] interactions [of urban dwellers] will undoubtedly be increasingly disparate, less and less linked to places of residence or work, less and less marked by the 'unifocal' features that characterised the old cities"¹¹. By focusing on accessibility as the key to the existence of cities, Webber stressed that with increasing accessibility the city itself becomes transformed from a place into a web of interactions at varying geographic scales. From this perspective, urban areas are manifestations of 'communities of interest' that exist at different scales - locally or globally - without established or assignable boundaries, and which are increasingly likely to expand geographically and become more complex as communications and technologies continue to develop at a rapid pace. The visual below (Figure 4) expresses this idea by emphasising the multidimensional nature of the community, which is always networked with other, larger communities and is itself a nexus of other nexuses, within which institutions, 'residents', 'transit migrants', 'internally displaced persons' and 'refugee urban settlements' only take on meaning in a multi-focal way. And these interacting networks are as much spatial as they are temporal, as human as they are institutional, as technological as they are cultural, as social as they are economic, as local as they are global, as centripetal as they are centrifugal... and they help to question (if not undermine) an identity-based approach to the community.

Figure 4: Network perspectives on urban.



Source: authors' own visual based on Agier's typology (1996), as well as Webber (1964) and Ingold (2016)

This redefinition of communities, while distinct from the other two perspectives, complements them in a way that is very useful for the methodology and conceptual framework of PACES. Its value lies particularly in the dimensions of temporality, bordering on and transcending the national framework (both sub-national and supra-national). According to this conceptualisation, today's communities are networks or hubs - and even 'meshworks', a term we borrow from Tim Ingold. The hub or meshwork can be defined as "the reticular patterns left by people (in homes, human communities, small towns, peri-urban areas, etc.) whose movements and traces

¹¹ Webber, M.M., "The urban place and the nonplace urban realm". In *Explorations into Urban Structure*, Edited by: Webber, M.M. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964.

contribute to create a living environment of "interwoven trails rather than a network of intersecting routes"¹². As such, it suggests that mobility and migration cannot be seen from a linear perspective, based on communication and transport from one point to another or from one hub to another along abstract routes. Rather, the understanding of communities as meshworks entails that people (including researchers, residents, and migrants) are all bearers of a past and a history, all actors in a supranational network of technologies and knowledge, all anchored in local social, cultural, economic and political realities¹³.

More than just administrative or geographical labels, the understanding that guides PACES' definition and choice of urban "communities" in this study and specific WP is therefore based on a **threefold perspective: moral-regional, situational and network/meshwork, as all of them are relevant, especially when combined**. In this respect, one of the expected learnings from this research will be to nuance our understanding of what a community is, but also how the notions of region, situation or networks apply to the urban context and mobility dynamics. The variables chosen to explain the choices made are therefore based as much on official and formal demographic and socio-economic data as on a subjective appreciation of regional, situational and network aspects.

We plan to select the neighbourhoods/communities, based on the conceptualisation provided in this section, as soon as the interviews with experts and local authorities have been completed.

2.2.3. Respondents without borders: migrants and residents

Within the secondary cities and specific communities or city neighbourhoods, we will pay particular attention to the interplay of two factors: (i) how social change is perceived through personal experiences and understanding of social norms and values, and (ii) how previous migrations shape ideas about life aspirations and one's own migration. To do so, we will examine the perceptions of long-term societal change and expectations of the future among residents as well as migrants in transit or who settled in the city. We will also pay particular attention to the gender-specific conceptions, obligations and preferences that influence ideas about migration and differ within the household and from one generation to the next.

By focusing on residents, we aim to examine the perceptions of long-term societal change and expectations of the future among residents who originate and/or have been living in the city for several years. Residents may have had a short migration experience in the past, may be children of migrants, or they may be migrants who have lived in the city for 20 or more years. These participants hold a good understanding of important events in the community and how society has changed over time. This includes important economic shifts, natural disasters, political tensions as well as shifts in the population because of the arrival or the departure of people. Because of the in-depth understanding of the city and its surroundings over the long-term, residents provide a temporal comparative perspective.

Among the migrants, we include people who come from other countries, faraway regions within the country or within the region. We consider those who have been in the city at least three months and may indicate an intention to transit and also those who shown some signs of settlement but have not been in the city for more than two years. We expect the transit and short-term settled migrants to vary in the level of local knowledge. However, both groups should be similar in the way in which they consider 2 or more locations when assessing the quality of life, the possibilities in situ and their ability to fulfil their life aspirations with or without further migration. Because of the reliance on multiple locations when making (further) decisions about pursuing migration or staying, migrants provide a spatial comparative perspective. By capturing the perceptions and

¹² Ingold, T. (2016) *Lines, A Brief History*, with a new preface by the author, Routledge Classics. Originally, Ingold borrows and develops the opposition "meshwork/network" from Lefebvre, H. (1991) *The Production of Space*, Oxford: Blackwell.

¹³ See Samuel Hall, 2023. *Youth, Migration and Development: A New Lens for Critical Times - Case Studies from Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Senegal, Thailand, and Tunisia*, KNOMAD Paper 53. <https://knomad.org/publication/youth-migration-and-development-case-studies-colombia-jordan-kenya-mexico-pakistan-0>.

expectations of both residents and migrants, the project team seeks to capture how a similar context is perceived by people with in-depth local knowledge and those with a less in-depth knowledge of the locality but with the ability to compare among different localities.

Having justified the selection of Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria, the value of focusing on secondary cities and on residents and migrants, we now present the three scoping studies, starting with Algeria.

3. Selected countries and secondary cities

3.1 The Choice of Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria

For the country selection, we considered a set of general characteristics as well as the history of migration, both internal and international, voluntary and involuntary mobility and the presence of a culture of migration. In the next few paragraphs, we present the main indicators for these three countries in a comparative perspective. More detailed country-level characteristics that are embedded in the national historical context are introduced in sections 3.2.1 for Algeria, 3.3.1 for Ethiopia and 3.4.1 for Nigeria.

From a political and socio-economic perspective, Algeria is the country with the highest GDP per capita (13,226\$ current international, PPP) in comparison to Ethiopia and Nigeria. It has the lowest fertility rate, the highest level of literacy, a high labor force participation among men, infrastructural development, high financial expenditures for health services, political stability and relatively low levels of violence. Its economy is heavily reliant on natural gas and oil, but this resource is decreasing in importance to the benefit of the services sector.

Several socio-economic indicators suggest that Nigeria may be placed in-between Algeria and Ethiopia with its GDP per capita (5,431\$ current international, PPP) and health expenditure and services. However, Nigeria has the largest population, the highest fertility rate (5.2 children per woman in 2022), the highest rate of completion of education (43.9% for the 25+ age group has completed secondary education or beyond), has an increasing number of people covered by social insurance programs. Nigeria also has a high number of homicides, high probability of dying among 20-24 year olds and high political instability and violence, which has been worsening since the late 1990s. Similarly to Algeria, the manufacturing sector and the role of oil have been important but are losing importance. Interestingly, the agricultural sector is gaining strength in Nigeria representing about 24% of the GDP in 2022.


Ethiopia's population of 115 million (2023) is in-between Algeria and Nigeria, and so is its fertility rate, which decreased rapidly from 7 children per woman in 1995 to 4.1 in 2022. Data on levels of insecurity suggest that Ethiopia is also in-between Algeria and Nigeria with a rapidly declining probability of dying among young people (20-24 age group) from 38.8 per 1,000 in 1991 to 8.5 in 2021. Ethiopia has had constantly a stunningly high labor force participation for men (86.1%) and women (75%) (2022 figures). Like in Algeria, labor force participation is decreasing among men and increasing among women. In many ways, however, Ethiopia is lagging in socio-economic development levels with only 51% literacy, only 4.5% of its 25+ population having completed secondary education or beyond, a GDP per person of 2.812\$ (current international, PPP), an economy that is still dominated by agriculture (37% of GDP), low spending for health services and relatively low but improving infrastructural development.

In terms of history, the three countries are very different. Algeria was a French colony starting in 1830 and had a violent war for independence (1954-1962) and continues to be influenced by France to this day. Also Nigeria experienced a long colonial history at the hands of the UK (1850), but its transition to independence (1960) was fairly peaceful. Ethiopia largely escaped colonialization, which has been the source of pride and an important

part of a national narrative until recent times (Finneran, 2013). At present, all three countries are relatively stable, but all have areas of tension. All three countries have relatively low levels of rule of law, low but increasing accountability of authorities and the ability of the population to voice their discontent, but they all show high levels of corruption, and incidents of bribery (see Table A1). Anti-corruption was a central focus of the 2019 demonstrations in Algeria, which led to President Boutflicka’s departure from power. Corruption and lack of resource distribution have also underpinned the insurgencies in the Niger Delta of Nigeria starting in the 1990s until today, which appear to be linked with a decrease in oil exploitation in this country.

When we consider all forms of mobility, we also see a rather complex picture. In terms of displacement for disasters or conflict and violence, Nigeria has the largest numbers, linked to its large population, with 2.43 million of people displaced by disaster and 3.64 million displaced by conflict and violence in 2022. The respective figures for Ethiopia are 873,000 and 3.85 million in 2022, while Algeria has much smaller figures with 73,000 people displaced by disaster in the 2007-2022 period and 2,500 displaced by conflict and violence in 2016. Refugee populations have also varied greatly with very large numbers of refugees in Ethiopia (903,226 Ethiopians registered as refugees in 2018) in comparison to Algerians (peak of 219,000 in 1992) and Nigeria (peak of 100,000 in 1980). Despite these different histories, today the figures are similar across the 3 countries with 77,000 Algerian refugees (2021), 79,598 Ethiopian refugees and 91,275 Nigerian refugees (2022), with the number of Nigerian asylum seekers and refugees showing peaks and valley in the past decade (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Nationals of Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria in 32 European countries



Source: Eurostat, 2022

When we consider other forms of international migration, in 2020 the three countries had numbers of emigrants within the same range: 2 million for Algeria, 1.7 million for Nigeria and just under 950,000 for Ethiopia.¹⁴ Disaggregated migration data by migration categories (Figure 5) show low migration among Algerians and Ethiopians, although the rapid growth of irregular migration among Algerians raises questions about what may be associated with such rapid change and the emergence of new destinations away from France towards Spain,

¹⁴ Total number of emigrants at mid-year 2020 by UN DESA, available on the Migration Data Portal at https://www.migrationdataportal.org/international-data?t=2021&i=inflow_perm, accessed on 11 January 2024.

Italy, Germany and Central and Eastern European countries, e.g., Slovakia and Hungary. It raises questions about changing living conditions in this country possibly associated with growing political instability and uncertainties and the presence of strong culture of migration in certain parts of Algeria. This, however, needs to be further explored. Similarly, declining migration figures for Nigeria raise questions about possible societal changes and their influence on personal trajectories and migration aspirations or, alternatively, a change in preference towards non-European migration destinations. This, also, needs to be explored further.

From this overview and with the aim of understanding social transformations over time, how they shape people's perceptions and expectations of the future and, in turn, desires to stay or aspirations to migrate, we drew these insights and questions:

- How do Algerians perceive the evolution of the situation in their country - and city - given that, on one hand they have observed growth in per capita income, more public services and infrastructure, better rule of law and ability to voice their discontent, while on the other hand they are facing shifts in economic sectors (and decreasing oil revenues) and ongoing corruption and bribery? How do people understand these societal changes? What do these changes mean for Algerians' personal aspirations and trajectories, and for their decisions to stay or migrate? Are young people making choices between voicing their discontent through protests, by decreasing their labor market participation or by migrating? How does the overall discontent about internal corruption combined with disgruntlement with ongoing French influence in Algerian matters shape decisions to stay or migrate and where to migrate, if at all?
- How do Ethiopians make sense of the slow improvement in living conditions, the slow-moving improvements in education levels and in the provision of healthcare, public services, and infrastructure? Are the small gradual changes seen as sign of progress, nonetheless? Have recent years of improved democratic processes, representation of different ethnic groups, and the promotion of non-agricultural sectors generated new expectations for the future? And are the changes in Ethiopia's cultural identity, which has shifted from a narrative of ancient Christian Orthodox lineage to multiple heritages that have emerged against political changes (Finneran, 2013), influencing preferences to stay or migrate?
- How do Nigerians understand the societal changes in their country - and city - given on one hand steady growth in GDP (but its placement much behind African countries such as Algeria), an economy that is gradually shifting to agriculture and services, but with a population that has high secondary and tertiary education levels? What are the views on the gradually improving health and social services? What is the relevance of high levels of corruption and violence in shaping desires to migrate and stay? Are Nigerians voicing their discontents through an increased ability to voice opinions and hold the government accountable or are these irrelevant in aspirations to stay and migrate? Are other factors, such as the growth and global visibility of the Nigerian entertainment industry, e.g., music, fashion and movies, shaping young Nigerians' identity, aspirations and expectations of the future and their preferences to stay or migrate?

While the sets of questions above are phrased at the national level, we do not seek to seek national-level answers given the high level of regional and ethnic diversity within these countries. Rather, we aim to focus on the city level and further to a specific neighbourhood within the city, where it is more realistic to identify how major social changes have materialised in communities and are perceived by the population. We now turn to introducing and justifying the focus on secondary cities.

3.2. Scoping section – *Algeria*

3.2.1. Country overview: a pivotal country for migration in a worrying political and social situation

With a current surface area of 2.38 million square kilometres, Algeria is the largest country in Africa and the Arab world. Due to the size of its territory, the abundance of its natural resources (particularly hydrocarbons), its political stability and its strategic position between the Mediterranean and the countries of the western Sahel (with its border with Libya), Algeria plays an important geopolitical and migratory role in Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean region.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, well before the significant acceleration that began in the 1960s with socio-economic and industrial modernisation, the country had already suffered the harsh impacts of capitalism and endured profound ruptures and upheavals. French colonisation led directly and indirectly to the loss of a third of the indigenous population, the systematic seizure of land throughout the 19th century, the virtual disappearance of the social, economic and religious elites replaced by the colonising power (whether they were from mainland France or French-born Algerians), and the emergence of an aggressive industrial and agrarian capitalism. These aspects of the colonial period (1830-1962) are essential to understanding the country's current situation, particularly in terms of the character of power and society.

While Algeria currently stands as a country with medium per capita income (106th out of 187 in 2022 according to the World Bank) and a medium Human Development Index (91st out of 191 in 2021 according to UNDP¹⁵), its future seems uncertain. Its nationalist, socialist-leaning policies generally provide basic infrastructure for all its citizens. However, the oil and gas windfall, which made the country a privileged economic partner of Europe (via the state company Sonatrach), is uncertain, due to the lack of investment in exploration and production.

Since gaining independence in 1962, the country's population has quadrupled, rising from 11.8 to 44.9 million inhabitants by 2022, according to estimates from the United Nations Population Division (UNPD). This represents an extraordinary average growth of 2.25% annually sustained over 60 years. While Algeria, like many other countries, experienced a sharp decline in fertility from the 1960s to the 1970s (from 7 to 2.5 children per woman between 1980 and 2002, according to UNPD), this trend, expected to bring the country below 2.1 children per woman, reversed in the 2000s, and fertility increased again to 3.1 children per woman in 2016¹⁶. Aging in Algeria will take time to become noticeable and will be slower than in most countries.

3.2.2. Social transformations and migration dynamics: gerontocracy put to the test by youth and economic crises

3.2.2.1. *An interminable transition, a fragmented society*

In Algeria, as in other countries that gained independence through war, having lived through the "war of liberation" is the government's primary source of legitimacy. However, at the end of the 1980s, three quarters of the population had not lived through or remembered independence. While in this period the cost of living was low, society remained very egalitarian and there was no absolute poverty as in other African countries, a growing social malaise permeated Algerian society. The gap between an increasingly gerontocratic

¹⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2022). Human Development Report 2021/2022: Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World. United Nations.

¹⁶ Ouadah-Bedidi, Z., Vallin, J. & Bouchoucha, I. (2012). La fécondité au Maghreb : nouvelle surprise. Population & Sociétés, 486, 1-4.

government and Algeria's young population – most of whom have limited prospects (referred to as *hittistes*¹⁷) – became visible in the eighties¹⁸. This marks the beginning of *Raï* (a transgressive Algerian musical style), clandestine emigration, and the very Algerian and Maghrebi concept of "hogra"¹⁹. With the decline in oil prices starting in 1986, the economy worsened sharply, and social unrest erupted unexpectedly with the October 1988 uprisings, which were spontaneous demonstrations promoted exclusively by young people in the major cities. Along with the "Berber Spring" of 1980, the 1988 uprisings are among the first of the many youth uprisings, street protests, and opposition to authorities that have since regularly shaken the Muslim world. In 1988, the authorities, overwhelmed and completely surprised, reacted by sending in an army that was not prepared for urban unrest and killed 500 young people.

Following the uprisings, the country opened up to a multi-party system, moving from a single party (FLN) to a multi-party system. However, the only structured movement ready to channel the enormous discontent and frustration, connected with the hogra and structural corruption, was the Islamists of the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), who won the 1990 municipal elections and the first round of the December 1991 legislative elections. At that point, the government decided to suspend the legislative elections and outlaw the FIS, triggering the start of a tumultuous civil war that lasted until 1999. Algeria was the first country to confront the Islamist movement in a war, neutralising the movement's historical leaders, with the new leaders becoming increasingly extreme in their actions. During this war, Algerian society felt isolated and misunderstood by the rest of the world, particularly the West and other Arab countries, who saw the conflict more as a civil war than as a war against a political and global Islamist movement. The perception of the rest of the world changed after 11 September, when Algeria's experience in this type of struggle gained appreciation by the West and the Arab regimes.

The Algerian army won the civil war militarily, but society remained deeply marked by the violence and highly sensitive to any hint of new violence. From 1999, when the economy reopened to foreign investment, capital began to flow in again, triggering a construction and consumption boom. Politically, at the same time, Islam was asserting itself as an increasingly important identity reference among young people, which further increased the generational conflict between those who were young before 1988 (particularly those who lived through the 1960s) and those born after 1988.

3.2.2.2. *The Algerian Youth Bulge: An Unstable Social Balance*

The authorities are well aware that discontent among young people is the country's main social problem in the short and long term, against a backdrop of strong demographic growth. Once the civil war had been resolved during President Bouteflika's first term (1999-2004), the government's main priority was young people. Basic necessities such as transport, food, social housing and education were to become more accessible. And while the cost of living has certainly risen since the 1980s due to inflation and economic liberalisation, it remains much lower than in comparable countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Infrastructure and living conditions have improved overall, although there are still marked socio-economic disparities. However, young people continue to denounce paternalism, corruption, hogra and the lack of prospects. The riots and demonstrations that reflect this discontent are regular and sometimes have international repercussions: the "black spring" in Kabylia in 2001 and 2002, the riots of December 2010 and January 2011 in Algeria (and Tunisia).

Faced with difficulties in gathering, organizing, and expressing their discontent, some young people sometimes opt for individual actions that occasionally reach the extreme of self-immolation. The only spaces for expression are social networks and, in the case of young urban men, football stadiums. In 2018, the chant "La Casa de Mouradia", which alluded to the series "La Casa de Papel" and the heist in Mouradia, the presidential palace in

¹⁷ A word that emerged in Algeria in the 1980s that literally means "those who hold the wall" and refers to unemployed people who spend their days leaning against the wall.

¹⁸ Stora, B. (1994). *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale 1830-1954*. Editions La Découverte.

¹⁹ Oppression, exclusion or unjust bullying, abuse of power or authority or denial of justice, coupled with impunity.

Algiers, became famous and marked the beginning of another period of turbulence. When Bouteflika, who was very sick and absent from public view since 2012, hinted at running for a fifth term in 2019, it ignited a movement, the Hirak, which led to unprecedented, massive, peaceful, and orderly demonstrations starting from February 22, 2019. The Hirak, which surpassed any protest movement since the civil war, succeeded in making Bouteflika withdraw his candidacy. The December 2019 presidential elections resulted in the election of President Tebboune, the first president who did not participate in the war of independence, marking a delicate generational change in the political power structure. Nevertheless, the Hirak continued to demonstrate every Friday until public gatherings were banned in March 2020 because of the global pandemic.

An important social aspect of Algeria is that it is a highly centralized country that relies on hydrocarbons as a significant source of foreign exchange. The State subsidizes basic products and provides various form of aid to reduce the cost of living. In addition, the State grants young people various types of interest-free loans and major facilities to buy or build a house in the village. Any Algerian who meets certain conditions has the right to own a home and launch a business project. These loans are granted by the State, negotiated in the wilaya, and not by a private bank. Often, these debts are cancelled and, sometimes, young people sell their property to go travelling with the harraga²⁰. Generally speaking, as in other socialist countries, these measures to support home ownership have probably played a role in stemming the rural exodus.

Finally, in Algeria, security is generally guaranteed throughout the territory. After the "Black Decade" of the nineties, society completely rejects violence, and security forces are very present across the territory. Security incidents involving foreigners can affect the country's external image, which is why authorities tend to overprotect foreigners.

3.2.2.3. Migration Context: between the European political hammer and the anvil of xenophobia

Algeria has a tumultuous migratory history. During the colonial period, France encouraged the migration of French citizens to this country and tolerated the arrival of other Europeans (Maltese, Italians, and especially Spaniards). At the same time, Algerians emigrated to other neighboring Muslim countries and the Middle East.

At the end of the war of independence and during the sixties, the vast majority of the million French colonial residents, mostly humble workers born in Algeria, were forced to flee what they considered their country. Concurrently, there was a rapid rural exodus to coastal cities, especially to Oran and Algiers. However, over the years, this exodus has been much less significant than in other developing countries.²¹

However, Algerians have had significant emigration abroad, especially to France, which has been their almost exclusive destination for most of the twentieth century. This migration began in the early twentieth century when Algeria was administered by France and intensified during the world wars with the departure of soldiers and workers. After independence, migration to France increased, and currently, almost all Algerians have relatives in France, where millions of people of Algerian origin or descent reside²². This situation creates a degree of interdependence between the two countries that goes beyond migration and even influences political decisions.

²⁰ In the local dialect, would-be emigrants are known as "harraga". *Harraga* is the plural of *harag*, which means "burner", because they "burn" the borders and the steps required for regular migration. Moreover, if they arrive in Europe, they destroy or "burn" their identity papers to avoid deportation. Finally, metaphorically, the idea of "burning" also suggests that they are burning their youth and risking their lives in the Mediterranean crossing.

²¹ This can be associated with the government's housing subsidies mentioned above, which seem to have slowed down rural-urban migration.

²² Lacroix, T., Sempere Souvannavong, J. D. et Simon, G. (2015). Algérie. In G. Smon (dir.). *Dictionnaire des migrations internationales. Approche géohistorique* (pp. 210-218). Armand Colin.

Chena, S. (2016). *Les traversées migratoires dans l'Algérie contemporaine. Africains subsahariens et Algériens vers l'exil*. Karthala.

In the last twenty years, in addition to the classic migration of workers and students to France, three new dimensions should be highlighted. The first is the expansion of the Algerian migratory landscape with new destinations such as Spain, the United Kingdom, Canada, Gulf countries, etc. The second is the widespread practice of *harga*²³, attempts at clandestine crossings across the Mediterranean (Mostaganem is an important departure point). Finally, it is worth noting the increasing mobility of middle-class Algerians, who travel for tourism, business and professional reasons.

New foreign immigration began to be visible in the early 2000s with the arrival of workers, especially Chinese, Spanish, Italians, and sub-Saharan Africans, who likely number in the hundreds of thousands today²⁴. These new migrants from the south, often Muslims, have caught North African societies off guard, being accustomed to building relationships with Europe and looking north for migration issues, and towards the Mashreq for religious and identity matters²⁵. The arrival of Sub-Saharan migrants has sparked xenophobic reactions in the local population.

In the 2000s, Europe's adoption of policies that externalise migration control shifted the Algerian government's approach to migration governance. Algeria, always protective of its independence, took more years to adopt these policies. Only in 2008 the Algerian government introduced its first law punishing clandestine emigration, while Morocco and Tunisia responded much more swiftly in 2003 and 2005, respectively. But Algeria fulfils its commitment to control the clandestine departures of Africans and Algerians and readmit Algerians expelled from Europe. Unlike Tunisia, and especially Morocco, Algeria has not used migration as a bargaining tool so far and has complied with agreements, regardless of the state of bilateral relations with European countries. However, in a context of shifting migration patterns, the country is caught between the hammer of European externalisation and the anvil of xenophobia and racism against sub-Saharan migrants, in an Algerian society prey to fragmentation, discrimination and loss of bearings.

3.2.3. Mostaganem

3.2.3.1. Context and social transformations

Mostaganem is the most important port city between Oran and Algiers, located 80 kilometres east of Oran and 360 kilometres west of Algiers. In 2018, the city had around 150,000 inhabitants and its wilaya had just over 737, 000 inhabitants. Mostaganem is an ancient city founded by the Phoenicians and occupied by the Romans. The Spanish occupation of Oran dates back to the early 16th century, with the occupation of the coastal town of Mers El-Kebir in 1505, followed by the city of Oran in 1509, until 1791. From Oran and throughout its occupation, the Spanish army launched attacks against the local population, then spread to the towns of Mostaganem, Tlemcen and Mascara. During the colonial period (1830-1962), the city and the region experienced strong European immigration due to its agricultural and fisheries production. In 1957, the department of Oran was divided into four departments, one of which was Mostaganem.

With the exception of Oran, the main metropolitan area in western Algeria, this region consists of a balanced network of mid-sized cities with populations ranging from 80,000 to 200,000²⁶. In general, all of Algeria, especially the northern part, which concentrates almost the entire population and economic activity, is

²³ Sempere Souvannavong, J. D. (presse). Harraga, harrag, el-harga. In N. Ribas Mateos; L. Oso & M. Moralli (Eds.). *Encyclopedia of Global Migration*. Edward Elgar.

²⁴ Bensaâd, A. (Dir.). (2009). *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve des migrations subsahariennes. Immigration sur émigration*. Karthala.

²⁵ Bustos, R., Orozco, O. y Witte, L. (coords.) (2011). *El Magreb y las migraciones subsaharianas: el papel de asociaciones y sindicatos*. Casa Árabe.

²⁶ Semmoud, B. (1997). L'armature urbaine et l'organisation régionale en Algérie. Sur le rôle particulier des petites et moyennes villes. *Cahiers du Gremamo*, 14, 41-54.

characterized by a dense and balanced network of medium and small cities (only Algiers exceeds one million inhabitants, and only Oran exceeds half a million inhabitants)²⁷. Currently, Mostaganem city and its urban area form the third or fourth most important entity in western Algeria, with a population similar to that of Tlemcen, Tiaret, Bechar, or Relizane, and slightly below Sidi Bel Abbes.

In very general terms, Algerian cities have three types of neighbourhoods: the pre-colonial city (medina, casbah), the European city built by the French adjacent to the Muslim city, and post-colonial neighbourhoods that usually surround the medina and the European city. In the case of Mostaganem, the old urban center is structured in two sectors: to the right of the Oued Sefra is Tiggdit, the oldest neighbourhood, and to the left is the colonial city center, now called Bled. Around these two neighbourhoods is the urban expansion of the 20th century.

Mostaganem was founded as a port city in the center of a plain suitable for agriculture, thanks to several permanent watercourses, including the Cheliff River, the longest in Algeria. Traditionally, it has been an agricultural region and an important fishing port. Since independence, the city has not received significant investments and lacks large public industries, as in the neighbouring city of Arzew, the country's main hydrocarbon port. However, being the capital of the wilaya and having a very important university (founded in 1998), Mostaganem serves as an administrative, educational, and commercial center of regional importance.

The city's transport connections have significantly grown in the last two decades. The completion of the motorway that crosses the entire country from east to west (its nearest exit is 30 km from the city) in the 2010s and the start-up of the ferry service with Valencia (Spain) in 2016 are important milestones in the city's recent socio-economic transformation. Since then, thousands of Algerians have chosen to travel through Mostaganem on their way to Spain, and often to France, raising the profile of the port and the town within the country. In addition to these public investments, a tramway has been built in the town, and the eighty kilometres of road between Mostaganem and Oran have been considerably improved. Mostaganem has a railway station, but only regional lines.

Over the last ten years or so, Mostaganem has been transformed, mainly thanks to private initiatives, into a major tourist destination for Algerians and Algerians from France. In addition to its beaches and its historical and cultural heritage (it has a famous theatre), various tourist infrastructures have been built, such as a permanent fair and several hotels open all year round. Despite these recent changes, a look at satellite photos shows that, unlike what has happened for decades on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, the infrastructure for seaside tourism have remained underdeveloped.

3.2.3.2. Migration dynamics

Since independence, Mostaganem has been the destination of Algerian internal migrants from rural areas. In particular, migrants come from Kabyles and they are known in the city for their barbecue restaurants. Despite being an attractive coastal city, however, Mostaganem has a small population that barely represents 20% of the inhabitants of its wilaya, preserving a community social structure where local residents know all the families in the city or neighbourhood. This reflects the fact that rather than having a few large cities, Algeria has a thick network of medium and small size cities throughout the country.

Despite having a Moroccan community throughout the colonial period until the 1990s, currently Mostaganem does not host Moroccan migrants except for the few Moroccans who come as craftsmen to finish house interiors. Mostaganem also hosts few Tunisians, who come to Mostaganem for brief periods to take advantage of lower prices than in Tunisia. Since the 2000s, workers from various countries, especially from Spain, China, and India, have come to work as laborers, technicians, or engineers in the construction of homes and public works. Finally,

²⁷ Kateb, K. (2003). Population et organisation de l'espace en Algérie. *L'Espace géographique*, 32/4, 311-331.

in the last twenty years, refugees have settled in Mostaganem. Refugees from sub-Saharan Africa began arriving around 2005, while Syrians, very present throughout the Maghreb, have come to this city since 2011.

As for the local population, it is important to note that the desire to migrate is generally widespread among the youth, and Mostaganem is an important starting point for both local and transit Algerian youths who come to this city to clandestinely reach Spain. The most important destination for the emigration of young people from Mostaganem, and Tiggditt in particular, is Toulouse. It is necessary to distinguish between local youths, who generally have no other option than to leave as "harraga" (e.g., most young people from Tiggditt), and those who have other options, such as trying to obtain a visa for a Schengen country or attempting to go to other destinations like the Gulf countries or Canada. The migration of one type or another depends more on social standing (cultural background, level of education, contacts) than on money, as clandestine crossings can be more expensive than traveling with a visa. Young people from poorer neighbourhoods like Tiggditt can sell their assets (homes acquired with state support) or use the loan given by the state to leave clandestinely.

The phenomenon of the "harraga", young people attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Spain in small boats, became widespread in the early 2000s. Initially, it was an impromptu voyage involving six to ten well-known young people, almost always from the region, boarding small boats with 180 hp engines, in the hope of reaching the Cartagena or Alicante region in around ten hours, without any problems. Over the last decade, this clandestine crossing has developed considerably, going from an amateur trip where almost everyone was "from the neighbourhood" to a business involving professional smugglers and young men and women from all over Algeria and sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to note that many clandestine departures organised by networks of smugglers have moved from Oran, which is too closely watched, to Mostaganem.

3.2.3.3. *Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?*

The size, historical evolution and recent societal, economic and infrastructural changes of Mostaganem make it a good representative of medium-sized cities in Northwestern Algeria. From a migratory perspective, Mostaganem is a coastal city and an important starting point for clandestine migration for the entire country. Within the city, the neighbourhood of Tiggditt seems like an ideal community, since it is a lower-middle-class neighbourhood from which many young people depart to attempt clandestine migration. Given the project's conceptual ambitions, this neighborhood would allow in-depth research of what residents and migrant value, how they perceive local changes, what they expect for the future and how these aspects influence their life and migration aspirations.

Picture 1: Migrants off the coast at Mostaganem (AFP)



3.2.4. Sétif

3.2.4.1. Context and social transformations

In eastern Algeria, the mountain range runs parallel and close to the coast, which explains why the most important towns tend to be inland, with strong connections between the valleys. The urban network is also made up of larger towns than in the west: Constantine has 450,000 inhabitants, Biskra, Sétif, and Batna have populations between 250,000 and 300,000, Annaba 200,000, and Bordj Bou Arreridj and Skikda 170,000 inhabitants. Among these cities, only Skikda and Annaba are on the coast, while the others are located in inland valleys or on the plateau south of the Tell Atlas Mountain range.

With a population of 288,000 in 2008, Sétif is the eighth-largest city in the country but is the third wilaya of Algeria, with an estimated population of 1,866,000 inhabitants (recently surpassed by the Oran wilaya). The city dates back to the time of the Numidian kingdoms before Roman domination in the 1st century BC, playing a significant role in various periods of Roman history. Sétif is situated fifty kilometers from the coast at an altitude of about 1,100 meters, behind the Tell Atlas Mountain range, giving it an inland and elevated climate, distinct from the coast.²⁸

Sétif has always been a major crossroads and currently, it has excellent connections via the east-west highway to Algiers, 230 kilometers from Sétif, and Bordj Bou Arreridj to the west, and to Annaba and Constantine, 120 kilometers from Sétif. In addition to roads, the city has train connections to Algiers and Annaba, a small international airport with flights to Algiers and five French cities, and a major bus station with destinations throughout Algeria and Tunisia.

Historically, until the 1960s, Sétif was a city with primarily an agricultural and livestock economy. After independence, Sétif was selected to become a leading industrial center, following the model of the "industrializing economy" policy implemented by the government in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, it remains one of the most important industrial centers in Algeria²⁹, with 38 ceramics factories, as well as plastic and cardboard factories. Initially, local industry was exclusively public and state-owned, but currently, there are both public and private enterprises ranging from small to large in size. Private initiatives are encouraged, and young people are motivated to create small and micro-businesses. Both the city and the wilaya of Sétif are centers of productive activities rather than services, maintaining significant economic weight in the country. Due to this industrial tradition, Sétif is an exceptionally clean city where almost all waste is recycled. Thirty kilometers east of Sétif is the city of El Eulma, with 280,000 inhabitants, highly specialized in trade and wholesale. Despite their size and proximity, both cities have hardly grown towards each other, that is they are not forming a conurbation. Regarding services, Sétif is home to three universities, a central hospital, and several other public hospitals, one of which specializes in cancer. As with the rest of Algeria's public health system, the main problem is waiting times. There are also many private healthcare clinics (maternity, aesthetics, dentists). Sétif is finally the headquarters of an important military and gendarmerie school.

Like the rest of Algeria, Sétif has undergone significant changes during the years of strong economic growth in the 2000s and early 2010s. Real estate has been a major promoter of development during these years. Construction, both residential and administrative, has allowed for a certain urban expansion of the city. Additionally, the 2000s saw the take-off of Algerian tourism, particularly of heritage, family and shopping tourism. The city has about 40 hotels, ranging from 3 to 5 stars, catering mostly to Algerian and Tunisian tourists. Nearby El Eulma is a major wholesale shopping center visited by people from Tunisia and all over Algeria to buy in bulk.

²⁸ Troin, J.-F. (Dir.) (2006). *Le Grand Maghreb : Mondialisation et construction des territoires*. Armand Collin.

²⁹ Oxford Business Group (2016). *The wilaya of Sétif develops as key industrial center in Algeria*.

3.2.4.2. Migrations

Like most Algerian towns, Sétif has been an area of migration to France since the 1950s. The main overseas community is in Lyon, so that anyone from Sétif has acquaintances, friends or family in Lyon. On the other hand, the "harraga", those who try to reach Europe clandestinely by sea, generally leave from Algiers for the Balearic Islands and, above all, from Mostaganem for the Iberian Peninsula. Once in Spain, most of them will try to reach France. In Sétif, there are European "expatriates" who come to work in Italian and French companies. Today, many people come from Mali and Niger and cannot regularise their situation, so employers cannot employ them without risking heavy fines. Sétif is also the destination of Chinese migrants and Indian migrants who came and settled a decade ago to work in the construction industry. Finally, many Syrians, who have arrived since 2011, have been integrating in the urban environment and have opened restaurants in the city. As far as mobility is concerned, it should be noted that Tunisians come to purchase in-bulk items or for tourism and not for migration. The inhabitants of Sétif also generally go on holiday to the West coast of Algeria.

3.2.4.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

Just as Mostaganem may be representative of the urban network of western Algeria, Sétif is representative of the urban network of eastern Algeria - a less dense network with larger towns located inland. Unlike Mostaganem, Sétif is a highly industrialised inland town with good communications and infrastructure. While it is known that young people from Sétif also embark on clandestine migration from the Algerian coast towards European destinations, we seek to learn how the more dynamic economic environment and ample availability of public and private services in Sétif influence perceptions and future expectations of this city, with possible repercussions on life and migration aspirations. The specific neighborhood with the ideal characteristics will be identified at a later date.

3.2.5. Algiers

3.2.5.1. Context and social transformations

Algiers, the country's capital, is by far the largest city in Algeria, with around three million inhabitants, four to five times more than the second largest city (Oran). However, it is a relatively small capital, accounting for less than 6% of the country's total population. However, this has not prevented the city from experiencing challenges, such as serious traffic and transport problems since the beginning of the 20th century. The Algiers metro, planned since the 1920s and launched in the 1970s, has been operational since 2011. The city is located almost in the centre of the Algerian coast, as well as in the centre of a vast and rich coastal plain (Mitidja). However, the coastal topography poses challenges to urban development, due to the hills that separate the city from the Mitidja.

The origins of the city, which date back to Phoenician times, lie in the kasbah, just opposite the islands (Djazair in Arabic, which gave the country its name) that served as the departure point for the main quay of the port of Algiers. Since the beginning of the Turkish era in 1515, the city has been the capital of Algeria, playing an extraordinary role in the Mediterranean, particularly as a privateer city. Since then, Algiers has been the undisputed centre of the country's political and social activity, and as such has been the focal point of social upheaval, from the Battle of Algiers (1957) to the war on terror (1992-1999) and the Hirak (2019-2020). As a result, the city has undergone urban growth. During the colonial period, the French attached the European city to the kasbah. After independence, most of the new districts were created and the towns of the Mitidja (Blida, Tipaza, Boumerdès, Médéa, Hadjout, Boufarik, Larbaâ...) developed. Urban growth since the beginning of the 21st century has been so significant that what was once on the outskirts of the city is now a fully developed urban area.

Since Algeria is a centralized country, the capital is the seat of all powers and administrations and power in each region is in the hands of the representative of the central government (wali). While the situation in Algiers regarding issues like housing is similar to that of the entire country, it is clear that Algiers has always received significant investments from the state, both in administration and infrastructure, with such investments

becoming particularly important since the early 21st century. In terms of services, education and healthcare are the most developed in the country, with prestigious public hospitals and universities on a national scale. In addition to this, Algiers hosts a large number of private healthcare centers.

3.2.5.2. Migration Context

Algiers has always had a significant foreign presence, hosting all diplomatic representations and major companies, explaining the strong presence of foreign workers and expatriates. Since the 2000s, there has been a visible increase in the number of Sub-Saharan Africans, Chinese, Indians, and since the 2010s, Syrians. The social and economic dynamism attracts people from all regions, and there is likely less emigration of qualified young individuals from Algiers. However, there is still migration of "harraga" heading towards the Balearic Islands.

3.2.5.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

In contrast to Mostaganem or Sétif, Algiers is a large city where an extraordinary diversity of communities can be found. The ease of obtaining contacts and the presence of multiple international and national key stakeholders allow for fieldwork to be conducted easily in this city. From a conceptual perspective, Algiers also offer a wider range of opportunities that make it interesting to examine how people perceive the socio-economic changes in the city, their future expectations of the city and personal life trajectories, and whether residents and migrants have aspiration to leave or continue residing in the city.

3.3. Scoping section – *Ethiopia*

3.3.1. Country overview: the promise of socio-economic growth and the chaos of inter-ethnic relations

With a population of 123 million people, Ethiopia is the second-most populous country in Africa after Nigeria.³⁰ Nevertheless, the nation's annual population growth rate has been decreasing from 3.3% in 1984 to 2.9% in 1994 and 2.6% in 2007.³¹ The majority of the populace is aged between 15-64 (58%) and those aged 0-14 are 39%.³² Ethiopia's economy grew at 6.4% in the financial year 2021/2022, being one of the fastest-growing economies in the region. As a result, Ethiopia has witnessed poverty reduction, with those living below the poverty line decreasing from 30% in 2011 to 24% in 2016. Nevertheless, and despite 70% of Ethiopia's population being employed in the agricultural sector, the country has been struggling with food security.³³

Ethiopia has been marred by armed conflict since 2020. The internal conflict is underpinned by the historical dominance in the country's leadership by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), despite Tigrayans constituting an ethnic minority.³⁴ Meles Zenawi, who governed between 1991 and 2012, turned the country into an autocracy and marginalised larger ethnic groups such as the Oromo, Somali and Amhara. After his death, Ethiopia was governed by TPLF until the 2018 accession by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali. When he extended his first term in June 2020, he incensed the Tigrayan leadership. In November 2020, the Prime Minister ordered a military operation in Tigray, known as the Mekelle Offensive, which led to a military response by the Tigray Defense Force (TDF). The conflict culminated in the Tigray War, which persisted until November 2022, when the government and the TPLF signed the Pretoria Agreement, which led to a cessation of the conflict.³⁵

Ethiopia grapples with ongoing stability challenges, notably heightened tensions between the government and armed groups in the Amhara and Oromia regions, the country's two largest regions. The absence of a comprehensive reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction plan exacerbates these tensions, further fuelled by ethno-regional militias.³⁶ Amid a dire humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia, over 20 million people are grappling with urgent needs for medical care, shelter, food, and essential assistance. The economic hardship faced by the population intensified in May 2023 when the United States ceased aid supply, citing corruption and governance issues.³⁷

³⁰ The World Bank, "The World Bank in Ethiopia," 2023, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>.

³¹ Mekuria, Wuletaw. "The link between agricultural production and population dynamics in Ethiopia: A review," *Adv. Plants Agric. Res* 8, no. 4 (2018): 348-353.

³² United Nations Population Fund, "World Population Dashboard: Ethiopia" 2023, <https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/ET>

³³ Mekuria, "The link between agricultural production and population dynamics in Ethiopia: A review."

³⁴ Centre for Preventative Action, "Conflict in Ethiopia," August 28, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia>.

³⁵ Brittany Gleixner-Hayat, "Ethiopia's Fragile Stability Remains at Risk," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 01, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/01/ethiopia-s-fragile-stability-remains-at-risk-pub-90895>.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Human Rights Watch, "World report 2023: Ethiopia," 2022 <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia>.

3.3.2. Social transformations and migration dynamics: radical liberal change, endemic political instability, shifting migration trends.

3.3.2.1. The economic, cultural and technological drivers of migration in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is an outlier of the migratory trends of many African nations. Noteworthy for its steadfast resistance to colonial powers in the 19th century and only a brief Italian occupation pre-World War II, Ethiopia's migration dynamics are not linked to linguistic and historical ties with former colonial powers. Ethiopia's historical migration patterns have been predominantly motivated by economic and political factors.³⁸ The current estimate for international migration from Ethiopia surpasses 800,000 individuals over the last five years.³⁹ Among the emigrants, 78% were individuals aged 15-29. The primary destination countries include Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Migration to Gulf countries is marked by irregular and perilous routes, resulting in over 51,000 migrants missing. In contrast, internal migration accounts for only 17% of the population, primarily women moving from rural to urban areas, a trend exacerbated by high unemployment rates in this demographic.⁴⁰

Schewel and Asmamaw (2021) delve into Ethiopia's recent social transformations and their profound impact on migration trends over the past two decades.⁴¹ Employing a comprehensive social transformations model, their analysis spans the political, cultural, economic, technological, and demographic dimensions that collectively shape migration patterns. Politically, Ethiopia has undergone significant changes with regime shifts, conflicts, and resettlement efforts during the last two decades, directly influencing the country's migration landscape.

Economically, migration in Ethiopia has been significantly influenced by economic development policies. Notably, the early 2000s brought rapid economic growth triggered by the transition from agriculture to diverse liberal economic strategies such as the promotion of market forces, private sector growth, foreign investment, and industrial capitalism. This transformative period witnessed a substantial shift to the burgeoning service sector, which expanded from 10.5% in 2000 to 22.4% by 2017. It also resulted in a notable surge in rural-urban migration. Under the current market-oriented regime that emphasizes industrialisation, there has been a remarkable increase in both internal and international migration. The government's Growth and Transformation Plans are presently focused on establishing manufacturing centres, fostering urban-centric migration and contributing to the development of infrastructure pathways, thereby facilitating the growth of towns and cities surrounding industrial and economic centres.

Culturally, the paramount determinant influencing migration in Ethiopia is the level of education. Despite witnessing an overall increase in education, the country still grapples with comparatively low levels of educational attainment. In fact, Ethiopia stands out with a 20% lower level of educational attainment compared to other low-income countries in the region. While primary school enrolment surged by 45% between 2000 and 2014, the growth in secondary education was minimal, increasing by only 3% during the same period. This educational landscape fosters heightened local and regional migration, particularly as students from rural areas often relocate to urban centres to access secondary education. Urban-urban migrants exhibit the highest educational levels. Ethiopia's low education levels partially explain this country's reduced rate of international migration when compared to nations with similarly levels of economic developed but higher education levels.

³⁸ Girmachew Adugna, "Once Primarily an Origin for Refugees, Ethiopia Experiences Evolving Migration Patterns," Migration Policy Institute, October 5, 2021, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ethiopia-origin-refugees-evolving-migration>.

³⁹ International Organisation for Migration-East and Horn of Africa, "More than 800,000 Ethiopians Migrated Abroad Over the Past Five Years" September 02, 2021, <https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/news/more-800000-ethiopians-migrated-abroad-over-past-five-years>.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Schewel, Kerilyn, and Asmamaw Legass Bahir. "Migration and Social Transformation in Ethiopia." *International Migration Institute Working Paper Series Paper 152* (2019).

Indeed, we observe that, unlike international migrants from other African countries, most international migrants from Ethiopia possess only primary-level education.

Technologically, infrastructural development has played a pivotal role in shaping migration trends in Ethiopia. Notably, the allocation of a quarter of the country's infrastructure budget to road expansion resulted in a doubling of the road network to over 100,000 kilometres by 2015. This expansion has seamlessly connected rural and urban areas, fostering increased interaction as more individuals from rural regions access urban centres. Significant investments in railway networks have further contributed to the emergence of new urban centres along the routes, generating demand for public services, financial institutions, and a workforce. The aviation sector, spearheaded by Ethiopian Airlines as the largest intra-African network operator, has also been instrumental in fostering migration. The resultant decrease in the cost of international travel has influenced the migration patterns of young Ethiopian women, who increasingly move to the Middle East to engage in domestic work. Concurrently, the country has experienced a notable surge in mobile phone and internet access, and increased access to information that enhances awareness of available opportunities, both domestically and abroad, which has contributed to a rise in migration.⁴²

3.3.2.2. Recent trends: the impact of the EU's externalisation and containment programmes

The European Union recognises Ethiopia as a country of interest in managing migration from the region, due to its location at the centre of the migration corridor from Eritrea and Somalia to Sudan and Yemen, and the large refugee population it hosts.⁴³ European Union (EU) relations across the Horn of Africa have notably intensified in recent years,⁴⁴ reflecting both the union's broader migration interests and emerging security threats in East Africa and the Red Sea. More recently, concerns about increased migration flows have surfaced because of the Tigray war, notably as hundreds of thousands of refugees have poured into Sudan. Today, the country is one of the five prioritised in the Communication on forming a new partnership framework under the EU agenda on migration. The EU is also engaged in dialogue with Ethiopia, through the framework of Strategic Engagement-sectoral dialogue on migration, and the Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility (CAMP). EU policies and statements have had a negative impact on the Union's reputation, particularly in relation to the rights and freedoms and values-based agenda that the EU theoretically promotes. In particular, the rise of populism in Europe, the spread of far-right ideas and the openly xenophobic temptations of former colonial powers (France, Italy and the UK) have reinforced critical perceptions of Europe and created "a sentiment that Europe has abandoned Ethiopia and its future development".⁴⁵

3.3.3. Adama

3.3.3.1. Context and social transformations

Adama City is situated in central Ethiopia within the Oromia region, positioned 98 kilometres east of Addis Ababa and serving as a crucial link to the Djibouti seaport.⁴⁶ Ranked as the second-fastest growing city in Ethiopia, Adama has experienced a remarkable six-fold expansion from its original centre in all directions between 2005 and 2017. Despite initially having the smallest urbanised land area compared to cities like Addis

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Delegation of the European Union to Ethiopia, "The European Union and Ethiopia," July 22, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/ethiopia/european-union-and-ethiopia_en?s=98

⁴⁴ Halawa (2022). 'Ethiopia: A conflict at breaking point' in Balfour, R., Bomassi, L. and Martinelli, M (ed). The Southern Mirror: Reflections on Europe From the Global South, Carnegie Endowment.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Terfa, Berhanu Keno, Nengcheng Chen, Dandan Liu, Xiang Zhang, and Dev Niyogi. "Urban expansion in Ethiopia from 1987 to 2017: Characteristics, spatial patterns, and driving forces." Sustainability 11, no. 10 (2019): 2973.

Abeba and Hawassa, Adama exhibited the highest expansion rate, displaying a physically scattered development pattern. As of July 2021, the Ethiopian Statistical Service reports a population of 435,222 inhabitants in Adama, with 212,991 being male and 222,231 female.⁴⁷ The city has a youthful demographic, with a median age of 20.9 years. Adama boasts a diverse population with ethnic groups predominantly from the Oromo, Gurage, Mhara, and Silte communities. The primary language spoken is Amharic. In terms of religion, there is a demographic split, with 44% of inhabitants being Muslim and 41% adhering to the Orthodox Christian faith. The city's strategic location toward the seaport has attracted migrants seeking employment opportunities in the service sector. Adama is intricately linked to the surrounding rural areas, serving as a hub for wholesale trade and providing essential products like fertilisers and farming equipment to the agricultural hinterlands.

Adama stands as an island of relative peace and stability within the Oromia region, despite the broader conflicts affecting the area.⁴⁸ The primary conflict zones typically lie in the border regions between Oromia and Somali. Notably, Adama has become a sanctuary for a significant number of internally displaced people (IDPs). The majority of these IDPs are Oromo individuals forced to flee the Somali region due to ongoing conflicts.⁴⁹ In 2018, the city hosted 1,340 registered households of IDPs. Recognising the limited attention from the central government, local authorities, including the 18 neighbourhood districts, 28 sectoral bureaus, and local NGOs, played a pivotal role in settling and supporting these IDPs. Beyond its role as a refuge, Adama has actively contributed to national dialogues amid internal conflicts. Notably, the city hosted a significant dialogue session involving sixty political parties in 2018.⁵⁰ Moreover, its proximity to Addis Ababa and the inherent stability it provides have attracted foreign investments across various sectors.⁵¹ The city proudly hosts the first regional health monitoring laboratory in the country, which plays a crucial role in disease surveillance for the entire nation. Adama, therefore, not only serves as a sanctuary amid regional conflicts but also actively contributes to national dialogues and attracts vital investments, showcasing its resilience and strategic importance.

The rapid urbanisation of Adama over the past two decades has triggered a significant shift in its primary economic activities.⁵² While the Oromia region, including Adama, traditionally relied heavily on agriculture, there has been a noteworthy reduction in the centrality of farming. Research conducted by Dadi, Mulegeta, and Simie,⁵³ underscores the reciprocal relationship between rural-urban migration into Adama and agricultural activities. For each unit increase in migration, there is a corresponding 32% decrease in farming and a parallel 24% increase in other economic endeavours. As an integral part of a connected urban cluster that includes Addis Ababa and intermediary cities like Mojo, Adama has evolved into a crucial economic hub. Kebede,⁵⁴ notes its attractiveness to investments spanning various sectors, including banking, agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, and wind energy production. This economic diversification underscores Adama's strategic importance and its role as a dynamic engine of growth within the region.

⁴⁷ Ethiopian Statistical Service, "Population Size by Sex, Region, Zone and Wereda: July 2021," July 2021, <https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Population-of-Weredas-as-of-July-2021.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Schemm, "They started to burn our houses': Ethnic strife in Ethiopia threatens a key U.S. ally."

⁴⁹ Evan Easton-Calabria, Delina Abadi, and Gezahegn Gebremedhin, "IDPs in Secondary Cities: The Case of Adama, Ethiopia," Cities Alliance, 2021, <https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/cities-alliance-knowledge/idps-secondary-cities-case-adama-ethiopia>.

⁵⁰ Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy, "60 Ethiopian Political Parties Come Together for Dialogue in Adama," September 6, 2018, <https://nimd.org/60-ethiopian-political-parties-come-together-for-dialogue-in-adama/>.

⁵¹ U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, "Ambassador Jacobson visits Transformative Investments in Adama, Oromia Region," July 26, 2022, <https://et.usembassy.gov/ambassador-jacobson-visits-transformative-u-s-investments-in-adama-oromia-region/>.

⁵² Dadi, Wakitole, Messay Mulegeta, and Negussie Simie. "Urbanization and its effects on income diversification of farming households in Adama district, Ethiopia."

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Getahun Fenta Kebede, "Rural-urban migration, urban informality and the challenges of promoting inclusive development in Ethiopia," Research and Evidence Facility, December 2021, <https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/files/2021/12/Getahun-Fenta-Rural-Urban-migration-and-informality-paper-FINAL-131221.pdf>.

Adama's technological progress, particularly in road infrastructure, has intricately linked the city with its rural hinterlands, creating resilient production-consumption connections.⁵⁵ Established as a train depot in 1916,⁵⁶ the city has evolved into a distribution centre for agricultural supplies. The influx of internal migrants can be attributed to Adama's strategic development of public amenities, including educational institutions. This strategic move addresses the growing demand for higher education in regions that previously lacked such facilities.⁵⁷

Demographically, Adama has undergone a substantial increase in its youthful population over the last two decades, driven by migrants in pursuit of improved educational and employment opportunities. According to the Ethiopian Statistical Agency, migrants constitute 59.2% of Adama's residents,⁵⁸ underscoring the city's appeal. Nevertheless, the city's economic planning has not comprehensively addressed the requirements of this influx, leading to challenges such as a shortage of productive employment opportunities.⁵⁹

Adama has also undergone administrative restructuring, impacting its investment landscape.⁶⁰ Despite administrative fluctuations, the registered businesses in Adama surged from 14,672 to 25,084 between 2012 and 2017. Government services, including banking, insurance, and microfinance,⁶¹ contribute to the city's economy, generating an annual tax revenue of approximately 1 billion birr (equivalent to 16,300,000 euros). However, the city faces a notable shortfall in water supply, particularly due to the high fluoride content in Rift Valley water. The Ethiopian Business Review reports a water supply deficit of 7 million cubic metres.⁶² Nevertheless, the government has made strides in developing health facilities, including a teaching hospital.⁶³

Despite Adama's strategic importance in Ethiopia's logistics and trade landscape, positioning it as a potential international investment hub, significant mega-projects have materialised only recently. The city's inaugural industrial park, for example, was inaugurated by the current Prime Minister in October 2018.⁶⁴ Furthermore, U.S. investment in wind energy production commenced in 2022.⁶⁵ Adama, with its central location, is an attractive destination for tourists and conferences, boasting numerous historical sites, and wildlife. However, the tourism sector remains largely untapped.⁶⁶ Entrepreneurs and investors voice concerns about the challenges hindering new ventures, particularly insufficient political support, subpar services from institutions, and difficulties in land acquisition.

3.3.3.2. Migration dynamics

Adama's remarkable growth has been chiefly fuelled by internal migration, occurring through rural-urban migration and the influx of displaced individuals from the Somali region. Delving into the dynamics of internal migration from rural to urban areas, Kebu, Berisso, and Belugeta conducted an analysis of migration patterns in the Adama-Addis region of Ethiopia. Their findings highlighted the presence of push and pull factors, with

⁵⁵ Organisation for Economic Development, "Rural Development Strategy Review of Ethiopia: Reaping the Benefits of Urbanisation," 2020, <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/357e6ee3-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/357e6ee3-en>.

⁵⁶ Ethiopian Business Review, "Adama," 2023, <https://ethiopianbusinessreview.net/adama/>.

⁵⁷ Schewel and Asmamaw, "Migration and Social Transformation in Ethiopia."

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Evan Easton-Calabria, Delina Abadi, and Gezahegn Gebremedhin, "IDPs in Secondary Cities: The Case of Adama, Ethiopia," Cities Alliance, 2021, <https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/cities-alliance-knowledge/idps-secondary-cities-case-adama-ethiopia>.

⁶⁰ Ethiopian Business Review, "Adama."

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ File, Temesgen, Hunduma Dinka, and Lemu Golassa. "A retrospective analysis on the transmission of Plasmodium falciparum and Plasmodium vivax: the case of Adama City, East Shoa Zone, Oromia, Ethiopia." Malaria journal 18, no. 1 (2019): 1-5, PMID: 31185977; PMCID: PMC6558791.

⁶⁴ Ethiopian Business Review, "Adama".

⁶⁵ Getahun, "Rural-urban migration, urban informality and the challenges of promoting inclusive development in Ethiopia."

⁶⁶ Ethiopian Business Review, "Adama".

education and age emerging as primary determinants of migration.⁶⁷ The study underscored that migrants in Ethiopia are young and educated. Economic motivations were identified as the primary driver for migration, coupled with a desire to enhance overall well-being. The study emphasised that internal migration within Ethiopia surpasses international flows. Notably, a significant proportion of youth migrants in Adama hailed from the nearby Arsi and Shoa zones, indicating a prevalence of short-distance migration due to a desire to maintain familial connections, better opportunities in nearby cities, and the existence of established social networks in these urban centres. The research also revealed that these migrants were predominantly adults with a secondary education or higher, and most were single. However, the study acknowledged that migrants faced numerous challenges in urban areas, including difficulties in accessing housing, a lack of support systems, registration hurdles, and the inability to secure decent employment opportunities.

According to the United Nations Office for Project Services, Adama's attraction lies not only in the development of local infrastructures (pull factor) but also in environmental degradation and recurring conflicts (push factor). The same study also notes that Adama suffers from inadequate integration of rural and urban migrants, as well as inadequate reception and management frameworks.⁶⁸ The city faces challenges in collating migration data for informed policy-making, hindering efficient resource allocation in the budget.⁶⁹ Easton Calabria, Abadi, and Gebremedhin explored the local government's response to displaced populations in the Oromia region, particularly in Adama.⁷⁰ The study revealed that the local government devised a lottery system for the long-term settlement of displaced individuals. However, a notable challenge arose from this strategy, as numerous IDPs were undocumented, leading to their exclusion from the lottery system. Registering and documenting IDPs in urban areas like Adama is crucial for effective planning of future development initiatives and providing them with necessary assistance.⁷¹

Examining international migration in Ethiopia, Adama emerges as a crucial vantage point for comprehending the experiences of migrants increasingly heading to the Gulf States.⁷² The city, highlighted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), serves as one of the transit areas exploited by smugglers and traffickers facilitating the movement of migrants to the Gulf States, notably Yemen—a sought-after destination for many Ethiopians. The IOM has shared harrowing accounts detailing the perilous journeys undertaken by these migrants, including minors with only primary-level education. Despite the challenges faced by these migrants, there is a notable absence of policies at the local administration level in Adama to address and mitigate the exploitative elements associated with such international emigration. The EU's Valletta Action Plan, however, includes, in the open dialogue on migration with Ethiopia, the prevention of irregular migration, migrant smuggling and promotion of legal migration, thus making Adama a key area for consideration.⁷³

3.3.3.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

Adama serves as a crucial case study due to its unique blend of migration patterns, encapsulating rural-urban migration, movements of displaced populations, and its strategic role in addressing irregular outflows of migrants to Gulf states from Ethiopia. Beyond the migratory aspects, Adama's significance lies in the lens of social transformation, offering valuable insights into the region's evolving dynamics. The city's rapid growth,

⁶⁷ Kebu, Habtamu, Oumer Berisso, and Messay Mulugeta. "Drivers of migration and determinants of wellbeing among internal youth migrants in Ethiopia: Towns along Addis Ababa-Adama route in focus." *Heliyon* 9.3 (2023). [https://www.cell.com/heliyon/pdf/S2405-8440\(23\)00987-8.pdf](https://www.cell.com/heliyon/pdf/S2405-8440(23)00987-8.pdf).

⁶⁸ United Nations Office for Project Services, "Adama: Improving the Reception, Management and Integration of Rural-Urban Migrants with a Voluntary Registration Scheme, Resource Centre, Networking, and Infrastructure Development in Adama, Ethiopia."

⁶⁹ United Nations Office for Project Services, "Adama: Improving the Reception, Management and Integration of Rural-Urban Migrants with a Voluntary Registration Scheme, Resource Centre, Networking, and Infrastructure Development in Adama, Ethiopia."

⁷⁰ Easton-Calabria, Abadi, and Gebremedhin, "IDPs in Secondary Cities: The Case of Adama, Ethiopia."

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² International Organisation for Migration, "Hazards Abound but Migrants Risk Horn of Africa Route for a better Life," 2023.

⁷³ Delegation of the European Union to Ethiopia, "The European Union and Ethiopia," July 22, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/ethiopia/european-union-and-ethiopia_en?s=98

driven by technological and infrastructural advancements, positions it as the second-fastest growing urban centre. However, the absence of a definitive development or planning policy tailored to address the city's specific migration trends poses a challenge.

Picture 2: IDP Settlement camp in Adama city



Source: Gezaghem Gebremedhin/Delina Abadi Oxford RSC

3.3.4. Kebribeyah

3.3.4.1. Context and social transformations

Kebribeyah is located 55 kilometres from Jijiga, the regional capital of the Somali region in Ethiopia, and approximately 700 kilometres from Addis Ababa.⁷⁴ As of 2021, the Ethiopian Statistical Authority reported a population of 237,197 in Kebribeyah *Wereda*, with 122,854 males and 114,343 females.⁷⁵ It is unclear whether these statistics, provided by the national authority, incorporated the refugees in the city. However, the UNHCR estimated in 2018 that there were 14,413 Somali refugees, who lived in Kebribeyah Refugee Camp, located within the larger Kebribeyah city. In May 2023, the UNHCR, Ethiopia Refugees and Returnees Service, and Somali regional authorities struck a deal to integrate refugees into the local community.⁷⁶

Over the past two decades, Kebribeyah has evolved into a fascinating blend of the cultural, economic, and social experiences of both the local population and refugees. Notably, the local population in Kebribeyah shares a Somali identity, encompassing language, religion, and culture with the refugees. With 56% of the refugee population being minors, their seamless integration is facilitated by their familiarity with the local culture. Additionally, the historically permeable border between Ethiopia's Somali region and Somalia has sustained trade, even during conflicts, allowing the flow of contraband such as khat and cars.

The protracted conflict situation in Somalia transformed Kebribeyah into a long-term refuge city, thus making local integration a necessary solution.⁷⁷ The local integration has proven mutually beneficial. Historically facing

⁷⁴ Muhumed, Ahmed, and Saleh Ahmed. "Educational inequality in the Kebribeyah Somali refugee camp in Ethiopia: an autoethnography." *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 7 (2022): 1-13.

⁷⁵ Ethiopian Statistical Service, "Population Size by Sex, Region, Zone and Wereda: July 2021," July 2021.

⁷⁶ Samuel Bogale. "Refugee camp merges with Somali town to settle for good." June 2023. <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/34414/>.

⁷⁷ UN Habitat, "Kebribeyah Settlement Profile, Ethiopia."

challenges linked to insufficient infrastructure and basic amenities due to marginalization by the central government, Kebribeyah lacked formal road networks connecting it to Somalia, despite trade links with the northern region. Situated in the arid Somali region, the local population traditionally relied on pastoralism and agro pastoralism. The arrival of the refugee population brought about economic and social changes, including the development of amenities by international organizations like the UNHCR, benefiting both the refugees and the local population. Consequently, the migrant influx spurred social transformations, including the development of the service-sector,⁷⁸ contributing to the overall development of the area and encouraging the local population to remain.

The Somali region nevertheless remains underdeveloped and marred with challenges. The region still experiences marginalisation, which has led to food and economic insecurity. The educational sector is also adversely affected, with insufficient facilities and underfunding resulting in low literacy levels. The Somali region, overall, contends with a substantial dropout rate, where 20% of school-going children leave by grade two, and only half persist until grade eight. Another social challenge is food insecurity, affecting 70% of the population.⁷⁹ The population employs coping strategies such as seasonal migration, livestock sales, and reducing meal frequency to manage food insecurity. Climate data for Kebribeyah shows that the region is prone to droughts, including a severe one in 2017 that triggered extensive internal displacement. Flash flooding, as witnessed in 2016, adds to the challenges, affecting both refugees and non-refugees.⁸⁰

In the early 2000s, Kebribeyah saw limited infrastructure development, but recent years have seen a sharp increase in road building, both to develop the local socio-economic fabric and to strengthen links with neighbouring countries, notably the Gulf States, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. This parallels the trend identified by Schewel and Asmamaw,⁸¹ where the expansion of road networks correlates with increased population density along these routes. These roads have not only facilitated transportation but have also connected marginalised communities in the Somali region. In response to this, the local administration in Kebribeyah, under the guidance of the Urban Development and Construction Bureau situated in Jijiga, has undertaken strategic planning to extend local infrastructures. This initiative reflects a commitment to leveraging infrastructure for the city's growth and connectivity.

3.3.4.2. Migration dynamics

In 2019, Ethiopia enacted Refugee Proclamation No. 1110/2019, a progressive legal framework granting refugees the rights to move, own property, and work, marking a significant stride in refugee policy. This legislation, applicable nationwide, extends to refugees the ability to register marriages and births and access financial services. The impact of this policy is particularly pronounced in Kebribeyah, given its substantial refugee population. The region, situated in the Fafan Administrative Zone, prioritises the integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and host communities. The emphasis on shared language, culture, and religion aims to foster harmony and collaboration. However, the escalating population places a sustained strain on the environment, leading to extensive deforestation for charcoal production and construction materials.⁸²

3.3.4.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

The outlying city of Kebribeyah presents an ideal case for PACES, primarily owing to the scarcity of research on migration trends in the region. Existing literature predominantly concentrates on the refugee population in Kebribeyah, with limited exploration of rural-urban migration and international migration to neighbouring countries, including Gulf States. The city serves as a compelling case study to examine the ramifications of policies promoting integration between host and refugee populations. It seeks to understand of long-term residents and refugees experience the local changes, their expectations of the future and how these

⁷⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Economic Impact of Covid-19 in the Somali Region of Ethiopia," June 2020.

⁷⁹ Mohamed, Abdinasir. Food Security in Kebribeyah Woreda of the Somali Region of Ethiopia.. Diss. St. Mary's University, 2013.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Schewel and Asmamaw, "Migration and Social Transformation in Ethiopia."

⁸² UN Habitat, "Kebribeyah Settlement Profile Somali Region, Ethiopia."

experiences shape their life and their aspirations to stay or to migrate. Moreover, looking at the EU's policy agenda on partnering with Ethiopia to address aspects of refugee migration, Kebribeyah, becomes a vital case study. The EU Trust Fund for Africa, for instance, is geared towards addressing the long-term protection and developmental needs of both refugee populations and their host communities.⁸³ Therefore, this city is also an ideal location to explore how residents and refugees perceive the interventions by external actors, particularly when the interventions seek to shape migration aspirations.

3.3.5. Batu

3.3.5.1. Context and social transformations

Batu, previously known as Ziway, stands as a town in the Oromia Region, situated near Lake Ziway and approximately 162 kilometres south of Addis Ababa.⁸⁴ Its strategic geographic position is integral to its migration dynamics, as it lies along the vital Addis Ababa-Nairobi road,⁸⁵ and forms part of the road connection between Addis Ababa and Hawasa.⁸⁶ Nestled in the heart of the Ethiopian Rift Valley,⁸⁷ Batu serves as a central location in Ethiopia. The city's demographic makeup boasts a population of around 86,234,⁸⁸ with an estimated 38,604 women and 40,180 men, according to Hassen and Dinka's assessments.⁸⁹ Batu, functions both as a city and a *woreda*, a district, within which two *kebeles* serve as smaller governance units.⁹⁰ Historical records indicate that the city was initially settled by the Oromo people, a fact reflected in its name, Batu.⁹¹ Situated within the Oromia region, the city may be susceptible to the ethnic clashes reported in this region, adding a layer of complexity to its political landscape.

In terms of infrastructure and technology, Batu boasts several amenities, including two hospitals, one of which is privately owned, and an additional ten health facilities encompassing clinics and health centres. The significance of these amenities is underscored by the city's proximity to Lake Ziway, where Anopheles mosquitoes, responsible for transmitting malaria, thrive.⁹² The healthcare facilities play a crucial role in addressing health concerns associated with the local environment.

Batu's economic landscape is prominently shaped by agriculture and horticulture, positioned as pivotal sectors within its economy. The city's strategic location in the Rift Valley region creates a favourable environment for agricultural activities, transforming Batu into a notable exporter of vegetables and fruits to various cities across the country. Notably, the horticultural sector, including international flower farms,⁹³ drives exports on an international scale. Agriculture serves as a catalyst for internal migration to Batu, offering significant employment opportunities. This economic dynamic has attracted investments, particularly foreign direct investment in private agribusinesses,⁹⁴ contributing to enhanced employment prospects for the youth, albeit the jobs available are at lower wage levels. While developmental interventions remain limited, noteworthy

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Melese, Kassegn Berhanu, and Temesgen Heiyo Belda. "Determinants of tourism product development in Southeast Ethiopia: Marketing perspectives." *Sustainability* 13.23 (2021): 13263.

⁸⁵ Teshome, Lemma. *FACTORS THAT AFFECTING THE GROWTH OF SMALL AND MICRO ENTERPRISE A CASE IN BATU/ZIWAY TOWN*. Diss. 2019.

⁸⁶ Samuel Hall, "MIGNEX: Migration and development dynamics in Batu, Ethiopia", 2023, https://reliefweb.int/attachments/db35a001-61d9-4032-b6b6-9c0c93dd2c64/d10-mcsb-eth2-layout-2022-08-10_5.pdf

⁸⁷ Hassen J, Dinka H. "Magnitude of urban malaria and its associated risk factors: the case of Batu town, Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia." *Journal of International Medical Research*. 2022;50(3). doi:10.1177/03000605221080686

⁸⁸ Samuel Hall, "MIGNEX: Migration and development dynamics in Batu, Ethiopia."

⁸⁹ Hassen and Dinka, "Magnitude of urban malaria and its associated risk factors: the case of Batu town, Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia."

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Government of Batu, "Batu City Profile" n.d. <http://www.baatuucity.gov.et/baatuu-2/>

⁹² Hassen and Dinka, "Magnitude of urban malaria and its associated risk factors: the case of Batu town, Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia."

⁹³ Samuel Hall, MIGNEX: Migration and development dynamics in Batu, Ethiopia."

⁹⁴ Muluken Yewondwossen, "Batu's bustling investment scene" 2021, <https://www.capitalethiopia.com/2021/09/13/batus-bustling-investment-scene/>

collaborations, such as the partnership between the World Bank and the government, have led to notable improvements in the city's road infrastructure.

The Batu City government emphasizes that the 1997 restructuring aimed at elevating it to city status was centred on fostering economic growth, primarily through industrial advancement, particularly in the realm of industrial farming.⁹⁵ The city's economic development plan involves two administrative structures—five kebeles and the Batu Town Council. However, the extent to which this development vision has materialized remains unclear. Despite its potential as a tourist destination, featuring geological sites such as Shalla National Park, Shalla lakes, beaches, and culturally significant monasteries, Batu's tourism sector is underexplored due to a lack of effective marketing strategies.⁹⁶

3.3.5.2. Migration dynamics

Batu City exhibits a notably low inclination towards international migration, viewed as a last resort, with 56% expressing a commitment to stay in the country, despite ethnic conflicts in the broader Oromia region. Among those who do migrate internationally, predominantly women, the Gulf countries are the primary destination, often seeking employment as domestic workers.⁹⁷ Internal migration to Batu comprises 36% of the population arriving from various parts of Ethiopia.⁹⁸ Strong transnational connections are evident, with 66% maintaining contact with migrant acquaintances or family members. Additionally, 29% of the population received remittances in 2022, highlighting the city's intricate web of migration patterns and ties.

3.3.5.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

Batu is a compelling case study for PACES for several reasons. Firstly, its strategic location and migration dynamics present a nuanced understanding of urbanization in the context of a developing town. The choice of internal migration over international movement, provides valuable insights into the socio-economic factors influencing migration decisions. Additionally, Batu's role as an agricultural and horticultural hub, coupled with foreign-owned agribusinesses, reflects the economic forces shaping urban growth. The lack of comprehensive literature on the migration dynamics within the broader Oromia region and the minimal exploration of sociocultural transformations in the last two decades offer PACES an opportunity to delve deeper into these uncharted aspects, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of urban evolution in the African context.

⁹⁵ Government of Batu, "Batu City Profile"

⁹⁶ Malese and Temesgen, "Determinants of tourism product development in Southeast Ethiopia: Marketing perspectives."

⁹⁷ Samuel Hall, MIGNEX: Migration and development dynamics in Batu, Ethiopia."

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

3.4. Scoping section – Nigeria

3.4.1. Country overview: Enormous socio-economic potential stunted by economic predation, insecurity, and corruption.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria has the largest population in Africa, with an estimated 220 million people and nearly two-thirds below the age of 25. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse federation of 36 autonomous states and the Federal Capital Territory. Nigeria's society is vastly diverse and has been influenced by various migratory movements. Approximately 87 million Christians live in the South, while over 90 million Muslims live mostly in the North, making up 50% and 48% of the population, respectively.⁹⁹

Following its 1960 declaration of independence from the British colonial administration, the nation was governed by a succession of military dictators until 1999. Following the death of the military leader Gen. Sani Abacha in 1998, Gen. Abdusalami Abubakar commanded the nation for less than a year until a democracy was established. In 1999, a new constitution was ratified, opening the door for civilian rule across its whole territory.¹⁰⁰ Historically, the political landscape has been partly dominated by the ruling All Progressives Congress party (APC) which controls the executive arm of government and holds majority seats at both the Senate and House of Representatives in parliament, and majority of the States.

The winner of the February 2023 election, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu was sworn in on 29 May 2023. The country remains stunted by numerous social and economic challenges, including insecurity (banditry and kidnappings, particularly in the north-west region), the continuing insurgency by terrorist groups in the north-east and separatist unrest in the south-east. In such an uncertain environment, with autonomous states grappling with Boko Haram, extremism and the absence of the rule of law, civil society, the media and other civic groups have pledged to continue advocating for reforms and actions to improve economic and social outcomes for citizens. Despite these challenges, Nigeria has become a significant political and economic force in the region and the continent at large.

3.4.2. Social transformations and migration dynamics: several speeds of growth in a country of extreme inequalities and ECOWAS crisis

3.4.2.1. Growing economic and spatial inequalities

Nigeria's economy is faced with structural challenges, in particular, the high prevalence of corruption across state agencies and economic actors, inadequate infrastructure, and insecurity in various areas of the country. Furthermore, the high dependence on petroleum products with little economic diversification has negatively affected sustainable economic growth in the country.¹⁰¹ As highlighted in the World Bank Country Overview 2023, Nigeria has the largest economy and population in Africa, but offers limited opportunities to most of its citizens: "A Nigerian born in 2020 was expected to be a future worker 36% as productive as they could have been if they had full access to education and health, the 7th lowest human capital index in the world."¹⁰² The country has experienced high unemployment rates, but the latest employment statistics are complex to interpret. Recent statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) report unemployment rates of 5.3% in late 2022, and the new Nigeria Labour Force Survey (NLFS) reported 4.1 % in early 2023. However, previous statistics of 2020 estimated an unemployment rate of 33.3 % (NVS). As argued by Jonathan Lain and Utz Pape¹⁰³,

⁹⁹ Arhin-Sam, K. (2019). *The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria*. Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute (ABI).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview>

¹⁰³ Lain, J., & Pape, U. (2023, October 20). Nigeria's dichotomy: Low unemployment, high poverty rates. World Bank Blogs. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/nigerias-dichotomy-low-unemployment-high-poverty-rates>

while the unemployment rates in Nigeria might be low, many Nigerians are still living in poverty and are “underemployed”. It is estimated that 12.2 % are underemployed as of early 2023, which means they work less than 40 hours per week. The poverty rate is expected to reach 37% in 2023, with an estimated 84 million Nigerians living below the poverty line – the world’s second-largest poor population after India.

A striking feature of Nigeria is the coexistence of great wealth and entire regions marked by poverty and endemic violence. The World Bank notes that “*spatial inequalities remain high, with the best-performing regions of Nigeria comparing favourably with upper-middle-income countries, while the worst-performing states are below the average for low-income countries*”¹⁰⁴. In a context of political predation, rent-seeking authoritarianism, Dutch disease, unbridled liberalism and social and inter-ethnic fragmentation, state capacity is weak, service delivery is limited while insecurity and violence are widespread. This reality hinders the national economic integration that would allow the country to take advantage of its market size, without successive governments appearing able or willing to do anything about it. In addition, the increased severity and frequency of the consequences of climate change (flooding), particularly in the north of the country, are having an aggravating effect: in 2022 alone, flooding killed at least 662 people, injured 3,174, displaced about 2.5 million, and destroyed 200,000 houses individuals.

3.4.2.2. Nigerian youth, between disillusionment and anger

Constituting nearly two-thirds of the country’s 220 million population, the youth are at the centre of social transformations, and the youth-led protests named #EndSARS in 2020 were a testimony to their civic power. As argued by Commodore and Frimpong¹⁰⁵, while the protests started against brutality by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigeria Police Force, which was subsequently disbanded by the federal government together with security reforms, “*a constellation of growing poverty, unemployment, and shrinking space for inclusive participation of youth in government policy-making was its essential context*”. The youth’s discontent in the country was evident during the protest and is also linked to civic movements and increasing confrontations between states and young people in the region, such as Burkina Faso, as well as the #BlackLivesMatter movement in the United States. And while the #EndSARS protests led to the dismantling of SARS, the structural socio-economic challenges faced by young people in their daily lives persist and have continued to contribute to youth-related protests and violence across Nigeria.¹⁰⁶

Finally, weak job creation and entrepreneurial prospects stifle the absorption of the 3.5 million Nigerians entering the labour force every year, and many workers choose to emigrate in search of better opportunities. One of Africa’s cultural flagships, the entertainment industry in Nigeria, offers a lucrative opportunity for economic diversification, having contributed 5.3% (\$16.4 billion) in 2015.¹⁰⁷ However, the entertainment industry has received little attention by the government in its economic policies and budgets.

3.4.2.3. Uncertain migration dynamics, with climate- and conflict-induced displacements, against the backdrop of the ECOWAS crisis in East Africa

Another key social transformation issue has been migration. The topic has been increasingly relevant in Nigeria’s political and public discussions and in the European Union’s engagement on emigration from Nigeria as well as return migration to the country.¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹ While Nigeria is now a country of net emigration, it has historically and until now welcomed many migrants, particularly from within West Africa, who have been essential in the

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview>

¹⁰⁵ Commodore, R., & Frimpong, O. B. (2021). #EndSARS Youth Protests in Nigeria: Lessons and Opportunities for Regional Stability. *The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (SVNP)*.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Yerima, Ahmed, Eunice Uwadinma-Idemudia, and Bridgette R. Yerima. "Recognising the Nexus Between the Entertainment Industry and Nigeria’s Economic Growth." *International Journal of Sustainable Development & Planning* 17, no. 4 (2022).

¹⁰⁸ Samuel Hall (2018). Community profiling of return areas in Nigeria (Executive Summary), for the regional West Africa bureau and the International Organization for Migration.

¹⁰⁹ Arhin-Sam, K. (2019). *The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria*. Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute (ABI).

country's economic growth. The regional migration dynamics are rooted in prevalent patterns of mobility in West Africa dating back to pre-colonial areas and the adoption of the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, which legally enabled these mobility patterns in West Africa. However, national socio-political dynamics led to a politicisation of the protocol and an expulsion of up to 2.5 million migrants from ECOWAS members in 1983. The past decade has seen a shift towards more enabling frameworks to ease mobility to and from the country, moving away from an approach largely focused on immigration control. Significant migration policy reforms were set up to regulate emigration patterns, and there has been a particular focus on leveraging development gains from the country's significant diaspora. In terms of the country's refugee policies, it grants refugees free movement as well as access to national health and education services.¹¹⁰

In contrast to the government's priorities of strengthening the engagement with Nigeria's diaspora for development, the European Union (EU) has been particularly interested in engaging with Nigeria to reduce the irregular migration of Nigerians and others transiting to Europe. Since the so-called 2015 migration crisis in Europe, the country has been significant to the EU's external migration management efforts due to the number of Nigerians migrating to Europe irregularly, its position as an origin and transit country, as well as the political, economic, and social power it has in West Africa. The first reason is evident as, in 2017, the largest group of undocumented migrants from West Africa to Europe consisted of 18,100 Nigerians (arrivals by sea in Italy). Most Nigerians travelling to Europe are from Southern Nigeria, particularly Edo State, despite the battle against the Islamic militancy in north-eastern Nigeria¹¹¹. Nigerians are migrating abroad for a variety of reasons, including governmental neglect, joblessness, a lack of chances and prospects, and, to a lesser extent, violence.¹¹² The current EU action on Nigeria (2021 - 2027) focuses on addressing "root causes", and the largest funding is dedicated to migration governance and management, specifically focused on border management and trafficking of human beings.¹¹³

Regarding migration decision-making among Nigerians, research¹¹⁴ has been conducted using secondary data and large surveys to understand the migration decision-making of youth migrants, but there is a need for a more nuanced understanding aligned with PACES' objectives that can be obtained through in-depth qualitative research. Concerning research on the effect of EU information campaigns to influence migration decisions in Nigeria, a field experimental randomised control trial study (N = 1,500) of an actual European information campaign in Nigeria which aimed at reducing irregular migration conducted by Morgenstern¹¹⁵ concluded that anxiety-triggering campaign messages reduced respondents' intentions to migrate irregularly. However, the author acknowledges the small magnitude of impact and the limited generalizability of the results. Another research by Beber and Scacco¹¹⁶ on these information campaigns argues that existing migration-related information campaigns, which are central to the EU's migration policies, are not effective in their aim of reducing irregular migration to Europe. The research concludes that respondents who have been targeted by the information campaigns were still generally hopeful and especially optimistic about their own chances of migrating irregularly to Europe. The authors highlight that *"campaigns risk becoming misinformation campaigns, particularly when they suggest to potential migrants that they are overestimating the benefits of living in Europe."*¹¹⁷

Finally, Niger's exit (along with that of Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire) from ECOWAS poses serious problems for Nigerian refugees in the region, estimated at over 200,000 in Niger alone. One of these is that

¹¹⁰ Hargrave, K. (2021). Public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants: Nigeria country profile. ODI.

¹¹¹ Where people are more likely to migrate to neighbouring Niger, due to their lower social and economic capital, which does not allow them to envisage a passage to Europe in the short term.

¹¹² Arhin-Sam, K. (2019). The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria. Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute (ABI).

¹¹³ EU's Draft Action Plan for Nigeria (September 2021)

¹¹⁴ Amare, M., Abay, K. A., & Chamberlin, J. (2023). The Role of Spatial Inequalities on Youth Migration Decisions: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 59(6), 911-932.

¹¹⁵ Morgenstern, S. (2023). (How) Do Information Campaigns Influence Migration Decisions? *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 1-13.

¹¹⁶ Beber, B., & Scacco, A. (2022). The Myth of the Misinformed Migrant? Survey Insights from Nigeria's Irregular Migration Epicenter. RWI.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

their legal status may be vulnerable because ECOWAS protection will no longer be effective, which may compromise their access to protection and essential services such as health, education and employment opportunities. ECOWAS has in fact played a fundamental role in assisting refugees, and without this support, the difficulties would be exacerbated for Nigerian refugees in Niger as well as for the populations of northern Nigeria, which is afflicted by violence, insecurity and chronic natural disasters.¹¹⁸

3.4.3. Benin City

3.4.3.1. Context and social transformations

Benin City is the capital and largest city of Edo State in southern Nigeria. Benin City is the fourth largest city in Nigeria according to the 2006 census, after Lagos, Kano and Ibadan, about 40 kilometers north of the Benin River and 320 kilometers by road east of Lagos. Benin City's original people are the Edo (Beninese), who have one of the richest clothing cultures on the African continent and are known for their beadwork, body markings, bracelets, anklets, raffia work and subsistence farming of yams, plantains, and cassava. Benin City is now the center of Nigeria's rubber industry, while oil and palm oil production are also a core industry. Benin City is situated on a branch of the Benin River and is well connected to the rest of the country by the main roads linking Lagos to the Eastern States. The city is also linked by roads to Sapele, Siluko, Okene and Ubiaja. It is served by air and by the ports of Koko and Sapele, on the Niger River delta. Against a backdrop of chronic youth unemployment and lack of prospects, the city is also known for its disenfranchised youth and the migration business from Nigeria to Europe, of which it is the heart.

3.4.3.2. Migration dynamics

International migration in the Edo state dates to the 1980s, when Italians migrated to Benin City to establish businesses. Marriages between these businessmen and local women (mainly from the Bini people) often led to international migration when the spouses moved to Italy. Many of the Nigerian spouses in Italy started engaging in textile, leather, and jewellery industries with links to Edo state and supported other Nigerian women to migrate to Italy for low-skilled labour in the agricultural sector.¹¹⁹ However, with the collapse of the Nigerian economy towards the end of the 1980s and decreased labour demand in Italy, many of the Bini women in Italy turned to prostitution to survive. The women also began recruiting friends and family members in Edo state. Eventually, Benin City has become one of the most trafficked-through destinations in Nigeria.¹²⁰

Recent research¹²¹ has focused on the city's ties to the diaspora and migration, as well as on the significant number of migrants returning from Europe. According to the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), around 60% of Nigerian asylum seekers who arrive in Europe are from Edo state. In recent years, many young people have left the city for Europe because of the lack of prospects. In a difficult economic climate marked by the collapse of the naira, the national currency, foreign currency from Europe is a breath of fresh air for families who

¹¹⁸ Nextier, February 2024, accessible at <https://thenextier.com/fate-of-nigerian-refugees-in-niger/>

¹¹⁹ Osezua, O. (2011). Cross-border sex trade, transnational remittances and changing family structures among Benin people of southern Nigeria. *Gender and Behaviour*, 9(2), 4276-4297. <https://doi.org/10.4314/gab.v9i2.72200>

¹²⁰ Adeniyi, O. (2019). From frying pan to re: How African migrants risk everything in their futile search for a better life in Europe.

¹²¹ Akhigbe, A. O., & Effevottu, E. S. (2023). For the Greater Good: The Economic and Social Impacts of Irregular Migration on Families in Benin City, Nigeria. In M. Tiilikainen, J. Hiitola, A. A. Ismail, & J. Palander (Eds.), *Forced Migration and Separated Families: Everyday Insecurities and Transnational Strategies* (pp. 95-110). Springer International Publishing.

Ohonba, A., & Agbontaen-Eghafona, K. (2019). Transnational Remittances from Human Trafficking and the Changing Socio-Economic Status of Women in Benin City, Edo State Nigeria. *Women's Studies*, 48(5), 531-549. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00497878.2019.1632605>

Moyo, I., Laine, J. P., & Nshimbi, C. C. (2021). *Intra-Africa migrations: Reimagining borders and migration management*. Routledge.

care little about where the money comes from. Research shows that many young migrants from Benin City embody their families' hopes for upward social mobility and are supported financially by their families to migrate.¹²²

The issue of return migration and high emigration rates has particularly led to an increasing engagement of the European Union with authorities in the city, as well as the presence of international actors such as IOM and international NGOs and more international funding to support return migration and sensitisation on migration. There are also various bilateral engagements between Nigeria and European countries, such as the [Nigeria-German Migration Centre](#) with an office in Benin City that provides information on employment opportunities in Nigeria as well as information on regular migration.

The large number of Nigerians who have returned from Benin have become sociopolitical actors in their own right, and Shaidrova¹²³ revealed the complex evolution of the "returnee" identity in the city, which is often performed for donors, researchers and media to enable return migrants to access opportunities unavailable to other residents. Furthermore, despite the EU migration-management policies adopted by Nigerian actors in Benin City and at the national level, their initial purpose of reducing migration to the EU and contributing to development has largely failed.

3.4.3.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

Benin City is the capital of Edo State in southern Nigeria, with a population of Edo State around 1,496,000 in 2015 and a port on the Benin River. The city has become an economic and migration hub in past decades. It is particularly relevant to PACES due to its fast-paced economic growth but also its significant emigration to Europe over the past four decades and current issues of return migration. It provides an interesting context of a secondary city strongly influenced by its diaspora in terms of investment in the local economy, socio-cultural influence (social remittances) but also migratory aspirations, since the real or fantasised successes of the diaspora contribute greatly to fuelling emigration.

Picture 3: The residence of a deceased female smuggler known as 'Mamma Italo'¹²⁴



Source: Etinosa Osayimwen (for The Correspondent)

¹²² Akhigbe, A. O., & Effevottu, E. S. (2023). For the Greater Good: The Economic and Social Impacts of Irregular Migration on Families in Benin City, Nigeria.

¹²³ Shaidrova, M. (2023). Performing a 'Returnee' in Benin City, Nigeria. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 24(2), 503-520.

¹²⁴ This house was paid with the income from smuggling.

3.4.4. Lagos City

3.4.4.1. Context and social transformations

Lagos City presents a compelling case study for PACES, given its intricate migration history and developmental trajectory. Despite being the smallest state in Nigeria by geographical size, it is the most populous city in Africa. This is attributed to its unique composition of internal economic migrants from rural and other urban areas, hosting the largest population of urban refugees, and also attracting migrants from all over the world, making it a cosmopolitan city. Furthermore, Lagos has earned the title of the entertainment capital of Africa, propelling African music, fashion, and culture onto the global stage. The city stands as a valuable subject for examination to comprehend how social transformations within the country have propelled it to achieve its global megacity status. Understanding the factors contributing to its prominence as the most attractive destination for internal migration in Nigeria, despite the adverse effects of overpopulation, is crucial in unravelling the complexities of its dynamic growth.

Lagos City, formerly the capital of Nigeria, held the federal capital status until 1991 when the government relocated the capital to Abuja for its central location. It also served as the capital of Lagos State until 1975, when Ikeja took over.¹²⁵ Extending to Nigeria's border with Benin to the west and reaching small riverine towns on the right, Lagos City's exact size is contested due to overlapping administrative areas with disputed boundaries. The Lagos Municipality encompasses Lagos Island, the former headquarters of the Lagos colony. The Lagos metropolis comprises 16 local government areas, while Lagos State has 20. The Lagos Megacity encompasses Lagos State and villages and towns in four local government areas. Discrepancies in population figures further complicate matters: the National Population Commission estimated Lagos City's population at 9.8 million in 2006, while the Lagos State Government suggested 17.5 million.¹²⁶ Independent studies reported figures around 16 million in the same year, and an estimate for 2021 places it at 12 million. Notably, 40% of Lagos City's population is under 25 years old.

Regardless of these disparities, Lagos is recognized as a megacity,¹²⁷ ranking as the sixth largest globally, with a significantly higher population than other Nigerian cities. Despite being the smallest state in Nigeria, covering 3,345 km², Lagos State is densely populated, with its most populous areas (low-income) having a density of up to 12,000/km². Since 2000, the Lagos urban area has been expanding at an annual rate of 2.6%. The primary ethnic/indigenous group in Lagos City is the Awori, coexisting with pioneer migrant settlers like Brazilians, Edos, Saros, and Tapa, collectively known as Lagosians or Ekos.¹²⁸ In history, Lagos welcomed numerous freed slaves from America, alongside Freetown in Sierra Leone. The influence of these returnees significantly impacted sociocultural aspects; for example, returnees from Brazil in Lagos pioneered a new genre of African music, blending African and Western elements.¹²⁹

From a social standpoint, the UN-HABITAT highlights the challenges posed by the high population density in Lagos City.¹³⁰ Housing is notably overcrowded, with half of the population residing in homes where three people share a room for sleeping. Additionally, there are only 17 health workers (including doctors and nurses) for every 10,000 people in the city. A significant 62% of residents lack access to improved drinking water, while only 33% have access to basic sanitation services. However, from a technological perspective, UN-HABITAT recognises Lagos City as the technological hub of West Africa. In 2021, a minimal 5% of men and 14% of women did not own a mobile phone. Notably, half of the women and three-quarters of the men had used the internet in the past year.¹³¹

¹²⁵ Uduku, Ola, Taibat Lawanson, and Oghenetega Ogodo. "Lagos: City scoping study." Manchester, UK: African Cities Research Consortium, The University of Manchester. Available at: www.african-cities.org (2021).

¹²⁶ Bloch, Robin, Jose Monroy, Sean Fox, and Adegbola Ojo. "Urbanisation and urban expansion in Nigeria." (2015). P. 7.

¹²⁷ Lagos State Government, "About Lagos," November 30, 2023, <https://lagosstate.gov.ng/about-lagos>

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Onwuegbuna, Ikenna Emmanuel. "Trends in Stylistic Developments of Nigerian Highlife Music." P. 5

¹³⁰ UN-Habitat, "Lagos City Profile," August 25, 2021 <https://data.unhabitat.org/documents/GUO-UN-Habitat::lagos-city-profile/explore>

¹³¹ Ibid.

Lagos City's historical growth and expansion are traced back to the colonial era, when it became the seat of government in 1914. Despite the capital moving to Abuja post-independence, Lagos maintained its momentum, emerging as the most developed city with a crucial railway terminus and a seaport that made it a preferred colonial capital. Even today, Lagos retains its status as the commercial capital of Nigeria, boasting vital infrastructure such as a railway connection, a seaport, and the country's busiest international airport. This makes it a strategic hub for traders, offering air, sea, and land routes into and out of the country, including Apapa (sea exit) and Seme, Badagry, and Idi Iroko (land routes). Analysing international trading patterns through Lagos reveals that most international traders are bound for East Asia (53.4%), followed by West Asia (23.7%), with Europe and West Africa accounting for 6.6% and 6.4%, respectively.¹³² The Lagos-South Asia route has particularly witnessed a notable increase in trade mobility.

Lagos City currently stands as the commercial, maritime, and financial nucleus of Nigeria. As the commercial capital of the most populous country in Africa, it boasts economic activities that include manufacturing, higher education, internet-related industries, and fintech.¹³³ Lagos contributes over half of the employment opportunities within Nigeria's manufacturing sector. In 2017, the formal economy of Lagos yielded an output of \$136 billion. However, a significant majority of the working population in the city (5.5 million) is engaged in the informal sector. A pronounced disparity exists between residents in informal settlements and those in other areas of the city. The former grapples with a high unemployment rate of 25%, and some individuals survive on less than 10 euros per month.

The city of Lagos attracts economic migrants from Nigeria and all over the world, earning it the nickname of "Africa's Dubai". Beyond its economic appeal, Lagos has positioned itself as a global city, thanks to its renowned entertainment industry, which has played a key role in raising the profile of African music, particularly Afrobeats, on the world stage¹³⁴. The Lagos entertainment industry has been exported by the diaspora to other parts of the world, notably the United States and the United Kingdom. The impact of the Nigerian diaspora in Peckham-London has earned the area the nickname "Little Lagos" due to the predominant influence of the migrant population. This influence has manifested itself in the introduction and popularisation of Afrobeats music, Ankara fashion and Nollywood films in the host community¹³⁵.

3.4.4.2. Migration dynamics

Lagos City not only serves as a magnet for economic migrants within Nigeria but also emerges as a pivotal location for examining the dynamics of emigration and return migration in the country. Most migrants in Lagos are internal migrants and immigrants from neighbouring countries.¹³⁶ The Lagos State government has implemented specific policies to encourage internal migration, such as the Lagos State Employment Trust Fund, designed to assist migrants in becoming entrepreneurs. However, the influx of internal migrants from rural areas to Lagos City has had adverse effects on agricultural production in rural regions, impacting food availability in the country. The exponential population growth in Lagos has resulted in challenges such as overcrowded schools, insufficient housing and healthcare facilities, increased traffic congestion, limited employment opportunities, and a rise in crime.¹³⁷ Moreover, the city serves as both a source and transit point for air trafficking of migrants to global destinations. The city's robust infrastructure facilitates such irregular migration. As part of efforts to address human trafficking, the EU's Migration Policy in Nigeria includes a specific project, INSigHT, under the Mobility Partnership Facility, which focuses on Lagos as a place of origin and Italy and Sweden as

¹³² Ikwyatum, Godwin O. "Determinants of Traders' Spatial Mobility Behaviour and International Migration from Lagos, Nigeria." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2, no. 9 (2012): 157-173.

¹³³ Uduku, Ola, Taibat Lawanson, and Oghenetega Ogodu. "Lagos: City scoping study."

¹³⁴ De Ferrari, Rosa Hassan, and Anthony Ocepek. "CHAPTER 8 LAGOS Africa's New Dubai?." In *Emerging Global Cities: Origin, Structure, and Significance*, pp. 187-212. Columbia University Press, 2022.

¹³⁵ Alakija, O. B. "Living with difference: Ontological security and identification of second-generation members of the Nigerian diaspora in Peckham, 'Little Lagos', London." *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research* 14, no. 2 (2021): 237-259.

¹³⁶ Arhin-Sam, Kwaku. "The political economy of migration governance in Nigeria." *Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Freiburg* (2019).

¹³⁷ Abdul-Azeez, Ibraheem Adegoke, and Nurain A. Opoola. "An appraisal of the factors influencing rural-urban migration in some selected local government areas of Lagos state Nigeria." *Journal of sustainable Development* 4, no. 3 (2011): 136.

countries of destination.¹³⁸ Additionally, Lagos reportedly hosts many return migrants who are unsuccessful in their pursuits outside the country. These individuals choose to stay in the city, seeking alternative economic opportunities to avoid the stigma of returning home empty-handed. Some returnees became migrant smugglers, leveraging their familiarity with migration routes.¹³⁹

3.4.4.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

Lagos City presents a compelling case study given its intricate migration history and developmental trajectory. Despite being the smallest state in Nigeria by geographical size, it is the most populous city in Africa. This is attributed to its unique composition of internal economic migrants from rural and other urban areas, hosting the largest population of urban refugees, and also attracting migrants from all over the world, making it a cosmopolitan city. Furthermore, Lagos has earned the title of the entertainment capital of Africa, propelling African music, fashion, and culture onto the global stage. The city stands as a valuable subject for examination to comprehend how social transformations within the country have propelled it to achieve global megacity status and, as such, who finds the ability to fulfil life aspirations in this city and who, instead, feels that migration is a better option. Understanding the factors contributing to this city's prominence as the most attractive destination for internal migration in Nigeria, despite the adverse effects of its overpopulation, is crucial to unravel its role in its complex migration system.

3.4.5. Kaduna City

3.4.5.1. Context and social transformations

Kaduna City bears the same name as Kaduna State, to which it is the capital. To distinguish the two, the state is commonly known as 'Kaduna State,' while the city is simply referred to as Kaduna. Situated in the Northwest zone of Nigeria, Kaduna City is positioned 200 kilometres north of Abuja, the nation's capital.¹⁴⁰ While its historical development is largely attributed to colonial influences,¹⁴¹ the government of Kaduna State also acknowledges the city's historical significance rooted in precolonial aspects, notably the existence of the Nok tribe—an early African civilization.¹⁴² The city's history is further shaped by Lord Frederick Lugard's decision to designate it as the capital of the Northern Protectorate in 1912.¹⁴³ This choice was influenced by the sparsely populated indigenous areas, and a strategic consideration based on the experiences of colonial officers in Lagos and Calabar, who had faced hostility from indigenous populations. The name 'Kaduna,' meaning 'many crocodiles' in the Hausa language, originates from the abundance of crocodiles in the river Gurara during this period, rendering the area challenging for habitation. By 1914, following the merger of the southern and northern protectorates, Kaduna city had national importance, being the most populous area in Nigeria, and attracting a diverse migrant population. Among them were colonial officers and their families, both skilled and unskilled workers from the Southern Protectorate, and merchants and labourers primarily from the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri ethnic groups, migrating from different parts of the northern protectorate. Furthermore, Kaduna City's historical significance extends to its pivotal role in Nigeria's political history. It served as the birthplace of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the political party that formed the first post-independence government in Nigeria.¹⁴⁴ In this way, Kaduna stands as not only a geographical and demographic hub but also a key player in the shaping of Nigeria's historical and political landscape.

¹³⁸ Council of the European Union, "Operationalization of the Pact - Action plans for strengthening comprehensive migration partnerships with priority countries of origin and transit Draft Action Plan : Nigeria," 20 September 2021, <https://www.statewatch.org/media/2898/eu-council-migration-action-plan-nigeria-11951-21.pdf>

¹³⁹ SOM Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants, "Migrant Smuggling from Nigeria," n.d. <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/edc15a9dd4cf411c8d8edd061c6c9460>

¹⁴⁰ CIRDDOC, "Kaduna State." June 2016. https://cirddoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Kaduna_State.pdf

¹⁴¹ Bununu, Y. A., Ludin, A. N. M., and Hosni, N. (2015). "City profile: Kaduna." *Cities* 49: 53

¹⁴² Kaduna State Government, "About: Kaduna State" <https://kds.gov.ng/about-kaduna/>

¹⁴³ Bununu, Y. A., Ludin, A. N. M., and Hosni, N. "City profile: Kaduna."

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

There exists a lack of consensus on the size and population of Kaduna,¹⁴⁵ mirroring similar uncertainties found in other Nigerian cities, such as Lagos.¹⁴⁶ Estimates vary, with some sources suggesting around 1.2 million people,¹⁴⁷ while others indicate 1.8 million.¹⁴⁸ A 2020 study even posited a population exceeding 3 million in 2015.¹⁴⁹ Despite these disparities, Kaduna is consistently reported as the fifth most populous and among the largest in Nigeria, trailing behind Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, and Abuja. Unlike the colonial era, where population growth was mainly driven by migration, recent exponential growth is primarily attributed to internal births within the city.¹⁵⁰ The state's total fertility rate has been declining and stood at 4.1 in 2013, lower than the national rate of 5.5.¹⁵¹ Notably, the youth population (15-34 years) in 2010 accounted for 35% of the total population,¹⁵² deviating from the national trend where two-thirds of the population falls within this age range. A striking demographic aspect in Kaduna is the ethnic and religious diversity. The state is characterized by various ethnic communities, cultures, and religions, with the predominantly Muslim hausa forming the majority in the northern part. In contrast, other mainly Christian ethnic groups occupy the southern part.¹⁵³ These diverse dynamics, particularly in religious identities, have played a crucial role in shaping the city's political landscape over the past two decades.

The political and social dynamics of Kaduna City are intricately connected, with a noteworthy feature being the influence of the predominant Hausa community and the marginalization of the Christian minority. While there is a close numerical balance, with the Hausa Muslim population constituting 50.4% and the Christians 49.7%¹⁵⁴, the political landscape of Kaduna State and City is significantly influenced by the dominance of the Hausa population, as traditional leaders wield considerable influence over political decisions. This influence is particularly evident in the traditional governance structures, with the leaders of the Hausa people holding sway, while ethnic communities in the south, characterized by chiefdoms, maintain distinct structures differing from the Emirate councils of the Hausa.¹⁵⁵ Kaduna City is divided into four local governments: Kaduna North, Chikun, Kaduna South, and Igabi.¹⁵⁶ These political divisions contribute to the complex socio-political fabric of the city, reflecting both historical and contemporary influences.

Religious and ethnic tensions are particularly evident in clashes that extend throughout the state. These conflicts have fostered a sense of marginalization among Christians in the south, who experience disparities in amenities and are perceived to have limited rights and influence due to their perceived non-indigenous status.¹⁵⁷ Another contributing factor may be the historical concentration of development in the northern region, leading to fewer amenities in the south. In the 2000s, ethnic clashes prompted many to relocate to the sparsely inhabited south, settling in these underdeveloped areas. This migration exacerbated disparities in amenities between the north and south. Abdussalam notes an increase in informal settlements, particularly in the southern part of the city. Bununu, Ladin and Hosni,¹⁵⁸ further explain that while the northern part underwent proper urban planning during the colonial era, the south, experiencing forced migration due to clashes, lacked such planning, resulting in haphazard expansion. This complex interplay of historical development, forced migration, and informal settlements contributes to the social challenges experienced in Kaduna City.

¹⁴⁵ Bununu, Y. A., Ludin, A. N. M., and Hosni, N. "City profile: Kaduna."

¹⁴⁶ Bloch, Robin, Jose Monroy, Sean Fox, and Adegbola Ojo. "Urbanisation and urban expansion in Nigeria." P. 7.

¹⁴⁷ Bununu, Y. A., Ludin, A. N. M., and Hosni, N. "City profile: Kaduna."; Nurhi 2, "Kaduna State." <https://nurhi.org/en/nurhi-kaduna/>

¹⁴⁸ Millenium Cities Initiative Earth Institute and Columbia University. (n.d). "Kaduna, Nigeria." <http://mci.ei.columbia.edu/millennium-cities/kaduna-nigeria/>

¹⁴⁹ Abdussalam, A. F. (2020). "Climate change and health vulnerability in informal urban settlements of Kaduna Metropolis." *Science World Journal* 15.3: 127-132.

¹⁵⁰ Bununu, Y. A., Ludin, A. N. M., and Hosni, N. "City profile: Kaduna." p. 57

¹⁵¹ Nurhi 2, "Kaduna State."

¹⁵² Bununu, Y. A., Ludin, A. N. M., and Hosni, N. "City profile: Kaduna." p. 57

¹⁵³ Nurhi 2. "Kaduna State."

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Abdussalam, A. F. "Climate change and health vulnerability in informal urban settlements of Kaduna Metropolis."

¹⁵⁷ Bununu, Y. A., Ludin, A. N. M., and Hosni, N. "City profile: Kaduna." 60

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

Assessing the economic profile of Kaduna City proves challenging due to a lack of transparency from the state government,¹⁵⁹ earning Kaduna State a low rating of 11 out of 100 on the State Budget Transparency Index. Public participation in budget formulation is minimal, and budgetary documents are not published on the state website. Despite these challenges, the Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics reported key economic drivers in 2020, including trade, manufacturing (particularly textiles, historically pivotal for the state nationally), education, and real estate.¹⁶⁰ Agriculture, telecommunications, and trade were the primary growth drivers in the 2019 report. Agriculture remains the most lucrative activity, contributing approximately 43% to the nominal GDP, while various services contribute to 48.67%. Industries, including textiles, hold national significance but contribute only 8.68% to the nominal GDP. This aligns with studies suggesting a decline in Kaduna City's economic base.¹⁶¹ From a state perspective, the administration prioritizes agriculture in developmental policies, offering incentives like access to finances (loans), markets (cooperatives), and input access to address state needs such as food security, job creation, and poverty reduction.

The economic shifts in Kaduna City over the past two decades are closely tied to social and political dynamics, resulting in distinct inequalities.¹⁶² Historically reliant on the industrial sector as its economic foundation, Kaduna City has faced a decline since the 1980s, leading to significant youth unemployment. This unemployment has contributed to ethno-religious conflicts, such as the 2011 post-election violence and the 'Miss World' and 'Sharia' riots in the 2000s, often rooted in youth disenfranchisement by the elite.¹⁶³ Young men, experiencing financial insecurity, may turn to violence as a means of asserting masculinity. Religious extremism, notably incidents by Boko Haram targeting churches in the south, has further impacted Kaduna City's economic landscape. Inefficient land management and urban planning in the southern part have resulted in urban sprawl, diminishing agricultural land, causing pollution and traffic congestion, and straining amenities, infrastructure, and services. These challenges collectively influence Kaduna City's economic profile.

Kaduna City's infrastructural and technological appeal is underscored by significant developments that not only connect it to the capital, Abuja, but also link rural areas along the connecting network.¹⁶⁴ The Kaduna-Abuja highway, a prominent example, has spurred growth, particularly in the southern region, extending to places like Kakau. Another crucial road is the Kachia road to the south-east. The most developed sector lies in the western area, marked by the presence of the Kano-Lagos railway. Linear settlements along this railway characterize the city, with subsequent expansion moving eastward, notably after the creation of the Western Bypass bridges. These bridges not only grant access to areas previously isolated by the river Kaduna but also link underdeveloped parts of the city with the developed north, enhancing overall connectivity and development.

The security situation in Kaduna has significantly impeded Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).¹⁶⁵ In the first quarter of 2022, Kaduna state reported zero foreign investment. However, a conflicting report by Enyiocha suggested that the state had attracted a total of \$4.3 billion in investments over the six years preceding 2022, as per government sources.¹⁶⁶ Notably, the report lacked detailed financial breakdowns for each of the six years, albeit it emphasized that most investments were directed towards the agricultural sector.

3.4.5.2. Migration dynamics

Migration patterns in Kaduna encompass rural to urban migration, forced displacement due to conflict, transit migration due to its strategic location in northern Nigeria, and urban-urban migration between Abuja and Kaduna. Proximity to Abuja makes Kaduna a preferred residence for civil servants, driven by factors such as lower rental costs, quality amenities, and a cosmopolitan environment. Forced displacement is a significant

¹⁵⁹ CIRDDOC, "Kaduna State."

¹⁶⁰ Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics. (2021). "Kaduna State Gross Domestic Product Report." <https://kdbns.ng/app/uploads/2018/02/FINAL-KDGP-REPORT-.pdf> p.2

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 60.

¹⁶⁵ Ikpoto E. "Kaduna, Rivers, 30 others attract zero foreign investments in Q1." <https://punchng.com/kaduna-rivers-30-others-attract-zero-foreign-investments-in-q1/>

¹⁶⁶ Enyiocha C., (2022). "Kaduna Investment Hits \$4.3bn In 2022 Despite Insecurity - KADIPA." <https://www.channelstv.com/2022/10/11/kaduna-investment-hits-4-3bn-in-2022-despite-insecurity-kadipa/>

aspect, with Kaduna becoming a centre for ethno-religious extremism and violence, rivalling Borno State, where Boko Haram originated.¹⁶⁷ Abductions by criminal gangs and targeted ethnic cleansing, particularly against Christians, have led to forced migration, concentrating this demographic in the southern part of the city. Post-election violence has been recurrent, and in 2022, the IOM reported approximately 70,000 internally displaced persons in Kaduna. Climate change-induced migration is evident, with people moving to Kaduna City as agriculture becomes unviable in the broader state. The city serves as a transit hub for irregular migration, especially from the north-western region. EU policies on Nigeria mention Kaduna State's significance in promoting food security and its potential as a hub for digital and innovation ecosystems in the country. Kaduna City's migration profile, however, is not extensively addressed in EU policies.

3.4.5.3. Why is this an interesting case study for PACES?

Kaduna provides a compelling case study due to its distinctive demographics and the consequential impact on migration trends within Nigeria. The city, exemplifying a diverse cosmopolitan centre, faces heightened ethno-religious conflicts and forced migration, which has not been addressed in international policies, especially of the European Union. This oversight offers a unique opportunity to explore the city's challenges and potential interventions that may have been overlooked in the formulation of migration policies globally. Additionally, Kaduna's sustained growth, despite economic decline, and the disenfranchisement of a significant portion of its population, including Christian and ethnic minorities, adds complexity to its dynamics. Investigating these aspects provides insights into the forces driving the city's growth beyond traditional economic indicators. Kaduna, therefore, serves as an intriguing case study for understanding the intricate dynamics of urban expansion in the face of economic challenges and social disparities.

¹⁶⁷ Campbell, J. and Council of Foreign Relations. (2021). "Ethnic and Religious Violence Worsen in Kaduna." <https://www.cfr.org/blog/ethnic-and-religious-violence-worsen-kaduna>

4. Concluding assessment

4.1. Synoptic table (for the 9 surveyed secondary cities)

Color code

Very poor	Poor	Limited	Nearly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Good
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	Mostaganem	Sétif	Algiers	Adama	Kebribeyah	Batu (Ziway)	Benin City	Lagos City	Kaduna
Pop size (estimates)	170,000	300,000	3,300,000	350,000	15,000	50,000	1,200,000	22,000,000	1,100,000
Urban planning	Poor planning, but in progress	Improvements, new developments	Speculative, poor planning	Potential (SEZ)	Encampment, informality	Fragmented, informal	Fragmented, informal	Metropolis, speculative, limited planning	Potential, but mainly fragmented
Transport	Very well connected (port, new highway)	Very well connected, improvements	Very well connected (capital city)	Improvements (infrastructures), Addis highway	Camp, poorly connected (Jigjiga)	On the road Addis-Nairobi	Well connected (highway, airport)	Very well connected but overcrowded	Very well connected (hub)
Public services	Limited but structured	Limited but structured	Limited, uneven but structured	Poor and uneven quality	Ad hoc, poor, with growing population	Poor and uneven quality	Limited absorption capacity	Difficult absorption of the huge needs	Limited absorption capacity
Socio-economic conditions	Agricultural, maritime, industrial and tourist zones (ZET)	Economic development, construction, tourism, informality	Oil and gas (Sonelgaz, Sonatrach) services, informality	Special Economic Zone, agriculture, manufacture	Limited protection, lack of schools, unemployment, civil documents	Agriculture, horticulture, tourism (Shalla)	Rubber industry, oil and palm oil production	Highest HDI, inequalities	Ongoing development
Local governance, corruption	High level reported	High level reported	Endemic, structural	High level reported	Limited (assistance)	High level reported	Major issue	Endemic	Major issue
External development initiatives	Limited investments	Limited investments	Delayed investments	Limited, Special Economic Zone	CRRF related integration programmes	WB-funded projects	Limited and for traditional sectors only	Massive investments	Very Limited
Violence and insecurity	Security, risks of trafficking	Security, risks of trafficking	Criminality, trafficking	Risks of ethnic violence	Good level of security	Risks of ethnic violence	Worsening security	Criminality and insecurity	Smuggling
Climate-induced stress	Reduced biodiversity, salinisation	Worsening arid, semi-arid climate	High impact, floods, rising °C, droughts	Worsening droughts	Worsening droughts	Worsening droughts	Major concern (floods)	Major concern (floods, sea level rise, storm)	Major concern (floods)
New development initiatives	Mainly related to tourism and agriculture (limited)	Mainly related to tourism and agriculture (limited)	Rouïba (1957) expanding, international companies	Integration activities (SDC)	Development projects, often on hold (conflict)	Development projects, often on hold (conflict)	Very limited	Multiple development projects, Lekki	Very limited, given the potential

Immigration	Mixed, rural, Sub-Saharan Africans and Syrians	Rural, Sub-Saharan Africans	Rural, Sub-Saharan Africans	Mainly IDPs, youth from rural areas	Somali refugees, IDPs, pastoralist communities	IDPs & internal migration (economic drivers)	Mainly returnees, youth from rural areas and IDPs	Rural migrants, IDPs + Togolese, Beninese, Ghanaian, Lebanese and Indian migrants	Mainly youth from rural areas, transit, and IDPs
Emigration	High youth migration (<i>harraga</i>)	High youth migration (<i>harraga</i>)	High youth migration (<i>harraga</i>)	Significant youth migration	Interactions with the Somali region and Somalia	Gulf Countries (women)	50% of Nigerian immigrants in Europe from Benin City	Relatively limited, metropolis of transit and settlement	Mainly to Europe (less than BC though)

4.2. Concluding remarks on the final selection of countries, secondary cities and “urban communities”

While the selection of countries was made primarily to favour those with distinct characteristics, in terms of migration history and profile, but also in geographical, socio-economic, linguistic, cultural, political, and societal terms, it was also based on the knowledge and expertise of the research team. The aim was to benefit from a shared base of contextual knowledge - hence *the choice of Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria, which offer guarantees in terms of existing networks, contacts, understanding of migration dynamics and intelligence of recent developments* (laws and regulations, policy evolutions, trends, routes, drivers, gender composition, demographics, etc.).

The second stage of selection, using scoping reports on each country, is based more on objective criteria and the selection of diverse secondary cities with peculiar social change and a varied typology of migration situations. The approach described in the introduction using moral region, situation and network is central here: the challenge in selecting communities is to offer points of view on communities that are both different and complementary. On the basis of this desk review and the summary presented in table (4.1), the conclusion of the present study is to favour, within the framework of PACES WP4, the following six cities: *Mostaganem (Algeria), Sétif (Algeria), Kebribeyeh (Ethiopia), Adama (Ethiopia), Benin City (Nigeria), Lagos (Nigeria)*. It is expected that these cities offer sufficient diversity (in terms of types of moral region, situations and mobility networks) to provide a critical perspective on the issue of decision-making in migration matters - whether institutional (policy-making) or individual (decision-making).

As previously stated, specific communities/neighbourhoods will be identified in each of the selected cities to capture the essence of place as well as the perceptions and expectations of local residents. In the case of Lagos, for example, which is a metropolis of 23 million inhabitants, *the next stage of the research will consist of narrowing down our field of investigation and selecting specific communities on a more human scale*: for example, Festac, where large communities of displaced people have recently settled, or Eleko, which is more residential, with large communities of migrants from neighbouring African countries, etc. Thus, during the inception phase the research team will identify, in each of the six selected cities, a suitable urban community where we will conduct in-depth qualitative interviews and labs-in-the-field experiments (the latter only in Ethiopia and Nigeria).

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Annex

Table A1. General characteristics and indicators for Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria¹⁶⁸

	Algeria	Ethiopia	Nigeria
Population (2023) ¹⁶⁹	45.6 million	126 million	223 million
Fertility rates	2.8 children per woman in 2022. Interesting trend as fertility had decreased to 2.4 in early 2002, then increased back to 3.05 in 2016 and back to 2.8 in 2022. The shifts in fertility seem to be associated with later age of marriage and higher education for women.	4.1 children per woman in 2022, steady decline from 7 children per woman in 1995. Wanted fertility rate in 2016 (last year data is available for Ethiopia) was 3.6, when actual fertility was 4.4 in 2016. This suggests probable continuing fertility decrease.	5.2 children per woman in 2022, slow decline since the 1970s, a plateau in the 2000s and renewed slow decrease since 2011. In 2018, when actual fertility was 5.4, wanted fertility was 4.8. This suggests probable continuing fertility decrease.
Ethnic groups	Arab and Berber	More than 10 ethnic groups, the most populous being Oromo, Amhara, Somali, Tigray, Sidama, Guragie, Welaita, Afar, Silte and Kefficho.	More than 8 ethnic groups, the most populous being Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Tiv, Kanuri/Berberi, Ibibio and Ijaw/Izon.
Levels of secondary+ education	In 2019, 24.1% of the population 25+ had completed at least secondary education, with a slightly higher percentage among women (24.8%) than among men (23.3%). In 2018, 81% of the population aged 15 and above was literate, with literacy higher among man than women.	In 2019, only 4.5% of the population 25+ had completed at least secondary education, with a lower percentage among women (3.4%) than among men (5.7%). In 2017, 51% of the population aged 15 and above was literate, with higher literacy among men than women.	In 2021, 43.9% of the population 25+ had completed at least secondary education, with a lower percentage among women (36.6%) than among men (51.9%). In 2018, 62% of the population aged 15 and above was literate, with higher literacy among men than women.
GDP per capita	13,226\$ (current international) per capita, PPP, in 2022, increase from 6,974\$ in 1990. Decrease in people living below 50 percent of median income from 1990s to 2011, when 6.3% of population lived below 50 percent of median income.	2,812\$ (current international) per capita, PPP, in 2022, increase from 414\$ in 1990. After decreasing in the 1990s and early 2000s, the people living below 50 percent of median income have increased again to 12.4% in 2015.	5,431\$ (current international) per capita, PPP, in 2021, steady increase from 2,080\$ in 1991. People living below 50 percent of median income have steadily declined from the 22.7% in 1992 to 13,2% in 2018.
Personal remittances	Personal remittances were about 1000 million in 2021, about 1% of the country's GDP. In the 1990s it reached up to 3.2% of GDP, but it has decreased since the mid-2000s.	Personal remittances are comparable to those of Algeria with a peak in 2014 with 1,600 millions (about 3% of GDP). In 2022 remittances were only 0.4% of GDP at about 250 million.	Personal remittances are very large in absolute numbers, reaching a peak of 7.1% of GDP in 2005, while today it has decreased to 4.2% of GDP.
Economic structure (restructuring)	The economy has been dominated by manufacturing and services sectors, with services gaining over 38% of GDP in 2022, and agriculture 11% of GDP.	The economy has been dominated by agriculture (37% of GDP in 2022) and despite efforts to promote manufacturing, this sector was responsible for only just over 4% of	The economy has remained stable with a large contribution of the services sector (44% of GDP in 2022), followed by manufacturing (23.6%) and agriculture (13.5%).

¹⁶⁸ The data in this table are from the World Bank, primarily the World Development Indicators, available at <https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx>, accessed on January 8-10, 2024.

¹⁶⁹ The population data comes from the World Bank, Health Nutrition and Population Statistics: Population estimates and projections, available at <https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx>, accessed on January 10, 2024.

	In 2022: Agriculture 11.5% of GDP Services 38.5% of GDP Manufacturing 34.8% of GDP	GDP in 2022. On the other hand, the services sector has rapidly grown to generate 36.5% of GDP (2022). In 2022: Agriculture 37.6% of GDP Services 36.5% of GDP Manufacturing 4.2% of GDP	The trend since the 1980s shows a gradual loss of the manufacturing sector and a gain in agriculture. This is reflected in figures that show that the amount of cropland (land dedicated to long-term farming) has increased from about 3.5% in 1973 to 7.2% of land area in 2021. In 2022: Agriculture 23.6% of GDP Services 44% of GDP Manufacturing 13.5% of GDP
Natural resources	Rents from natural resources contribute 22.5% to the GDP and consist of both natural gas and oil. This percentage has been wavering over the years and appears to be on the decline. Algeria is a massive exporter of natural gas to Europe	While in the past rents from natural resources were an important part of GDP (36% in 2003), this has rapidly declined to 5.8% in 2021. The natural resources are gold, platinum, copper, natural gas and hydropower.	Major oil producer, but rents from natural resources, mainly oil, have been declining since the 1990s. While in 1994, 23.8% of GDP came from natural resources, in 2021 the figure had dropped to 8.5% of GDP.
Labor force participation	The labor force participation rate of males (% of male population aged 15+) has been rapidly declining since the 1990s, when it peaked at 77.1% (1994-5) to just under 64% in 2022. The labor force participation of women, on the other hand, has been slowly but steadily increasing from 10.8% in 1990 to 16.3% in 2022.	The labor force participation rate of males (% of male population aged 15+) has been high at 89.5% (1990) but decreasing to 86.1% in 2022. The labor force participation of women was at 66.6% in 1990 increasing to 75% in 2022. Ethiopia has stunningly high labor participation rates for both men and women.	For men, the trend in labor force participation has been rather stable with small fluctuation, starting with 64.9% in 1990 to 65% in 2022. Female participation in the labor force is high but slightly declining, going from 56.4% in 1990 to 52% in 2022.
Infrastructural development	Since 2006, trade and transport-related infrastructure has been between 2 and 2.5 (1=low and 5=high).	Since 2006, trade and transport-related infrastructure has been between 1.7 (2010) and 2.1 (2014) (1=low and 5=high).	Since 2006, trade and transport-related infrastructure has been between 2.23 (2007) and 2.56 (2018) and 2.4 in 2022 (1=low and 5=high).
Health services	735\$ health expenditure per person (current international, PPP) in 2020 1.9 beds for 1000 people in 2015 1.5 nurses and midwives per 1000 people in 2018 1.7 physicians per 1000 people in 2018 Free national healthcare since 1975, overall good sanitation.	82\$ health expenditure per person (current international, PPP) in 2020 0.33 beds for 1000 people in 2016 0.77 nurses and midwives per 1000 in 2020 0.1 physician per 1000 people in 2020	173\$ health expenditure per person (current international, PPP) in 2020 No data on hospital beds since 2004, when it was 0,4 beds for 1000 people 1.56 nurses and midwives per 1000 in 2021 0.3 physician per 1000 people in 2021
Public services	Data show that social insurance programs did not cover anybody over the 1973-2021 period. However, this is likely due to lack of data.	In 2015, 2.3% of the population was covered by social insurance programs, but this percentage decreased to 1.25% in 2018.	Since 2012, the percentage of people covered by social insurance programs has increased from 1.24% in 2012, to 2.7% in 2015, and 3.3% in 2018.
Governance and corruption	In the 1990s, Algeria was placed 10-11 in the ranking of rule of law (whereby 0 is absence and 100 is full rule of law). Its ranking	In 2001, Ethiopia was placed 21 in the ranking of rule of law (whereby 0 is absence and 100 is full rule of law). Its ranking has steadily	In 2000, Nigeria was placed 13 in the ranking of rule of law (whereby 0 is absence and 100 is full rule of law). Its ranking increased just

	<p>increased in the 2000s reaching 34 in 2004 and 22 in 2022. Voice and accountability indicator has shown an increase in ranking since the from 14,5 in 1996 to 21.7 in 2021. Corruption increased from 1996 to 2000 but then it has been wavering with Algeria being at 18.9 ranking in 2008 to decrease again to 14.6 in 2022. Corruption is rather high (100 is no corruption). Bribery incidence was last recorded in 2007 with 18.8% of firm indicating bribe payment request.</p>	<p>increased, reaching 38 in 2020 and then back down to 26 in 2022. Voice and accountability have remained rather stable since the 1990s with an increase from 16.5 in 1996 to 20.8 in 2022. Corruption is rather high with Ethiopia ranked 8.6 in 1996 but since then there have been some improvements and 36.8 was reached in 2022 (100 is no corruption). Bribery incidents have increased in Ethiopia from 6.5% of firms experiencing it in 2011 and 26.8% in 2015.</p>	<p>under 21 in 2021, ending at just under 20 in 2022. Voice and accountability have increased since the 1990s going from 7 in 1996 to 32.4 in 2022. Corruption have been continuously high, with Nigeria being ranked 8.6 in 1996 and at 14.6 in 2022 (100 is no corruption). Bribery incidents were at 40% of firms experiencing it in 2007 and 28.9% in 2014.</p>
Insecurity	<p>Homicides have remained low with 1.5 homicides per 100,000. Probability of dying among youth ages 20-24 years (per 1,000): 3, fairly stable since 1990s. Political instability and absence of violence has improved since the 1990s when it ranked 10 (1998) to 32 in 2022 (0 is high instability and 100 high stability).</p>	<p>In Ethiopia in 2012 there were 8.6 homicides per 100,000 people. Probability of dying among youth ages 20-24 years (per 1,000): 8.5, rapid decrease from 38.8 in 1991. Political instability and absence of violence were improving in the late 1990s (42 in 1998) but it decreased ranking to 8 in 2022.</p>	<p>In Nigeria, in 2016 there were 33.6 homicides per 100,000 people; this number decreased to 21.7 in 2019. Probability of dying among youth ages 20-24 years (per 1,000): 10.2, stading decrease from 20.6 in 1990. Political instability and absence of violence were at 43 in 1998, but have been steadily declining since then reaching 9.9 in 2022.</p>
Colonization	<p>France, 1830-1962, 1 million French people lived in Algeria before independence The Algerian population was uprooted during colonization as land was taken by French colons displacing local population</p>	N/A	UK, 1850s-1960
Independence	War 1954-1962	N/A	Relatively peaceful transition
Current political situation	Relatively stable	Relatively stable, with areas of tension	Relatively stable, with some areas of tension, e.g. Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies (1990s-present)
Internal displacement	<p>In the 2007-2022 period, Algeria had just under 73,000 people displaced because of disasters and 2,500 displaced by conflict and violence in 2016.</p>	<p>Since 2009, Ethiopia has had a growing number of people registered as displaced by conflict and violence, reaching 3.85 million in 2022, with 873,000 people displaces because of disasters in 2022.</p>	<p>In Nigeria, there was a peak of 3.89 million people displaced by disaster in 2012 and that figure decreased until 2022 when it measured 2.43 million displaced people. The figures of internally displaced people because of conflict and violence have been high since 2013, when they were 3.3 million and in 2022 they reached 3.64 million.</p>
Refugee population	<p>In 1975, there were 21,000 registered refugees from Algeria. This figure increased rapidly to 167,000 in 1981 and reached over 219,000 per year in 1992-1994. Since then the number of refugees has been decreasing with 77,000 refugees registered in 2021.</p>	<p>Since 1968, Ethiopia has always had registered refugees with 20,000 in 1968, a peak of 773,764 in 1990, a decline leading to a low 83,573 in 2008 and since then a rapid increase with 903,226 refugees in 2018. In 2022, UNHCR registered 79,598 Ethiopian refugees.</p>	<p>Since 1976, the number of Nigerian refugees has been low, with a small peak in 1980-1981 when 100,000 and 89,570 refugees were registered respectively. Numbers remained very low until 2018, when 34,727 refugees registered. Since then, yearly figures have increased</p>

			with a total of 91,275 Nigerian refugees registered in 2022.
Net migration	Algeria lost people to migration (lowest point in 1965 with -122,843) until 1975, when net migration was positive with 338,533 more arrivals, a situation that repeated itself in 1976. Net migration remained positive until 1987, when Algeria lost 18,564 people. Net migration has been negative, but around -20,000 per year until 2005 when Algeria lost over 111,000, but since then net migration has been negative but stable with the same population losses each year (-18,797 in 2021).	Ethiopia has positive net migration until 1971, when it lost 14,508 people. The coming year would bring strong emigration with net migration at -903,529 in 1980. However, in 1981 net migration became positive again with a peak in 1991 with 859,739. Net migration remained positive until 2000 when it became negative again. It has been wavering between positive and negative since the 2000s, and in 2021 net migration was -1,391.	Nigeria has primarily experienced positive net migration, with a small peak in 1980 when net migration was 184,467. Net migration has been negative only in the last decade with -145,917 in 2015. Net migration has been wavering between positive and negative since then.