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Journal articles
The Stackelberg equilibrium as a consistent conjectural equilibrium
Abstract : We consider a static game with conjectural variations where some firms make conjectures while others do not. Two propositions are proved. We first show that there exists a continuum of conjectural variations such that the conjectural equilibrium locally coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium (Proposition 1). Second, we define the conditions under which a conjectural equilibrium is a locally consistent equilibrium (i.e. such that conjectures are fulfilled). The concept
of (local) consistency is restricted to firms making conjectures. Two conditions on consistency are featured: consistency within a cohort and consistency among cohorts. The Stackelberg equilibrium fulfills only the latter condition (Proposition 2). An example is provided.
Keywords :
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Cited literature [14 references]
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01228003
Contributor : Valerie Przedwoj <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 21, 2017 - 10:15:52 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 2, 2021 - 10:05:25 AM
Contributor : Valerie Przedwoj <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 21, 2017 - 10:15:52 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 2, 2021 - 10:05:25 AM
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